The FCO was timid and inconsistent in the discussions which led to the decision to award to Sri Lanka the right to host the 2013 CHOGM. It should have taken a more robust approach since, in the light of continuing human rights abuses in the country. In 2009 the FCO objected to Sri Lanka hosting the 2011 CHOGM but did not obstruct a proposal that it might do so in 2013, nor did it insist that Sri Lanka's right to host in 2013 should be conditional on improvements in human rights. The Committee took evidence from the BBC World Service on jamming and denial of access to its broadcast and internet services, particularly in Iran and China. The Committee calls on the BBC to recognise in future funding plans the need to provide the resources necessary to afford protection. All providers of satellite services have a commercial interest in defeating jamming. The report considers Government policy on human rights in Burma and concludes that the EU's decision to lift economic sanctions in April 2013 was the right one, given the remarkable progress made in Burma. But it warns that the UK should be prepared to advocate re-imposition of sanctions if undertakings on human rights are not followed through. The Government should also urge condemnation of those responsible for violence in Rakhine State in 2012. The Committee does not support suggestions that the 2014 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games should be boycotted in protest against human rights abuses in Russia
This reference book is primarily a procedural work which examines the many forms, customs, and practices which have been developed and established for the House of Commons since Confederation in 1867. It provides a distinctive Canadian perspective in describing procedure in the House up to the end of the first session of the 36th Parliament in Sept. 1999. The material is presented with full commentary on the historical circumstances which have shaped the current approach to parliamentary business. Key Speaker's rulings and statements are also documented and the considerable body of practice, interpretation, and precedents unique to the Canadian House of Commons is amply illustrated. Chapters of the book cover the following: parliamentary institutions; parliaments and ministries; privileges and immunities; the House and its Members; parliamentary procedure; the physical & administrative setting; the Speaker & other presiding officers; the parliamentary cycle; sittings of the House; the daily program; oral & written questions; the process of debate; rules of order & decorum; the curtailment of debate; special debates; the legislative process; delegated legislation; financial procedures; committees of the whole House; committees; private Members' business; public petitions; private bills practice; and the parliamentary record. Includes index.
Eighteen months since the Arab Spring began, there has been extraordinary progress in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Yet many challenges still lie ahead, not least the need to support and reform the economies of these Arab Spring states. In 2011, the G8 Deauville Partnership identified $38 billion of funding available to support reform. The UK must use its leadership in the EU and G8 to ensure that we deliver on our promises. The Government needs to learn lessons from its experience in anticipating and handling the Arab Spring. Questions arose about the FCO's staffing levels, linguistic expertise and information gathering in the Middle East and North Africa region, although diplomats understood well the long-term problems in the region. The report welcomes the Government's recent moves to establish contacts with Islamist parties in the region and calls for deeper engagement to demonstrate at an early stage the UK's support and assistance for democratically elected leaders who respect human rights and democratic reforms. The BBC's Arabic Service further highlighted the importance of the BBC World Service in providing an independent news service and enhancing the UK's standing in the region. The Committee welcomes the Government's decision to reverse planned cuts to the Arabic Service last year, expresses concerns that cuts made elsewhere in the World Service will prove detrimental to the national interest, and urges that there be a sustained investment in the World Service
In this report, published on the last day that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has funding responsibility for the World Service, the Foreign Affairs Committee says that it has "clear differences" with the BBC on new arrangements for governance of the World Service. It specifically has reservations about the move to licence fee funding for the World Service and what that would mean for the World Service's budget, and its ability to be heard amongst all the other competing voices within the BBC. The Committee regrets that the World Service now has no direct voice on either the BBC Executive Board or the Management Board, and it says that it "remains to be seen" whether representation of the World Service's interests at Board level by the Director of News and Current Affairs will indeed safeguard the distinct nature of the World Service. The Committee welcomes the assurance given in evidence by James Harding, the BBC's Director of News and Current Affairs, that the £245 million budget for the World Service in 2014-15 will be used as a baseline for the following two years. But what is really needed is longer-term protection at institutional level, and we continue to be concerned about the absence of a direct voice for the World Service on either the BBC's Executive Board or the Management Board
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain remain key partners for the UK but relations are complicated by the differences between our societies and the pressing need for reform in the Gulf. Historic warm relations between the UK government and the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are not mirrored in public opinion in Saudi Arabia and the UK, and the UK's reputation in Bahrain has also suffered since 2011. The Government must make its public profile and reputation a more central part of its work in the Gulf, consider how it can best support much-needed economic and political reforms, and how it can explain its policies and point to specific achievements when speaking to the public at home and in the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia, the Government must convert its promising steps so far in providing assistance on legal and judicial reform into solid and reportable programmes. In Bahrain, it must work to secure access for NGOs and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, and press more strongly for swifter implementation of reforms. Saudi Arabia's role as a key buyer for the UK defence industry is controversial but the report finds little to suggest that ending defence sales from the UK would have any positive effect. The aggressive way in which the Bahraini security forces handled events in 2011 has deeply damaged Bahrain's reputation. The recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) were sensible and the Bahraini government's failure fully to implement them is inexplicable.
This publication contains the Standing Orders of the House of Lords which set out information on the procedure and working of the House, under a range of headings including: Lords and the manner of their introduction; excepted hereditary peers; the Speaker; general observances; debates; arrangement of business; bills; divisions; committees; parliamentary papers; public petitions; privilege; making or suspending of Standing Orders.
All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britainthe legal advice for the invasionintelligence about weapons of mass destruction andplanning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events REVIEWS The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.
This reports finds that the Coalition Government has developed in public a more mature and measured relationship with the US, although there has been no fundamental change in the nature of the tie. The Committee declares the relationship to be in good health. In particular, the Committee said that it was not aware of any evidence that the House of Commons vote in August 2013 against potential military action in Syria had damaged the UK's relationship with the US. Rather, the Committee concluded that the episode illustrated general features of the UK-US relationship, namely that developments in the UK could influence US policy; and that the underlying tie was resilient. Today's publication follows up a report produced by the previous Foreign Affairs Committee at the end of the last Parliament, which recommended that the UK Government should adopt a more hard-headed and less deferential approach to the US. The Coalition Government seemed to have taken up this recommendation. The Committee criticises the UK Government's poor provision of information about the UK-US Joint Strategy Board, which was created during President Obama's State Visit to the UK in May 2011. Among strategic issues that it considered, the Committee agreed with the Government that the proposed EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) could have significant positive strategic impact for the UK and the transatlantic relationship.
