Folk is an analog foundation in a digital world. Phenomenology is a big word about a small, impossible task: trying to imagine the real. This book describes this task in relation to its foundation. Most of all, Folk Phenomenology is a defense of the integrity and sufficiency of art--thinking, feeling, living, dying. In short, being in love. .embed-container { position: relative; padding-bottom: 56.25%; height: 0; overflow: hidden; max-width: 100%; } .embed-container iframe, .embed-container object, .embed-container embed { position: absolute; top: 0; left: 0; width: 100%; height: 100%; }
Introspective evidence is still treated with great suspicion in cognitive science. This work is designed to encourage cognitive scientists to take more account of the subject's unique perspective.
This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze the consensual views of the subject. The contributors all maintain that current understandings of folk psychology and of the mechanisms that underlie it need to be revised, supplemented or dismissed altogether. That’s why this book is essential reading for those in the field.
Self-individualization has been interpreted as the process in which the all-embracing Self unfolds into an infinite variety of different individ uals, plants, animals and men. A comparison of the different ways in which the Self manifests itself in the biological and psychological devel opmental processes, or in a visionary image of the undivided Self, reveals the same basic structure of expression. The Self, the one, is represented by a circular domain, and comprises a basic inner duality, the two, creating a paradox of conflicting opposites. In the undivided Self the two give rise to a trinity in which, however, a quatemity is hidden. The latter expresses itself in this world as the four basic forces, the four Elements or the four main archetypes, specifying the possibilities or development in space and time. Self-individualization starts with the first appearance of a primary structure of an individual sub-Self. This is the fifth basic force, the fifth Element. Further development is character ized by four generative principles: 1st, the principle of wholeness: connection and integration (being oriented to remaining whole or restoring wholeness); 2nd, the principle of complementarity and com pensation (a periodic shift between opposing influences); 3rd, the enstructuring principle (causing the relative stability of the spatial appear ance of the manifest structure), and 4th, the principle of gesture (resulting in a gradual stepwise development of that structure into a full-grown individual).
Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating.
"This book presents a philosophical portrait of human persons that depicts each way in which we are irreducible, with the goal of guiding the reader to perceive, wonder at, and love all the unique features of human persons. It builds this portrait by showing how claims from many strands of the Catholic tradition can be synthesized. These strands include Thomism, Scotism, phenomenology, personalism, nouvelle théologie, analytic philosophy, and Greek and Russian thought. The book focuses on how these traditions' claims are grounded in experience and on how they help us to perceive irreducible features of persons. This book also explores irreducible features of our subjectivity, senses, intellect, freedom, and affections, and of our souls, bodies, and activities"--
This collection provides a selection of the most essential contributions to the contemporary free will debate. Among the issues discussed and debated are skepticism and naturalism, alternate possibilities, the consequence argument, libertarian metaphysics, illusionism and revisionism, optimism and pessimism, neuroscience and free will, and experimental philosophy.
Feelings of Being is the first ever account of the nature, role and variety of 'existential feelings' in psychiatric illness and in everyday life. There is a great deal of current philosophical and scientific interest in emotional feelings. However, many of the feelings that people struggle to express in their everyday lives do not appear on standard lists of emotions. For example, there are feelings of unreality, surreality, unfamiliarity, estrangement, heightened existence, isolation, emptiness, belonging, significance, insignificance, and the list goes on. Ratcliffe refers to such feelings as 'existential' because they comprise a changeable sense of being part of a world In this book, Ratcliffe argues that existential feelings form a distinctive group by virtue of three characteristics: they are bodily feelings, they constitute ways of relating to the world as a whole, and they are responsible for our sense of reality. He explains how something can be a bodily feeling and, at the same time, a sense of reality and belonging. He then explores the role of altered feeling in psychiatric illness, showing how an account of existential feeling can help us to understand experiential changes that occur in a range of conditions, including depression, circumscribed delusions, depersonalisation and schizophrenia. The book also addresses the contribution made by existential feelings to religious experience and to philosophical thought.
Social Phenomenology: Husserl, Intersubjectivity, and Collective Intentionality brings together insights from the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology and from recent discussions of collective intentionality. Eric Chelstrom offers a unique account of how consciousness is formative of the social world-that is, in some cases our collectively thinking something to be the case is what makes it so. For instance, that the money one uses on a daily basis is worth something is not because of its physical characteristics, but because we believe that those physical traits, printed by the right institutions, make it so. Our institutions only have authority because we believe they do. This book promotes a position between atomism and collectivism. Chelstrom argues that there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as collective consciousness. Further, this book disputes the atomistic conception of the human subject, the view that individuals are like islands unto themselves, able to develop their capacities independent from others, and free of necessary relations to others. The resulting analysis in the work offers a strong challenge to common interpretations of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Social Phenomenology is primarily written for phenomenologists concerned with the social world. Its broader aim, however, is to draw into dialogue both analytic and continental philosophers working in social philosophy, specifically on collective intentionality. Book jacket.
A comprehensive reader on the problem of the self as seen from the perspectives of philosophy, development psychology, robotics, cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology, semiotics, phenomenology and contemplative studies, all focused on a keynote paper.
