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Equilibrium Contract Distributions in a Competitive Insurance Market

Author: Gerald David Jaynes

Publisher:

Published: 1976

Total Pages: 27

ISBN-13:

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Consumer Risk Perceptions and Information in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection

Author: James A. Ligon

Publisher:

Published: 2008

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

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Standard models of adverse selection in insurance markets assume policyholders know their loss distributions. This study examines the nature of equilibrium and the equilibrium value of information in competitive insurance markets where consumers lack complete information regarding their loss probabilities. We show that additional private information is privately and socially valuable. When the equilibrium policies separate types, policyholders can deduce the underlying probabilities from the contracts, so it is information on risk type, rather than loss probability per se, that is valuable. We show that the equilibrium is quot;as ifquot; policyholders were endowed with complete knowledge if, and only if, information is noiseless and costless. If information is noisy, the equilibrium depends on policyholders' prior beliefs and the amount of noise in the information they acquire.

Foundations of Insurance Economics

Author: Georges Dionne

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 1992

Total Pages: 748

ISBN-13: 0792392043

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Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.

Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz

Author: Joseph E. Stiglitz

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2009

Total Pages: 767

ISBN-13: 0199533709

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The first in a series of six volumes containing a selection of Joseph Stiglitz's most important and widely cited work, this volume includes a number of seminal papers on the economics of information. The volume contains substantial additional original commentary by Joseph Stiglitz on his work and the field more generally.

How Adverse Selection Affects the Health Insurance Market

Author: Paolo Belli

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 38

ISBN-13:

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There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers.

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Author: Amy Finkelstein

Publisher: Columbia University Press

Published: 2014-12-02

Total Pages: 161

ISBN-13: 0231538685

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Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

The Microeconomics of Insurance

Author: Ray Rees

Publisher: Now Publishers Inc

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 178

ISBN-13: 1601981082

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In this relatively short survey, we present the core elements of the microeconomic analysis of insurance markets at a level suitable for senior undergraduate and graduate economics students. The aim of this analysis is to understand how insurance markets work, what their fundamental economic functions are, and how efficiently they may be expected to carry these out.

Economic Analysis of Markets and Games

Author: Partha Dasgupta

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 1992

Total Pages: 666

ISBN-13: 9780262041270

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These original essays focus on a wide range of topics related to Frank Hahn'sdistinguished work in economics. Ranging from market analysis and game theory to the microeconomicfoundations of macroeconomics and from equilibrium and optimality with missing markets to economicsand society, they reflect the diversity of modem research in economic theory. What distinguishesHahn's work and many of the essays in this book is that the motivation often comes from practicalconcerns about unemployment, savings and investment, poverty, or the stability of markets.The essaysin Part I deal with the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics - a field in which Hahn has madeimportant contributions, most notably in the theory of monetary economics. Topics include anevaluation of Hahn's contribution to the theory of distribution and such macroeconomic themes ascoordination failure, multiple equilibria, and strategic issues.Part II contains recentcontributions to game theory reflecting Hahn's interest in the question of what is rationalbehavior. The essays in Part III concentrate on general-equilibrium theory with missing markets, afield in which Hahn has made major advances. Although the essays address a different set of issues,they share with Hahn's works such themes as market failure, indeterminacy of equilibrium, and therole of money.Partha Dasgupta is Professor of Economics at Cambridge University. Douglas Gale isProfessor of Economics at Boston University. Oliver Hart is Professor of Economics at theMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Eric Maskin is Professor of Economics at HarvardUniversity.