First published in 1989, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany has become an invaluable resource for scholars and practitioners of comparative, international, and constitutional law, as well as of German and European politics. The third edition of this renowned English-language reference has now been fully updated and significantly expanded to incorporate both previously omitted topics and recent decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court. As in previous editions, Donald P. Kommers and Russell A. Miller's discussions of key developments in German constitutional law are augmented by elegantly translated excerpts from more than one hundred German judicial decisions. Compared to previous editions of The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, this third edition more closely tracks Germany's Basic Law and, therefore, the systematic approach reflected in the most-respected German constitutional law commentaries. Entirely new chapters address the relationship between German law and European and international law; social and economic rights, including the property and occupational rights cases that have emerged from Reunification; jurisprudence related to issues of equality, particularly gender equality; and the tension between Germany's counterterrorism efforts and its constitutional guarantees of liberty. Kommers and Miller have also updated existing chapters to address recent decisions involving human rights, federalism, European integration, and religious liberty.
Edited by Hermann Wellenreuther, this book sees legal, political and social historians compare the constitutional histories of Germany and the United States, concentrating on Federalism, the idea of a ruler, civil rights, national unity and change in industrial societies that affected the development of their respective constitutions. The authors identify relevant factors common to both countries and explain why their respective developments diverged.Germany and the USA - The Krefeld Historical Symposia
A stunning revision of our founding document’s evolving history that forces us to confront anew the question that animated the founders so long ago: What is our Constitution? Americans widely believe that the United States Constitution was created when it was drafted in 1787 and ratified in 1788. But in a shrewd rereading of the Founding era, Jonathan Gienapp upends this long-held assumption, recovering the unknown story of American constitutional creation in the decade after its adoption—a story with explosive implications for current debates over constitutional originalism and interpretation. When the Constitution first appeared, it was shrouded in uncertainty. Not only was its meaning unclear, but so too was its essential nature. Was the American Constitution a written text, or something else? Was it a legal text? Was it finished or unfinished? What rules would guide its interpretation? Who would adjudicate competing readings? As political leaders put the Constitution to work, none of these questions had answers. Through vigorous debates they confronted the document’s uncertainty, and—over time—how these leaders imagined the Constitution radically changed. They had begun trying to fix, or resolve, an imperfect document, but they ended up fixing, or cementing, a very particular notion of the Constitution as a distinctively textual and historical artifact circumscribed in space and time. This means that some of the Constitution’s most definitive characteristics, ones which are often treated as innate, were only added later and were thus contingent and optional.
Kommers's comprehensive work surveys the development of German constitutional doctrine between 1949, when the Federal Constitutional Court was founded, and 1996. Extensively revised and expanded to take into account recent developments since German unification, this second edition describes the background, structure, and functions of the Court and provides extensive commentary on German constitutional interpretation, and includes translations of seventy-eight landmark decisions. These cases include the highly controversial religious liberty and free speech cases handed down in 1995.
From James I's Address Before Parliament (1610) to Joseph R. Biden, Jr.'s Learned Hand Dinner Address Before the American Jewish Committee (2005), this two-volume set offers an unparalleled selection of key texts from the history of American political and constitutional thought.
'A major work in the field of American political and legal philosophy. Smith analyzes the liberal goals of the framers of the Constitution and the weaknesses of their political thought...This book will undoubtedly be the focus of debate in scholarly and legal circles for years to come...It is a work of grand scholarship.' -Thomas A. Karel, Law Books in Review
The Ultimate Rule of Law addresses the age-old tension between law and politics by examining whether the personal beliefs of judges come into play in adjudicating on issues of religious freedom, sex discrimination, and social and economic rights. Decisions by the Supreme Courts of India, Japan, Canada, the United States, Ireland, Israel, the Constitutional Courts of Germany, Hungary, South Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights on such controversial issues as government funding of religious schools, abortion, same sex marriages, women in the military, and rights to basic shelter and life saving medical treatment are evaluated and compared. Beatty develops a radical alternative to the conventional view that in deciding these cases judges engage in an essentially interpretative, and thus subjective act, relying ultimately on their personal beliefs and political opinions. His analysis shows that it is possible to apply an impartial and objective method of judicial review, based on the principle of proportionality, which acts as an ultimate rule of law and is fully compatible with the ideals of democracy and popular sovereignty. Controversially, Beatty concludes that although this method of judicial review originated in the United States, American judges generally appear to be far less inclined to this conception of constitutional adjudication than their counterparts in Europe, Africa, and Asia.