This workbook aims to get students involved with and excited about economic concepts. Based on the interactive classroom trend in economics education, the text includes 13 experiments, each designed to teach a major topic by encouraging active student participation. Each experiment involves the student in reading an introduction, collecting data and filling out a laboratory report, discussing findings, and completing coursework designed to reinforce key concepts. Learning objectives, worked examples, self-test exercises, and a key terms list are also included.
This book contains economic experiments designed for students who have not previously taken any economics. While this book can supplement any microeconomics text, it can and has been used by itself to teach principles. Unique in the marketplace, EXPERIMENTS WITH ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES: MICROECONOMICS is an extension of the groundbreaking work in Experimental Economics of Vernon Smith. Bergstrom and Miller are two of the most highly-regarded researchers in the creative world of Experimental Economics. FEATURES 1. A new chapter on public goods (ch. 6). 2. A new chapter on network externalities (ch. 9). 3. A new Part V on essential concepts of economic principles. 4. More problems and tie-ins to economics in the news. 5. More discussion of economic concepts. 6. More modular organization for easy custom-publishing of instructor's own selection of experiments. 7. Streamlining some experiments. 8. Improved layout of homework exercises allows faster grading. 9. Improved layout of personal information sheets in Instructor's Manual. 10. Convenient class preparation kits for instructors. Go to the text website for more information on Bergstrom/Miller Experiments with Economic Principles: http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~tedb/eep/eep.html
This book provides an easy to follow guide to economic experiments and specifically those that explore notions of fairness, altruism and trust in economic transactions and how findings in the field can change the way we approach a variety of economic problems.
While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appears blurred and may produce uncertain results. The contributors to this volume have provided brief notes describing specific experimental results.
Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.
