This book is the first comprehensive political and economic account of the birth and development of the Euro. Today the Euro is the supranational currency for sixteen European countries and the world's second-largest reserve currency. David Marsh tells the story of the rivalries, intrigues, and deal making that brought about a currency for Europe, and he analyzes the achievements and shortcomings of its first decade of existence. While the Euro represents a remarkable triumph of political will, great pressures are building on the single currency. Drawing on more than 100 interviews with leading figures associated with the Euro, and scores of secret documents from international archives, Marsh underscores the Euro's importance for the global economy, in particular for U.S. and British economic and political agendas. Hidden facts and fresh insights from The Euro --How the legacy of France and Germany's tortuous relations affects the Euro--Why the United Kingdom is unlikely to accept the Euro before 2025--The impact on the Euro of the U.S. credit crisis--How the Euro has rebounded against the aspirations of its founders--How Italy and Spain have massively lost competitiveness--Why radical changes must be adopted to prevent a European upheaval
Leaving the comfort and familiarity of his home in New York's Chelsea neighborhood, Farrell travels to London with his partner Tony for a six month business trip. Tony is there to direct a new musical stage production. Farrell accepts an internship in the most important kitchen in all of Great Britain. They live together in a superb flat complete with a stodgy, and very proper, British butler. While living and working in London, Farrell and Tony meet a number of celebrities who reveal their more personal nature. These encounters include meeting a few members of The Royal Family. Farrell also finds a rather perplexing mystery to solve when he discovers that there is a young man in London that looks exactly like him. As in the first two novels, Farrell and Farrell, Inc., this third installment in the series once again demonstrates the positive side of being "in the life," while at the same time providing some marvelously entertaining and humorous adventures.
Johan Van Overtveldt provides comprehensive documentation showing that the political dithering so apparent in the most recent euro crisis has in fact been the hallmark of the euro project from the start. --Anil Kashyap, Edward Eagle Brown Professor of Economics and Finance, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business From noted economic journalist Johan Van Overtveldt, an up-to-the-minute examination of the fate of the Euro. In a process that began with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and concluded on January 1, 1999, 11 Western European countries made the euro the European Union's single currency, and the European Central Bank (ECB) the EU's only policy-making central bank. Bringing together Germany, France, Italy, and other European countries into a monetary union with a single currency and a single monetary policy could only ever result in major imbalances between the member countries, thus threatening the EU itself. This was recognized from the start by many economists and other observers, and the political elite paid elaborate lip service to these warnings. However, no one really followed up on these risks in terms of actions and reforms. Instead, the politicians seemed to indicate, directly and indirectly, that if the EU showed unity, the conditions to turn itself into a well-functioning monetary union would simply come about automatically. Moreover, given the imperative to work together more closely, the monetary-union effort would strengthen the political union among the euro-countries. Thus, in spirit, the process of monetary union was often seen as a means to an end. With that reasoning, the political elite supervising monetary union turned a great idea--the creation of a unified currency for Europe--into a huge gamble. Implicit in their reasoning was the idea that Europe's leading politicians would always be able to come up with an adequate solution to any crisis that might occur. As the former Belgian prime minister and European Union leader Jean-Luc Dehaene repeated relentlessly: "The idea of a unified Europe grows and becomes reality through crises. We need crises to make progress." Dehaene and like-minded European politicians never seriously considered the possibility of an insoluble, catastrophic crisis that could potentially crash the entire EU effort. For ten years, from 1999 to 2008, it seemed that the politicians' claim was vindicated. Although there was little substantial progress toward real political union within the euro area, the euro and the euro countries in general prospered, despite a string of major shocks like the bursting of the dotcom bubble, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But things changed dramatically with the financial crisis of 2007-2008. In January 2009 Barry Eichengreen, professor of economics and political science at Berkeley, wrote that "what started as the Subprime Crisis in 2007 and morphed in the Global Credit Crisis in 2008 has become the Euro Crisis in 2009." After its immediate impact, the crisis caused the financial and capital markets to worry about the so-called sovereign risks, i.e. countries running the risk of becoming insolvent. Although budget deficits in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom were much larger than the aggregate data for the euro area, markets started to home in on the risks posed by countries inside the European monetary union. Markets recognized that the enormous problem facing everyone in the union was the long-term working of the monetary union itself. Eichengreen's "Euro Crisis" is all about the sustainability of EMU and the single currency. By early 2009 the structural imbalances within the euro area and especially the untenable situations building up in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland were there for everybody to see. The first reaction of the political leadership was denial of any structural problem whatsoever. The second reaction was recognition of the crisis situation, but absolute denial of any link between that crisis and the workings of the monetary union. Eventually, a third phase set in: the search for external villains to blame. Those villains were found in the greed, speculation, and irresponsibility of the financial markets. As the French saying goes: "les excuses sont fait pour s'en server" ("excuses are made to take advantage of"). Fundamentally, however, the gigantic problems facing the EMU, and the euro as a currency, have little to do with either alleged criminal behavior in the financial markets or with the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The crisis of 2009-2010 was an accident waiting to happen. It could have happened earlier, or the clash could have been postponed for several more years; but given the the basic characteristics of the EMU-set-up, a major crisis was simply unavoidable. Untenable imbalances within the monetary union were enshrined in the different treaties, pacts, and political agreements that led to the creation of the euro in the first place, and guided its first ten years. That politicians never acted on this reality to make them the prime culprits of the long and highly painful death agony of the euro. The structure of this book is as follows: Chapter I gives an overview of the birth of the euro. Understanding this history is essential to understand the anomalies built into the project from the beginning. These anomalies form the subject of Chapter II, along with an analysis of how they led to the situation that turned Greece, Portugal, and Spain into euro-destroying economic disaster areas. Chapter III shows how this was not an unforeseeable situation, as Europe's history is filled with earlier failed attempts to build monetary unions. Chapter IV is focused on Germany, by far the most important country within EMU, and why the chances of Germany leaving the union are much higher than is generally assumed. The book concludes with an analysis of what lies in wait for the remains of the monetary union--and for a deeply divided and troubled continent in general. Either the EMU transforms itself fundamentally or it disintegrates, and the likeliest outcome is the latter.
