Supporters of net neutrality have often argued that more competition among Internet service providers (ISPs) is beneficial for an open Internet and that the market power of the ISPs lies at the heart of the net neutrality debate. However, the joint effects of the competition among ISPs and among content providers (CPs) have yet to be examined. We study the critical linkage between ISP competition and CP competition, as well as its policy implications. We find that even under competitive pressure from a rival ISP, an ISP still has the incentive and the ability to enforce charging CPs for priority delivery of content. Upending the commonly held belief that when facing direct competition CPs will always support the preservation of net neutrality, we find that under certain conditions, it is economically beneficial for the dominant CP to reverse its stance on net neutrality. Our paper also makes an important contribution in extending the traditional multi-dimensional spatial-competition literature.
The ways in which Internet traffic is managed have direct consequences on Internet users’ rights as well as on their capability to compete on a level playing field. Network neutrality mandates to treat Internet traffic in a non-discriminatory fashion in order to maximise end users’ freedom and safeguard an open Internet. This book is the result of a collective work aimed at providing deeper insight into what is network neutrality, how does it relates to human rights and free competition and how to properly frame this key issue through sustainable policies and regulations. The Net Neutrality Compendium stems from three years of discussions nurtured by the members of the Dynamic Coalition on Network Neutrality (DCNN), an open and multi-stakeholder group, established under the aegis of the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF).
After a decade of discussion on how to guarantee an open, sustainable internet and often intense debate regarding the Federal Communications Commission's 2009 public hearing on the application of the principles of net neutrality, on 21st December 2010 the various elements that comprise the solution to this now famous controversy were passed. This solution has not satisfied many people, and nearly everyone agrees that it will not end the debate and nor will it resolve the underlying structural problems. This book examines the source, development and viewpoints on this issue based on contributions from leading experts from the academic and business worlds in the USA and Europe who have been involved in the debate. This is a highly important book for understanding the various points of view on the very current and controversial issue of web neutrality.
Since its popularization in the mid 1990s, the Internet has impacted nearly every aspect of our cultural and personal lives. Over the course of two decades, the Internet remained an unregulated medium whose characteristic openness allowed numerous applications, services, and websites to flourish. By 2005, Internet Service Providers began to explore alternative methods of network management that would permit them to discriminate the quality and speed of access to online content as they saw fit. In response, the Federal Communications Commission sought to enshrine "net neutrality" in regulatory policy as a means of preserving the Internet's open, nondiscriminatory characteristics. Although the FCC established a net neutrality policy in 2010, debate continues as to who ultimately should have authority to shape and maintain the Internet's structure. Regulating the Web brings together a diverse collection of scholars who examine the net neutrality policy and surrounding debates from a variety of perspectives. In doing so, the book contributes to the ongoing discourse about net neutrality in the hopes that we may continue to work toward preserving a truly open Internet structure in the United States.
As congressional policymakers continue to debate telecomm. reform, a major point of contention is the question of whether action is needed to ensure unfettered access to the Internet. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet, to ensure equal access and non-discriminatory treatment, is referred to as ¿net neutrality.¿A major focus in the debate is concern over whether it is necessary for policymakers to take steps to ensure access to the Internet for content, services, and applications providers, as well as consumers, what these steps should be. Contents of this report: Intro.; FCC Activity; Industry Initiatives; Network Mgmt.; The Policy Debate; Congress. Activity. A print on demand report.
In early 2018, the Federal Communications Commission issued a repeal of net neutrality rules, which mandated equal access to web content regardless of the provider, user, or platform. While many telecommunications companies expressed jubilation and pockets of the internet expressed outrage, many were left scratching their heads and wondering why net neutrality matters at all. this book answers that question, offering readers a collection of articles on the history and importance of net neutrality. Coverage includes the earliest debates over internet regulation, the enactment of a net neutrality policy under Obama, court decisions on its enforcement, and its 2018 repeal.
Net neutrality - all bits should be treated identically by broadband Internet service providers regardless of source - is hotly debated. Proponents find adequate competition among broadband providers to prevent harm from content-based discrimination. Opponents find such regulation premature or unnecessary, noting that uniform treatment precludes higher quality services and effective congestion management. Both sides neglect network externalities - the value of broadband to each content provider depends on the expected quality of links to others' content. Competition could exacerbate this, as each provider fails to internalize the network externality. This suggests an alternative approach - a minimum quality of service standard. This addresses underlying concerns at far lower cost than net neutrality, while fostering innovation by allowing providers to offer higher quality service and manage congestion, with the ancillary benefit of protecting potential speech rights of content providers. Ex post antitrust remedies will not be available if judicial limits on FCC authority remain.
