Analyzes the 19th century system of international convertibility and the reasons for its collapse and outlines radical institutional reforms which might deal effectively with the present day dollar question.
For half a century, the United States has garnered substantial political and economic benefits as a result of the dollar's de facto role as a global currency. In recent years, however, the dollar's preponderant position in world markets has come under challenge. The dollar has been more volatile than ever against foreign currencies, and various nations have switched to non-dollar instruments in their transactions. China and the Arab Gulf states continue to hold massive amounts of U.S. government obligations, in effect subsidizing U.S. current account deficits, and those holdings are a point of potential vulnerability for American policy. What is the future of the U.S. dollar as an international currency? Will predictions of its demise end up just as inaccurate as those that have accompanied major international financial crises since the early 1970s? Analysts disagree, often profoundly, in their answers to these questions. In The Future of the Dollar, leading scholars of dollar's international role bring multidisciplinary perspectives and a range of contrasting predictions to the question of the dollar's future. This timely book provides readers with a clear sense of why such disagreements exist and it outlines a variety of future scenarios and the possible political implications for the United States and the world.
The U.S. monetary system is based on paper money backed by the full faith and credit of the fed. gov't. The currency is neither valued in, backed by, nor officially convertible into gold or silver. Through much of its history, however, the U.S. was on a metallic standard of one sort or another. On occasion, there are calls to return to such a system. Such calls are usually accompanied by claims that gold or silver backing has provided considerable economic benefits in the past. This report reviews the history of the GS in the U.S. It clarifies the dates during which the GS was used, the type of GS in operation at the various times, and the statutory changes used to alter the GS and eventually end it. It is not a discussion of the merits of the GS. A print on demand oub.
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In 1971, President Nixon imposed national price controls and took the United States off the gold standard, an extreme measure intended to end an ongoing currency war that had destroyed faith in the U.S. dollar. Today we are engaged in a new currency war, and this time the consequences will be far worse than those that confronted Nixon. Currency wars are one of the most destructive and feared outcomes in international economics. At best, they offer the sorry spectacle of countries' stealing growth from their trading partners. At worst, they degenerate into sequential bouts of inflation, recession, retaliation, and sometimes actual violence. Left unchecked, the next currency war could lead to a crisis worse than the panic of 2008. Currency wars have happened before-twice in the last century alone-and they always end badly. Time and again, paper currencies have collapsed, assets have been frozen, gold has been confiscated, and capital controls have been imposed. And the next crash is overdue. Recent headlines about the debasement of the dollar, bailouts in Greece and Ireland, and Chinese currency manipulation are all indicators of the growing conflict. As James Rickards argues in Currency Wars, this is more than just a concern for economists and investors. The United States is facing serious threats to its national security, from clandestine gold purchases by China to the hidden agendas of sovereign wealth funds. Greater than any single threat is the very real danger of the collapse of the dollar itself. Baffling to many observers is the rank failure of economists to foresee or prevent the economic catastrophes of recent years. Not only have their theories failed to prevent calamity, they are making the currency wars worse. The U. S. Federal Reserve has engaged in the greatest gamble in the history of finance, a sustained effort to stimulate the economy by printing money on a trillion-dollar scale. Its solutions present hidden new dangers while resolving none of the current dilemmas. While the outcome of the new currency war is not yet certain, some version of the worst-case scenario is almost inevitable if U.S. and world economic leaders fail to learn from the mistakes of their predecessors. Rickards untangles the web of failed paradigms, wishful thinking, and arrogance driving current public policy and points the way toward a more informed and effective course of action.
This report presents a set of concrete proposals of increasing ambition for the reform of the international monetary system. The proposals aim at improving the international provision of liquidity in order to limit the effects of individual and systemic crises and decrease their frequency. The recommendations outlined in this report include: / Develop alternatives to US Treasuries as the dominant reserve asset, including the issuance of mutually guaranteed European bonds and (in the more distant future) the development of a yuan bond market. / Make permanent the temporary swap agreements that were put in place between central banks during the crisis. Establish a starshaped structure of swap lines centred on the IMF. / Strengthen and expand existing IMF liquidity facilities. On the funding side, expand the IMF's existing financing mechanisms and allow the IMF to borrow directly on the markets. / Establish a foreign exchange reserve pooling mechanism with the IMF, providing participating countries with access to additional liquidity and, incidentally, allowing reserves to be recycled into productive investments.To limit moral hazard, the report proposes the setting up of specific surveillance indicators to monitor international funding risks associated with increased insurance provision. The report discusses the role of the special drawing rights (SDRs) and the prospects for turning this unit of account into a true international currency, arguing that it would not solve the fundamental problems of the international monetary system. The report also reviews the conditions under which emerging market economies may use temporary capital controls to counteract excessive and volatile capital flows. The potential for negative externalities requires mutual monitoring and international cooperation in terms of financial regulation and suggests that the mandate of the IMF should be extended to the financial account.