There has been an explosion in the quantity of sports history literature published in recent years, making it increasingly difficult to keep abreast of developments. The annual number of publications has increased from around 250 to 1,000 a year over the last decade. This is due in part to the fact that during the late 1980s and 90s, many clubs, leagues and governing bodies of sport have celebrated their centenaries and produced histories to mark this occasion and commemorate their achievements. It is also the result of the growing popularity and realisation of the importance of sport history research within academe. This international bibliography of books, articles, conference proceedings and essays in the English language is a one-stop for the sports historian to know what is new.
Panenka's pearl of a penalty in Belgrade, van Basten's volley of a lifetime in Munich, Gazza's agonising near-miss at Wembley: over its six decades, the UEFA European Championship has thrown up many of the most memorable stories in football lore. Now it gets the history it deserves. Euro Summits is the first full retelling of the tournament, from its tentative beginnings in the late 1950s to its elephantine expansion in the mid-2010s. Taking in the USSR's early success, the grim violence of 1968, France's cavalier feats on home soil in 1984, the sensational triumphs of no-hopers Denmark and Greece, Spain's modern-day dominance, all the way up to Portugal's shock victory in 2016, it's a panoramic portrait of an event that captures a whole continent's imagination every four years. Dramatic, detailed and teeming with compelling personalities like Michel Platini, Guenter Netzer, Hristo Stoichkov, Zinedine Zidane, Wayne Rooney and Cristiano Ronaldo, this is the complete story of a footballing event second only to the World Cup.
Who were key figures in the making of European monetary union? Which ideas did they contribute to ensuring that monetary union would be sustainable? How prescient were they in identifying the necessary and sufficient foundations of a sustainable monetary union? This book provides the first systematic historical examination of key architects of European monetary union in the period before its launch in 1999. Using original archival and interview research, it investigates the intellectual and career backgrounds of these architects, their networking skills, and their own doubts and reservations about the way in which monetary union was being constructed. In the light of the later Euro Area, Architects of the Euro deals critically with not just their contribution to the making of European monetary union but also their legacy. The book brings together a distinguished group of scholars working on the history of Economic and Monetary Union.
The tension between the aim of creating sustainable multilateral region-building dynamics and the need to find more differentiated and flexible forms of cooperation has been ever-present in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The proliferation of different and partially overlapping initiatives in recent years – the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean – is a plain expression of this tension. The 2011 episodes of regime-change in the Arab world have once again placed the debate about differentiation in EU’s relations with Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries at the top of the Union’s foreign policy agenda. This book contributes to theoretical and practical debates on whether differentiation processes can aid or hinder policy convergence processes and region-building efforts more widely. The contributions to this collection assess the actual significance and consequences of differentiation in Euro-Mediterranean relations through sector-specific in-depth analyses, covering issue areas as varied as environmental policy, migration, foreign and defence policy, trade, energy, civil protection and democracy promotion. The particular angle and comprehensive analysis of this book will make it of great interest for both scholars and policy makers alike in a moment when Euro-Mediterranean are in need of a thorough rethink. This book was based on a special issue of Mediterranean Politics.
This concise introduction to European patent law and global patent perspectives combines the legal and economic perspectives to adopt a unique approach that serves both inventors -- engineers and scientists -- as well as financiers and economists. Written by experts with first-hand knowledge this book is completely up-to-date, taking into account recent additions to European patent law, especially in the field of biotechnology and genetics. While concentrating on the EU, the world perspective is nevertheless represented, including US particularities. The result is a set of guidelines allowing readers to develop a holistic patent strategy suitable for their specific needs. For scientists, engineers, managers and financiers in the chemical industry.
The decades since the end of the Second World War have seen massive change sweep across Britain's social, cultural and political landscape. Yet throughout this period, one thing has remained constant and unchanging: the thorny question of our relationship with Europe. Europe, and Britain's place in or out of it, has always been a hugely divisive factor – on either side of the political spectrum – creating warring camps in both the Labour and Conservative parties. Famous Europhiles to put their heads above the parapets over the years have included Conservatives Ted Heath and David Cameron, as well as Tony Blair for Labour, while leading Europhobes count among their number the former Conservative Prime Ministers Anthony Eden and Margaret Thatcher. Born out of a series of Oxford University lectures devised by the former director of the Number 10 Policy Unit, Andrew Adonis, Half in, Half Out presents a comprehensive and enlightening look at Britain's Prime Ministers of the past seven decades – and explores their often hugely differing attitudes towards our neighbours on the other side of the Channel. Starting with the premiership of Sir Winston Churchill, and ending with Theresa May, the book examines in fascinating and forensic detail the crucial relationships between our leaders and Europe. With each chapter written by a prominent political figure, including Sir Nicholas Soames, David Owen and Rachel Reeves, the book provides some hugely revealing portraits of Britain's former leaders, shining a light on their sometimes warm, and at other times downright hostile, attitudes towards Europe.