Scientific Essay from the year 2014 in the subject Computer Science - Internet, New Technologies, , language: English, abstract: Over the past ten years, the debate over "network neutrality" has remained one of the central debates in Internet policy. Governments all over the world have been investigating whether legislative or regulatory action is needed to limit the ability of providers of Internet access services to interfere with the applications, content and services on their networks. Net neutrality comprises two separate non-discrimination commitments. Backward-looking ‘net neutrality lite’ claims that Internet users should not be disadvantaged due to opaque and invidious practices by their current Internet Service Provider (ISP). Forward-looking ‘positive net neutrality’ is a principle whereby higher Quality of Service (QoS) for higher prices should be offered on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms to all-comers. Neither extreme in the debate is an optimum solution. There is too much at stake to expect government to supplant the market in providing higher-speed connections, or for the market to continue to deliver without basic policy and regulatory backstops to ensure continued openness. Permitting content discrimination on the Internet will permit much more granular knowledge of what an ISP’s customers are doing on the Internet. A co-regulatory regime will ensure oversight and remove the most obvious abuses by fixed and mobile ISPs. Beyond rules that forbid network providers from blocking applications, content and services, non-discrimination rules are a key component of any network neutrality regime. This analytical study provides background on the debate over network neutrality, including the implications for business models going forward that have been attempted and that are currently in play. This article explains for a global policy audience what the regulatory and governance problems and potential solutions are for the issue referred to as ‘network neutrality’, unpacking its ‘lite’ and ‘heavy’ elements. Eschewing technical, economic or legalistic explanations previously tackled elsewhere, it explains that increasing Internet Service Provider (ISP) control over content risks not just differentiated pricing and speed on the Internet. It explains that a co-regulatory regime may ensure regulatory oversight and remove obvious abuses by fixed and mobile ISPs, without preventing innovation, while guarding against government abuse of the censorship opportunities provided by new technologies.
As congressional policymakers continue to debate telecommunications reform, a major discussion point revolves around what approach should be taken to ensure unfettered access to the internet. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the internet, to ensure equal access and nondiscriminatory treatment, is referred to as "net neutrality." There is no single accepted definition of "net neutrality," but most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network, and they should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in its February 26, 2015, open meeting voted 3-2, along party lines, to adopt open internet rules and released these rules on March 12, 2015. One of the most controversial aspects of the rules was the decision to reclassify broadband internet access service as telecommunications service under Title II, thereby subjecting internet service providers to a more stringent regulatory framework. With limited exceptions, the rules went into effect June 12, 2015. Various parties challenged the legality of the FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in a June 14, 2016, ruling, voted (2-1) to uphold the legality of all aspects of the 2015 FCC Order. A petition for full U.S. Appeals Court review was denied and a subsequent petition for U.S. Supreme Court review was declined. The FCC on December 14, 2017, adopted (3-2) an Order that largely reverses the 2015 regulatory framework. The 2017 Order, among other things, reverses the 2015 classification of broadband internet access services as a telecommunications service under Title II of the Communications Act, shifts much of the oversight from the FCC to the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, and provides for a less regulatory approach. This action has once again opened up the debate over what the appropriate framework is to ensure an open internet. Reaction to the 2017 Order has been mixed. Some see the 2015 FCC rules as regulatory overreach and welcome a more "light-touch" approach, which they feel will stimulate broadband investment, deployment, and innovation. Others support the 2015 regulations and feel that their reversal will result in a concentration of power to the detriment of content, services, and applications providers, as well as consumers, and refute the claim that these regulations have had a negative impact on broadband investment, expansion, or innovation. The 2017 Order was published in the Federal Register on February 22, 2018, and went into effect on June 11, 2018. Federal Register publication triggered timelines for both court challenges and Congressional Review Act (CRA) consideration. Petitions for review have been consolidated in the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit. CRA resolutions (S.J.Res. 52, H.J.Res. 129) to overturn the 2017 Order, were introduced in the 115th Congress. S.J.Res. 52 passed (52-47) the Senate, but H.J.Res. 129 was not considered in the House. The FCC's move to adopt the 2017 Order has reopened the debate over whether Congress should consider a measure to amend existing law to provide greater regulatory stability and guidance to the FCC regarding broadband access. Four bills (H.R. 4682, H.R. 6393, S. 2510, and S. 2853) to provide a regulatory framework to outline FCC authority over broadband internet access services were introduced, but not acted on, in the 115th Congress. Debate over what the appropriate regulatory framework should be for broadband access is expected to continue in the 116th Congress.
There is an ongoing global debate on network neutrality, a principle that prohibits Internet Service Providers (ISPs) such as Comcast from charging content providers like Netflix for preferential delivery of their content to end-users. In this paper, we shed new light on the debate by developing and analyzing a two-sided model of the Internet that not only allows the ISP to charge both end-users and content providers, but, in contrast to previous work, also incorporates the ability of content providers to charge end-users directly. We show that in this scenario, which is more realistic in today's world, all players are equally well off with or without network neutrality. This is in stark contrast to the findings obtained in a scenario where we limit content providers to rely on advertising alone for revenue; in such a context, content providers are worse off but the ISP and end-users are better off without network neutrality. We show that our results continue to hold when the content providers command different advertising rates, suggesting that removing network neutrality does not favor stronger content providers over weaker ones. We also study a scenario where only one content provider can charge end-users directly while the other relies only on advertising revenue. In this scenario, while the players are no longer indifferent between the two regimes, content providers can be better off and total surplus can reduce without network neutrality, which is in contrast to the findings obtained when both content providers are constrained to rely only on advertising for revenue.
