Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory

Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory

Author: Tim Roughgarden

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2016-08-30

Total Pages: 356

ISBN-13: 1316781178

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Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.


Repeated Games

Repeated Games

Author: Jean-François Mertens

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2015-02-02

Total Pages: 597

ISBN-13: 1316060985

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Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.


Modeling Strategic Behavior: A Graduate Introduction To Game Theory And Mechanism Design

Modeling Strategic Behavior: A Graduate Introduction To Game Theory And Mechanism Design

Author: George J Mailath

Publisher: World Scientific

Published: 2018-12-18

Total Pages: 364

ISBN-13: 9813239956

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It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.


Social Organization and Mechanism Design

Social Organization and Mechanism Design

Author: Claude d' Aspremont

Publisher: De Boeck Supérieur

Published: 1999

Total Pages: 348

ISBN-13: 9782804129941

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By presenting a collection of contributions by leading experts, this book illustrates the variety of issues that the discipline of "mechanism design", as a branch of game theory, is capable of dealing with : voting rules, trial procedures, public good production, cost-sharing, monopolistic regulation, bequest function, etc. However, the book illustrates also the fundamental unity of the basic questions : information gathering, communication, individual as well as coalitional strategic and dynamic behavior.


Quantal Response Equilibrium

Quantal Response Equilibrium

Author: Jacob K. Goeree

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2016-06-28

Total Pages: 328

ISBN-13: 1400880920

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Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences. Quantal Response Equilibrium spans the range from basic theoretical foundations to examples of how the principles yield useful predictions and insights in strategic settings, including voting, bargaining, auctions, public goods provision, and more. The approach provides a natural framework for estimating the effects of behavioral factors like altruism, reciprocity, risk aversion, judgment fallacies, and impatience. New theoretical results push the frontiers of models that include heterogeneity, learning, and well-specified behavioral modifications of rational choice and rational expectations. The empirical relevance of the theory is enhanced by discussion of data from controlled laboratory experiments, along with a detailed users' guide for estimation techniques. Quantal Response Equilibrium makes pioneering game-theoretic methods and interdisciplinary applications available to a wide audience.


Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Author: Robert J. Aumann

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 1995

Total Pages: 372

ISBN-13: 9780262011471

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The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.


Economics Essays

Economics Essays

Author: Gerard Debreu

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2013-04-17

Total Pages: 363

ISBN-13: 3662046237

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Back in the good old days on the fourth floor of the Altbau of Bonn's Ju ridicum, Werner Hildenbrand put an end to a debate about a festschrift in honor of an economist on the occasion of his turning 60 with a laconic: "Much too early." Remembering his position five years ago, we did not dare to think about one for him. But now he has turned 65. If consulted, he would most likely still answer: "Much too early." However, he has to take his official re tirement, and we believe that this is the right moment for such an endeavor. No doubt Werner Hildenbrand will not really retire. As professor emeritus, free from the constraints of a rigid teaching schedule and the burden of com mittee meetings, he will be able to indulge his passions. We expect him to pursue, with undiminished enthusiasm, his research, travel, golfing, the arts, and culinary pleasures - escaping real retirement.


Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Author: R.J. Aumann

Publisher: Elsevier

Published: 1992

Total Pages: 824

ISBN-13: 9780444894274

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This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes