This book explores the important economic and legal questions of market manipulation that have arisen in restructured energy markets, paying particular attention to the actions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
In the course of energy liberalisation, electricity and natural gas contracts have been separated from physical delivery, and these contracts are now traded as commodities in multilateral trading facilities. Although designed to render energy trading standardised and efficient, this system raises serious questions as to whether existing regulatory and antitrust provisions are sufficient to address market abuses that cause imbalances in demand and supply. The European Union’s (EU’s) Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT), adopted to combat such market manipulation, is still lacking in significant case law to bolster its effectiveness. Addressing this gap, this invaluable book provides the first in-depth analysis of market manipulation in the energy sector, offering a deeply informed understanding of the new anti-manipulation rules and their implementation and enforcement. Focusing on practices that perpetrators employ to manipulate electricity and natural gas markets and the applicability of anti-manipulation rules to combat such practices, the analysis examines such issues and topics as the following: – factors and circumstances that determine when and what market misconduct can be subject to enforcement; – the European Commission’s criteria to determine whether a particular market is susceptible to regulation; – jurisdiction of REMIT and the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) with respect to the prohibitions of insider trading in financial wholesale energy markets; – to what extent anti-manipulation rules and EU competition law may be applied concurrently; and – types of physical and financial instruments that market participants have employed in devising their manipulative schemes. Because market manipulation is rather new in the EU context but has been prohibited and prosecuted under US law for over a century, much of the case law analysis is from the United States and greatly clarifies how anti-manipulation rules may be enforced. A concluding chapter offers policy recommendations to mitigate legal uncertainties arising from REMIT. Energy market participants, such as energy producers, wholesale suppliers, traders, transmission system operators and their counsel, and legal practitioners in the field will welcome this book’s extensive legal analysis and its clear demarcation of the objectives that REMIT seeks to accomplish with respect to energy market liberalisation.
Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) entered into force on 28 December 2011. The Regulation is the first attempt to regulate EU trading in energy products which is not purely financial. REMIT introduces two fundamental prohibitions, on insider trading and market manipulation, and a series of disclosure and other obligations on companies active in the wholesale markets for electricity and gas in the EEA, which the Agency for Cooperation of European Regulators (ACER) has been developing since, in consultation with various stakeholders. This book aims to offer a detailed yet clear guide for practitioners and in-house counsel faced with these issues, drawing on the available texts and experience so far. The book provides commentary on the Regulation, article by article and places it in the legal, economic and political context. In addition, the book describes the relationship between the REMIT and the European financial regulations, such as MAD, EMIR, MiFID II and MiFIR, which inspired its drafting. The book explains the interplay between the REMIT and EU Competition law with regard to the concept of market abuse and the obligation to disclose inside information. The book then provides an overview of the rules governing the trading on wholesale energy products in the United States, their scope, functioning, enforcement and a comparison with the corresponding provisions of the REMIT. A chapter is also dedicated to the economics behind the rules on market manipulation.
First Published in 2014. This book maps the issues and traces the U.S. government's efforts to properly regulate, monitor, and prevent financial speculation and price manipulation in various markets. It begins with the period from the late nineteenth century to the first congressional efforts at regulation in the 1930s and continues on to the present, with a full chapter on the legal and financial aspects of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The book also discusses the difficulty of initiating successful prosecutions of financial fraud and price manipulation and proposes a new approach to preventing manipulative practices.
