Essays on Repeated Games
Author: Pavlo V. Prokopovych
Publisher:
Published: 2005
Total Pages: 202
ISBN-13:
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Author: Pavlo V. Prokopovych
Publisher:
Published: 2005
Total Pages: 202
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Kiho Yoon
Publisher:
Published: 1997
Total Pages: 180
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: George R. Feiwel
Publisher: SUNY Press
Published: 1985-01-01
Total Pages: 512
ISBN-13: 9780873959421
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis important book and its companion volume, Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, capture and convey the spirit, fundamental issues, underlying tensions, rich variety, accomplishments, and failures in contemporary economics. It presents economics as a dynamic subject, showing its strengths and limitations, exploring alternative approaches, and tracing the sources of differences. The essays include original contributions by the theorists themselves; major interpretations, reflections, and assessments by leading economists, and evaluations of particular areas by rising young scholars.
Author: Nimrod Megiddo
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 209
ISBN-13: 1461226481
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2006-09-28
Total Pages: 664
ISBN-13: 0198041217
DOWNLOAD EBOOKPersonalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Jean-François Mertens
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2015-02-02
Total Pages: 597
ISBN-13: 1316060985
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThree leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.
Author: James Paul Gee
Publisher: New Literacies and Digital Epistemologies
Published: 2013
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13: 9781433123931
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe chapters in this book argue that good games teach through well-designed problem-solving experiences. In the end, the book offers a model of collaborative, interactive, and embodied learning centered on problem solving, a model that can be enhanced by games, but which can be accomplished in many different ways with or without games.
Author: Partha Dasgupta
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 1992
Total Pages: 666
ISBN-13: 9780262041270
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThese original essays focus on a wide range of topics related to Frank Hahn'sdistinguished work in economics. Ranging from market analysis and game theory to the microeconomicfoundations of macroeconomics and from equilibrium and optimality with missing markets to economicsand society, they reflect the diversity of modem research in economic theory. What distinguishesHahn's work and many of the essays in this book is that the motivation often comes from practicalconcerns about unemployment, savings and investment, poverty, or the stability of markets.The essaysin Part I deal with the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics - a field in which Hahn has madeimportant contributions, most notably in the theory of monetary economics. Topics include anevaluation of Hahn's contribution to the theory of distribution and such macroeconomic themes ascoordination failure, multiple equilibria, and strategic issues.Part II contains recentcontributions to game theory reflecting Hahn's interest in the question of what is rationalbehavior. The essays in Part III concentrate on general-equilibrium theory with missing markets, afield in which Hahn has made major advances. Although the essays address a different set of issues,they share with Hahn's works such themes as market failure, indeterminacy of equilibrium, and therole of money.Partha Dasgupta is Professor of Economics at Cambridge University. Douglas Gale isProfessor of Economics at Boston University. Oliver Hart is Professor of Economics at theMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Eric Maskin is Professor of Economics at HarvardUniversity.
Author: Robert Axelrod
Publisher: Basic Books
Published: 2009-04-29
Total Pages: 258
ISBN-13: 0786734884
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Author: Tatsuro Ichiishi
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 315
ISBN-13: 354024784X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKWe are pleased to help celebrate Roy Radner's 75th birthday, by issuing in one volume the papers that originally appeared in his honor in two special issues of Review of Economic Design (Vol. 6/2 and 6/3-4, 2001). Through his truly original ideas and lucid writing, Roy has influenced and guided the theory community for decades. Many colleagues and students have found their own work shaped and improved by Roy's wide-ranging curiosity, his encouragement, and his keen insights. In soliciting contributions to the Review of Economic Design Radner issues, we decided to approach his former students at the University of California, Berke ley, his former post-doctoral fellows at Bell Laboratories, and his published co authors. We express our sincere apology to any potential authors who fit these categories and whom we may have unintentionally failed to approach. Our job as editors of the Review of Economic Design Radner issues turned out to be easy, thanks to the enthusiastic response we received from authors and the quality of their submissions.