Essays on the Impact of Incomplete Information
Author: Chuen Hwa Leon
Publisher:
Published: 2004
Total Pages: 254
ISBN-13:
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Author: Chuen Hwa Leon
Publisher:
Published: 2004
Total Pages: 254
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Jungwook Kim (Economist)
Publisher:
Published: 2007
Total Pages: 106
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Salvatore Piccolo
Publisher:
Published: 2006
Total Pages: 225
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKIn my dissertation, I study equilibrium and optimal contracting between parties in relationships with asymmetric information. The welfare and private properties of incomplete contracting are analyzed both in imperfectly and perfectly competitive markets. The first essay analyzes the welfare effects of incomplete contracting in a principal-agent set-up. I study Resale Price Maintenance, a complete contract, and quantity fixing, an incomplete one, in a successive monopolies framework with information asymmetries. Both contracts entail a double marginalization driven by information rents distributed to the retailer. When firms behave non-cooperatively, the principal imposes retail price restrictions, and the impact of complete contracting on consumers' surplus is ambiguous. When, firms maximize ex ante joint profits, policy recommendations are unambiguous: if the preferred contracting mode from an ex ante viewpoint entails retail price restrictions, it also raises consumers' surplus, thereby producing a Pareto improvement relative to incomplete contracts. The second essay examines the welfare effects of contracting incompleteness when agents' preferences and productivity depend on their health status, and occupational choices affect individual health distributions. Efficiency requires agents of the same type to obtain different expected utilities if assigned to different occupations. Workers with riskier jobs get higher (lower) expected utilities if health affects production (consumption) capabilities. Competitive equilibria are first-best if complete contracts are enforceable, but typically not if only incomplete ones are traded. Compensating wage differentials are incompatible with ex-ante efficiency. The third essay provides a rationale for contracting incompleteness in a competing organizations set-up. I show that principals dealing with competing agents may leave contracts silent on some verifiable performance measures when certain aspects of agents' activity are noncontractible. Two effects are at play once one moves from a complete to an incomplete contract. First, reducing the number of screening instruments has a detrimental effect on principals' profits as it makes information revelation more costly. Second, it may create strategic value by forcing competing organizations to behave in a more friendly manner at the competitive stage.
Author: Jennifer Lynn Steele
Publisher:
Published: 2007
Total Pages: 212
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis thesis studies the effects of incomplete information on economic development. Relaxing the assumption that information is complete allows for corruption to occur, even in equilibrium, and for poverty traps to develop. The first paper looks at how the lack of enforcement mechanisms affects contracts, and how a more efficient contracting mechanism can be developed in aid settings. I find that as the level of corruption increases, the contract will encompass more stages. In the second paper, the agent's level of corruption is unknown, and the principal may screen agents by including corruption with positive probability. This would account for the corruption seen in development projects as an equilibrium effect. The third paper looks at the effect of uncertainty about foreign productivity on a firm's foreign direct investment (FDI) decision. Dependent on the form of the information, this may result in either an underinvestment of FDI, or no FDI at all.
Author: Kenneth Joseph Arrow
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 1986-07-25
Total Pages: 348
ISBN-13: 9780521304559
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis second volume of economic theory is divided into sections on general equilibrium and on the microfoundations of macroeconomics.
Author: Giovanni Maggi
Publisher:
Published: 1994
Total Pages: 162
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Man Xie
Publisher:
Published: 2021
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKConsumers make decisions under incomplete information. In addition to the generic information availability and accessibility, how firms selectively provide information and how consumers collect information all influence consumer decisions, including product choice, purchase, and reselling. In Essay One, we study the impacts of firms providing information on product list prices on online consumer purchases. Our examination of Amazon data finds that (1) displaying list price in information-rich online markets has no impact on sales when used as a standalone marketing strategy, but can positively or negatively influence sales if implemented concurrently when the price decreases; (2) the direction of that influence depends on user-generated information; and (3) list price interacts with price promotion via both price sensitivity and demand shift. Specifically, when a product with favorable consumer reviews lowers its price, simultaneously displaying list price boosts the effectiveness of price promotion by (i) shifting demand upwards and (ii) increasing price sensitivity. However, when a product with unfavorable reviews lowers its price, simultaneously displaying list price shifts demand downwards, which decreases sales or even destroys the sales gain that price promotion would have generated without list price. In Essay Two, we study the impacts of imperfect information from the initial choice set and post-purchase consumption on consumers' reselling price decisions in C2C (consumer to consumer) markets. We model C2C markets and show they significantly differ from traditional B2C (business to consumer) markets. For example, consumers (as buyers) tend to buy products with overlooked weaknesses rather than overlooked strengths, resulting in over-optimistic choices and post-choice remorse (i.e., "buyer's remorse"). Surprisingly, both increase with a more exhaustive choice search. Moreover, even without buyer's remorse, imperfect information alone causes consumers' valuations (as owners) and asking prices (as resellers) to decrease with the duration of ownership as residual uncertainty decreases. Hence, unlike traditional B2C selling, we find that C2C reselling asking prices depend on reseller expected utility from prolonged consumption, the original consideration set size, the duration of ownership, and residual uncertainty. Our empirical analyses provide evidence from both experimental data and aggregate real estate data.
Author: Dan Collins
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2024-06-28
Total Pages: 287
ISBN-13: 1040042384
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis thorough text provides a complete overview of the drive in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Divided into four key areas, the book considers clinical, theoretical, historical, and cultural aspects of the drive, with editorial headnotes throughout. The introduction to the collection provides a comprehensive overview of the theory and history of the drive as a concept and is followed by discussion of clinical cases. Critical Essays on the Drive then assesses theoretical aspects, with chapters by world-leading Lacanian scholars. The final parts of the book explore the history of drive theory and its impact on art and culture, debunking the notion that the drive is a dormant or defunct concept and considering its applications by artists, academics, and cultural theorists. Critical Essays on the Drive will be essential reading for psychoanalysts, psychologists, psychotherapists, and psychiatrists in practice and in training. It will also be of great interest to academics and scholars of psychoanalytic and Lacanian theory, critical theory, and cultural theory.
Author:
Publisher:
Published: 2008
Total Pages: 688
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Matthew Bowen Krepps
Publisher:
Published: 1996
Total Pages: 346
ISBN-13:
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