Journal of Economic Literature
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Published: 2007
Total Pages: 398
ISBN-13:
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Dissertation Abstracts International
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Published: 2008
Total Pages: 688
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKRepeated Games with Incomplete Information
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 1995
Total Pages: 372
ISBN-13: 9780262011471
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
Author: R.J. Aumann
Publisher: Elsevier
Published: 1992
Total Pages: 824
ISBN-13: 9780444894274
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior
Author: Charles A. Holt
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2019-03-12
Total Pages: 696
ISBN-13: 0691188971
DOWNLOAD EBOOKFrom a pioneer in experimental economics, an expanded and updated edition of a textbook that brings economic experiments into the classroom Economics is rapidly becoming a more experimental science, and the best way to convey insights from this research is to engage students in classroom simulations that motivate subsequent discussions and reading. In this expanded and updated second edition of Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Charles Holt, one of the leaders in experimental economics, provides an unparalleled introduction to the study of economic behavior, organized around risky decisions, games of strategy, and economic markets that can be simulated in class. Each chapter is based on a key experiment, presented with accessible examples and just enough theory. Featuring innovative applications from the lab and the field, the book introduces new research on a wide range of topics. Core chapters provide an introduction to the experimental analysis of markets and strategic decisions made in the shadow of risk or conflict. Instructors can then pick and choose among topics focused on bargaining, game theory, social preferences, industrial organization, public choice and voting, asset market bubbles, and auctions. Based on decades of teaching experience, this is the perfect book for any undergraduate course in experimental economics or behavioral game theory. New material on topics such as matching, belief elicitation, repeated games, prospect theory, probabilistic choice, macro experiments, and statistical analysis Participatory experiments that connect behavioral theory and laboratory research Largely self-contained chapters that can each be covered in a single class Guidance for instructors on setting up classroom experiments, with either hand-run procedures or free online software End-of-chapter problems, including some conceptual-design questions, with hints or partial solutions provided
Repeated Games and Reputations
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2006-09-28
Total Pages: 664
ISBN-13: 0198041217
DOWNLOAD EBOOKPersonalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Imperfect Competition, Differential Information, and Microfoundations of Macroeconomics
Author: Kiyohiko G. Nishimura
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 1995
Total Pages: 250
ISBN-13: 9780198290391
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis volume links a microeconomic model of imperfectly informed firms and unions in monopolistic competition to a general theory of wage- and price-setting in a macroeconomic model. The analysis is based on a profit maximization and rational behaviour and is thus in line with the newly emerged New Keynesian approach in its emphasis on the microeconomic foundation of macroeconomics. The volume goes on to explain three stylized facts in macroeconomics: nominal rigidity, real rigidity, and cost-oriented prices, presented in a coherent New Keynesian framework. The analysis also provides new insight into the role of competition in an economy with imperfectly and differentially informed firms. It shows that increased competition may increase nominal as well as real price rigidity and increased volatility of investment.
Game Theory and Economic Behaviour
Author: Reinhard Selten (Economist, Germany)
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Published: 1999-03-24
Total Pages: 924
ISBN-13: 9781781008294
DOWNLOAD EBOOK'These two volumes constitute an impressive collection of selected path-breaking works of Professor Selten. . . . Edward Elgar Publications deserve merit for bringing out most frequently-cited and prominent articles of Professor Selten in a conveniently available package.' - K. Ravikumar, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analysing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
Author: Luis C. Corchón
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Published: 2018-02-23
Total Pages: 567
ISBN-13: 178536328X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Repeated Games
Author: Jean-François Mertens
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2015-02-02
Total Pages: 597
ISBN-13: 1316060985
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThree leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.
