General James Longstreet fought in nearly every campaign of the Civil War, from Manassas (the first battle of Bull Run) to Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chickamauga, Gettysburg, and was present at the surrender at Appomattox. Yet, he was largely held to blame for the Confederacy's defeat at Gettysburg. General James Longstreet sheds new light on the controversial commander and the man Robert E. Lee called “my old war horse.”
"Though he has traditionally been saddled with much of the blame for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg, Lt. Gen. James Longstreet was a capable, resourceful, and brave commander. Lee referred to Longstreet as his "Old Warhorse," and Longstreet's men gave him the sobriquet "Bull of the Woods" for his aggressive tactics at Chickamauga." "Now, historian Alexander Mendoza offers a comprehensive analysis of Longstreet's leadership during his seven-month assignment in the Tennessee theater of operations. He concludes that the obstacles to effective command faced by Longstreet during his sojourn in the west had at least as much to do with longstanding grievances and politically motivated prejudices as they did with any personal or military shortcomings of Longstreet himself."--BOOK JACKET.
It is September 1863. Gen. James Longstreet and his Corps ride the rails westward to join Gen. Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee in its efforts to halt the advance of the Union Army. Longstreet, a favorite of Gen. Robert E. Lee, fully expects to replace Bragg as commander of the Western Army. Despite assurances to Longstreet from prominent Confederates, President Davis does not remove Bragg to make way for Longstreet. Longstreet's keen disappointment and unsoldierly behavior lead to disaster for the Army itself. Upon separation from Bragg's Army he fails spectacularly at Knoxville, proving to all his inability to function in an independent command. An objective and realistic look at a Confederate commander by a respected historian.
This is the first book-length, critical analysis of Lieutenant General James Longstreet's actions at the Battle of Gettysburg. The author argues that Longstreet's record has been discredited unfairly, beginning with character assassination by his contemporaries after the war and, persistently, by historians in the decades since. By closely studying the three-day battle, and conducting an incisive historiographical inquiry into Longstreet's treatment by scholars, this book presents an alternative view of Longstreet as an effective military leader, and refutes over a century of negative evaluations of his performance.
Acclaimed military historian Bevin Alexander offers a provocative analysis of Stonewall Jackson’s military genius and reveals how the Civil War might have ended differently if Jackson’s strategies had been adopted. The Civil War pitted the industrial North against the agricultural South, and remains one of the most catastrophic conflicts in American history. With triple the population and eleven times the industry, the Union had a decided advantage over the Confederacy. But one general had a vision that could win the War for the South—Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. Jackson believed invading the eastern states from Baltimore to Maine could divide and cripple the Union, forcing surrender, but failed to convince Confederate president Jefferson Davis or General Robert E. Lee. In Such Troops as These, Bevin Alexander presents a compelling case for Jackson as the greatest general in American history. Fiercely dedicated to the cause of Southern independence, Jackson would not live to see the end of the War. But his military legacy lives on and finds fitting tribute in this book.
“Hess’s account of the understudied Knoxville Campaign sheds new light on the generalship of James Longstreet and Ambrose Burnside, as well as such lesser players as Micah Jenkins and Orlando Poe. Both scholars and general readers should welcome it. The scholarship is sound, the research, superb, the writing, excellent.” —Steven E. Woodworth, author of Decision in the Heartland: The Civil War in the West In the fall and winter of 1863, Union General Ambrose Burnside and Confederate General James Longstreet vied for control of the city of Knoxville and with it the railroad that linked the Confederacy east and west. The generals and their men competed, too, for the hearts and minds of the people of East Tennessee. Often overshadowed by the fighting at Chickamauga and Chattanooga, this important campaign has never received a full scholarly treatment. In this landmark book, award-winning historian Earl J. Hess fills a gap in Civil War scholarship—a timely contribution that coincides with and commemorates the sesquicentennial of the Civil War The East Tennessee campaign was an important part of the war in the West. It brought the conflict to Knoxville in a devastating way, forcing the Union defenders to endure two weeks of siege in worsening winter conditions. The besieging Confederates suffered equally from supply shortages, while the civilian population was caught in the middle and the town itself suffered widespread destruction. The campaign culminated in the famed attack on Fort Sanders early on the morning of November 29, 1863. The bloody repulse of Longstreet’s veterans that morning contributed significantly to the unraveling of Confederate hopes in the Western theater of operations. Hess’s compelling account is filled with numerous maps and images that enhance the reader’s understanding of this vital campaign that tested the heart of East Tennessee. The author’s narrative and analysis will appeal to a broad audience, including general readers, seasoned scholars, and new students of Tennessee and Civil War history. The Knoxville Campaign will thoroughly reorient our view of the war as it played out in the mountains and valleys of East Tennessee. EARL J. HESS is Stewart W. McClelland Distinguished Professor in Humanities and an associate professor of history at Lincoln Memorial University. He is the author of nearly twenty books, including The Civil War in the West—Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi and Lincoln Memorial University and the Shaping of Appalachia.
