Anglo-German naval rivalry before 1914 had been expected to culminate in a cataclysmic fleet action in the North Sea once war was declared, a battle upon which the outcome of the war would depend: yet the two fleets met only once, at Jutland in 1916, and the battle was far from conclusive. ??In his own account of the war in the North Sea, first published in 1920, Admiral Scheer, the German commander at Jutland, gives his own explanation for the failure of either fleet to achieve the decisive victory expected of it, particularly the failure of his own operation plans that resulted in the battle of Jutland. ??This book is an invaluable account of one of the most important theatres of the First World War, written by one of its most senior commanders.
During the first two years of World War I, Germany struggled to overcome a crippling British blockade of its mercantile shipping lanes. With only sixteen dreadnought-class battleships compared to the renowned British Royal Navy's twenty-eight, the German High Seas Fleet stood little chance of winning a direct fight. The Germans staged raids in the North Sea and bombarded English coasts in an attempt to lure small British squadrons into open water where they could be destroyed by submarines and surface boats. After months of skirmishes, conflict erupted on May 31, 1916, in the North Sea near Jutland, Denmark, in what would become the most formidable battle in the history of the Royal Navy. In Jutland, international scholars reassess the strategies and tactics employed by the combatants as well as the political and military consequences of their actions. Most previous English-language military analysis has focused on British admiral Sir John Jellicoe, who was widely criticized for excessive caution and for allowing German vice admiral Reinhard Scheer to escape; but the contributors to this volume engage the German perspective, evaluating Scheer's decisions and his skill in preserving his fleet and escaping Britain's superior force. Together, the contributors lucidly demonstrate how both sides suffered from leadership that failed to move beyond outdated strategies of limited war between navies and to embrace the total war approach that came to dominate the twentieth century. The contributors also examine the role of memory, comparing the way the battle has been portrayed in England and Germany. An authoritative collection of scholarship, Jutland serves as an essential reappraisal of this seminal event in twentieth-century naval history.
Originally published in 1980 ‘Luxury’ Fleet (the phrase was Winston Churchill’s) was the first history of the Imperial German navy from 1888 to 1918. After tracing the historical background to German naval ambitions, the first two sections of the book analyse Admiral Tirpitz’s programme of building a battle fleet strong enough to engage the Royal Navy in the North Sea. The author shows the fleet in its European setting and describes the warships and the attitudes of the officer corps and seamen. The final section of the book discusses the tactical deployment of the German fleet during the First World War, both in home waters and overseas; and it weighs the balance between those who supported fleet actions in preference to those who favoured cruiser and submarine warfare.
This volume explores the intrigue and negotiations between the Admiralty and domestic politicians and social reformers before World War I. It also explains how Britain's naval leaders responded to non-military, cultural challenges under the direction of Adimiral Sir John Fisher.
Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War is a book by Reinhard Scheer, Admiral in the Imperial German Navy, which deals with the campaigns of the famous German Fleet during the First World War. The High Seas Fleet, or Hochseeflotte, was the battle fleet of the German Imperial Navy and saw action during the Great War. In the first part of the book, Scheer deals with the first two years of the War, from the outbreak to the Battle of Jutland (Skagerrak). The second part covers the period from the Battle of the Jutland to the unrestricted U-boat warfare. It describes the Battle of Jutland and its aftermaths leading to the U-boat Campaign. The third and final part of the book deals with the U-boat Campaign, a naval campaign fought by German U-boats against the trade routes of the Allies.
Admiral Reinhard Scheer (1863-1828) served as the last Commander of the German Navy during WWI. In this book he provides inside information about the German Navy, its techniques and the actions in the entire war. Reprint of the original book (1920).
This unique sourcebook explores the Stab-in-the-Back myth that developed in Germany in the wake of World War One, analyzing its role in the end of the Weimar Republic and its impact on the Nazi regime that followed. A critical development in modern German and even European history that has received relatively little coverage until now, the Stab-in-the-Back Myth was an attempt by the German military, nationalists and anti-Semites to explain how the German war effort collapsed in November 1918 along with the German Empire. It purported that the German army did not lose the First World War but were betrayed by the civilians on the home front and the democratic politicians who had surrendered. The myth was one of the foundation myths of National Socialism, at times influencing Nazi behaviour in the 1930s and later their conduct in the Second World War. The Stab-in-the-Back Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic draws on German government records, foreign and domestic newspaper accounts, diplomatic reports, diary entries and letters to provide different national and political perspectives on the issue. The sourcebook also includes chapter summaries, study questions, and further reading lists, in addition to numerous visual sources and a range of maps, charts, tables and graphs. This is a vital text for all students looking at the history of the Weimar Republic, the legacy of the First World War and Germany in the 20th century.