How the interplay between government regulation and the private sector has shaped the electric industry, from its nineteenth-century origins to twenty-first-century market restructuring. For more than a century, the interplay between private, investor-owned electric utilities and government regulators has shaped the electric power industry in the United States. Provision of an essential service to largely dependent consumers invited government oversight and ever more sophisticated market intervention. The industry has sought to manage, co-opt, and profit from government regulation. In The Power Brokers, Jeremiah Lambert maps this complex interaction from the late nineteenth century to the present day. Lambert's narrative focuses on seven important industry players: Samuel Insull, the principal industry architect and prime mover; David Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), who waged a desperate battle for market share; Don Hodel, who presided over the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) in its failed attempt to launch a multi-plant nuclear power program; Paul Joskow, the MIT economics professor who foresaw a restructured and competitive electric power industry; Enron's Ken Lay, master of political influence and market-rigging; Amory Lovins, a pioneer proponent of sustainable power; and Jim Rogers, head of Duke Energy, a giant coal-fired utility threatened by decarbonization. Lambert tells how Insull built an empire in a regulatory vacuum, and how the government entered the electricity marketplace by making cheap hydropower available through the TVA. He describes the failed overreach of the BPA, the rise of competitive electricity markets, Enron's market manipulation, Lovins's radical vision of a decentralized industry powered by renewables, and Rogers's remarkable effort to influence cap-and-trade legislation. Lambert shows how the power industry has sought to use regulatory change to preserve or secure market dominance and how rogue players have gamed imperfectly restructured electricity markets. Integrating regulation and competition in this industry has proven a difficult experiment.
With twenty-two chapters written by leading international experts, this volume represents the most detailed and comprehensive Handbook on electricity markets ever published.
Whilst financial rights have appeared as a successful ingredient in North-American power markets, they have their shortcomings both theoretically and in practice. Financial Transmission Rights: Analysis, Experiences and Prospects present a systematic and comprehensive overview of financial transmission rights (FTRS). Following a general introduction to FTRs, including chapters to explain transmission pricing and the general properties of FTRS, experts in the field provide discussions on wide scope of topics. These include: Varying perspectives on FTRS: from electrical engineers to economists, Different mathematical formulations of FTRS Financial Hedging using FTRS, and Alternative solutions to FTRs The detail, expertise and range of content makes Financial Transmission Rights: Analysis, Experiences and Prospect an essential resource for electricity market specialists both at academic and professional levels. “This is THE BOOK we were all expecting to address all key ‘Financial Transmission Rights’ issues. It is comprehensive and reader friendly. You can pick at will in its menu: more or less theory, a bit of maths or none, empirical review of real cases or numerical simulations of many feasible options. Big names rally there to delight you like: Hogan , Oren, Perez-Arriaga, Smeers, Hobbs and... Rosellón. More than a must read: a light house, a map and a survival kit.” Jean – Michel Glachant, Director Florence School, Holder Loyola de Palacio Chair, Chief-editor Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy. "In the last two decades, economists have developed a better understanding of the impact of financial rights on risk management, market power and network expansion in electricity markets, while power systems have experimented with such rights. Striking a good balance between academics and practitioners, always at the frontier of the field, written by the best experts, this volume is essential reading for all those- power systems’ managers and users, regulators, students and researchers- who want to understand the new electricity environment and predict its evolution." Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics and Institute for Industrial Economics (IDEI) Further comments inside.
This timely study evaluates four generic proposals for allowing free market forces toreplace government regulation in the electric power industry and concludes that none of thederegulation alternatives considered represents a panacea for the performance failures associatedwith things as they are now. It proposes a balanced program of regulatory reform and deregulationthat promises to improve industry performance in the short run, resolve uncertainties about thecosts and benefits of deregulation, and positions the industry for more extensive deregulation inthe long run should interim experimentation with deregulation, structural, and regulatory reformsmake it desirable.The book integrates modern microeconomic theory with a comprehensive analysis ofthe economic, technical, and institutional characteristics of modern electrical power systems. Itemphasizes that casual analogies to successful deregulation efforts in other sectors of the economyare an inadequate and potentially misleading basis for public policy in the electric power industry,which has economic and technical characteristics that are quite different from those in otherderegulated industries.Paul L. Joskow is Professor of Economics at MIT, author of ControllingHospital Costs (MIT Press 1981) and coauthor with Martin L. Baughman and Dilip P. Kamat of ElectricPower in the United States (MIT Press 1979). Richard Schmalensee, also at MIT, is Professor ofApplied Economics, author of The Economics of Advertising and The Control of Natural Monopolies, andeditor of The MIT Press Series, Regulation of Economic Activity.