In the South, one can find any number of bronze monuments to the Confederacy featuring heroic images of Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, J. E. B. Stuart, and many lesser commanders. But while the tarnish on such statues has done nothing to color the reputation of those great leaders, there remains one Confederate commander whose tarnished image has nothing to do with bronze monuments. Nowhere in the South does a memorial stand to Lee's intimate friend and second-in-command James Longstreet. In Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, William Garrett Piston examines the life of James Longstreet and explains how a man so revered during the course of the war could fall from grace so swiftly and completely. Unlike other generals in gray whose deeds are familiar to southerners and northerners alike, Longstreet has the image not of a hero but of an incompetent who lost the Battle of Gettysburg and, by extension, the war itself. Piston's reappraisal of the general's military record establishes Longstreet as an energetic corps commander with an unsurpassed ability to direct troops in combat, as a trustworthy subordinate willing to place the war effort above personal ambition. He made mistakes, but Piston shows that he did not commit the grave errors at Gettysburg and elsewhere of which he was so often accused after the war. In discussing Longstreet's postwar fate, Piston analyzes the literature and public events of the time to show how the southern people, in reaction to defeat, evolved an image of themselves which bore little resemblance to reality. As a product of the Georgia backwoods, Longstreet failed to meet the popular cavalier image embodied by Lee, Stuart, and other Confederate heroes. When he joined the Republican party during Reconstruction, Longstreet forfeited his wartime reputation and quickly became a convenient target for those anxious to explain how a "superior people" could have lost the war. His new role as the villain of the Lost Cause was solidified by his own postwar writings. Embittered by years of social ostracism resulting from his Republican affiliation, resentful of the orchestrated deification of Lee and Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet exaggerated his own accomplishments and displayed a vanity that further alienated an already offended southern populace. Beneath the layers of invective and vilification remains a general whose military record has been badly maligned. Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant explains how this reputation developed—how James Longstreet became, in the years after Appomattox, the scapegoat for the South's defeat, a Judas for the new religion of the Lost Cause.
A “fascinating and informative” reassessment of the underappreciated Confederate general’s achievements and ahead-of-his-time military strategy (Midwest Book Review). Lieutenant-General James Longstreet, commander of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, was a brilliant tactician and strategist. Prior to the Civil War there were many technological developments, of which the rifled musket and cannon, rail transport, and the telegraph were just a few. In addition, the North enjoyed a great advantage in manpower and resources. Longstreet adapted to these technological changes and the disparity between the belligerents, making recommendations on how the war should be fought. Longstreet made a mental leap to adjust to this new type of warfare. Many others didn’t make this leap, including Lee, Jackson, Bragg, Hood, and Jefferson Davis, and Longstreet’s advice went unheeded. In contrast to many southern generals, he advocated for defensive warfare, using entrenchments and trying to maneuver the enemy to assault his position, conserving manpower, resources, and supplies. With the advent of the highly accurate and long-range rifled musket, offensive tactics became questionable and risky. This caused Longstreet to come into conflict with General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg, and with General Bragg at Chickamauga. Longstreet, a pragmatic and methodical general, was never given full authority over an army in the field. Had his suggestions been utilized there would have been a better outcome for the South. Many historians and biographers have misunderstood Longstreet and his motives, but this work offers a fresh perspective. It takes a new viewpoint of the Civil War and the generals who tailored their designs to pursue the war, analyzes Longstreet’s views of the generals and the tactics and strategy they employed, and examines why Longstreet proposed and urged a new type of warfare.
This work presents a compelling account of the Civil War. It follows the narrative of a man who witnessed it from the beginning, always in the center of the action. When the war broke out in April 1861, G. Moxley Sorrel worked as a bank clerk in Savannah. He left this job to watch Fort Sumter fall, then offered his services to the new Confederacy. He found himself working as a staff officer for James Longstreet, then a brigade commander, in no time. It was the start of a long and beneficial partnership that lasted till the war's end. Published posthumously, this work comprises vivid descriptions of his thrilling experiences. His reminisces are easy to read, pleasant, and moving. Many critics called it one of the best portrayals of the personalities of prominent participants in the Confederacy, marked by a touch of humor and swift characterization.
