The Political Economy of Institutional Change in the Electricity Supply Industry
The Political Economy of Institutional Change in the Electricity Supply Industry

Author: Carlos Rufin

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

Published: 2003-01-01

Total Pages: 244

ISBN-13: 9781781957363

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Through a variety of analytical lenses - formal modeling, econometrics and case study comparisons - Carlos Rufín fills a gap in the political economy of second-wave, or microeconomic, reforms around the world. More specifically, he does so in the context of the electricity supply industry, where such reforms have been as problematic as they have been widespread. The author shows that ideological considerations and bargaining over the distribution of economic rents accruing from certain institutional arrangements are powerful shapers of institutional change. At the same time, the legacy of the past does not appear to have a clear or systematic effect on the direction of second-wave reforms that seek to transform existing economic institutions. If distributional conflicts can be resolved, these conclusions provide grounds for optimism about the ability to create new institutions even in countries where little favorable precedent exists.

Markets for Power
Markets for Power

Author: Paul L. Joskow

Publisher: MIT Press (MA)

Published: 1988-08-01

Total Pages: 269

ISBN-13: 9780262600187

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This timely study evaluates four generic proposals for allowing free market forces toreplace government regulation in the electric power industry and concludes that none of thederegulation alternatives considered represents a panacea for the performance failures associatedwith things as they are now. It proposes a balanced program of regulatory reform and deregulationthat promises to improve industry performance in the short run, resolve uncertainties about thecosts and benefits of deregulation, and positions the industry for more extensive deregulation inthe long run should interim experimentation with deregulation, structural, and regulatory reformsmake it desirable.The book integrates modern microeconomic theory with a comprehensive analysis ofthe economic, technical, and institutional characteristics of modern electrical power systems. Itemphasizes that casual analogies to successful deregulation efforts in other sectors of the economyare an inadequate and potentially misleading basis for public policy in the electric power industry,which has economic and technical characteristics that are quite different from those in otherderegulated industries.Paul L. Joskow is Professor of Economics at MIT, author of ControllingHospital Costs (MIT Press 1981) and coauthor with Martin L. Baughman and Dilip P. Kamat of ElectricPower in the United States (MIT Press 1979). Richard Schmalensee, also at MIT, is Professor ofApplied Economics, author of The Economics of Advertising and The Control of Natural Monopolies, andeditor of The MIT Press Series, Regulation of Economic Activity.

Deregulation, Innovation and Market Liberalization
Deregulation, Innovation and Market Liberalization

Author: L. Lynne Kiesling

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2008-09-03

Total Pages: 427

ISBN-13: 1135979804

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Over the past 50 years the US economy has experienced economic dynamism and technological change at a dizzying pace, driven substantially by innovation in digital communication technology. This dynamism has had limited effects in the electricity industry, and institutional change within the industry to adapt to these changes has been variable. Many states in the U.S. do not participate in open wholesale markets, and even more states have either no retail markets or have implemented such a restricted and politicized version of retail markets that potential retail market entrants still face substantial entry barriers. This book explores institutional design and regulatory policies in the US electricity industry that can adapt to unknown and changing conditions produced by economic, social, and technological change. Whereas the dominant regulatory paradigm has traditionally been centralized economic and physical control based on natural monopoly theory and power systems engineering, the ideas presented and synthesized by Kiesling compose a different paradigm – decentralized economic and physical coordination through contracts, transactions, price signals, and integrated intertemporal wholesale and retail markets. Digital communication technology, and its increasing pervasiveness and affordability, make this decentralized coordination possible. Kiesling argues that with decentralized coordination, distributed agents themselves control part of the system, and in aggregate their actions produce order. Technology makes this order feasible, but the institutions, the rules governing the interaction of agents in the system, contribute substantially to whether or not order can emerge from this decentralized coordination process.

The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform
The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform

Author: David G. Victor

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2007-02-08

Total Pages: 15

ISBN-13: 113946079X

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Over the last fifteen years the world's largest developing countries have initiated market reform in their electric power sectors from generation to distribution. This book evaluates the experiences of five of those countries - Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa - as they have shifted from state-dominated systems to schemes allowing for a larger private sector role. As well as having the largest power systems in their regions and among the most rapidly rising consumption of electricity in the world, these countries are the locus of massive financial investment and the effects of their power systems are increasingly felt in world fuel markets. This accessible volume explains the origins of these reform efforts and offers a theory as to why - despite diverse backgrounds - reform efforts in all five countries have stalled in similar ways. The authors also offer practical advice to improve reform policies.

Power Structure
Power Structure

Author: John E. Kwoka Jr.

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2007-08-28

Total Pages: 200

ISBN-13: 0585229651

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Power Structure examines the effects on economic performance of several key features of the U.S. electric power industry. Paramount among these are public versus private ownership, vertical integration versus deintegration, and retail competition versus monopoly distribution. Each of these, as well as other structural characteristics of utilities and their markets, are analyzed for their effects on costs and price. These issues are important for a number of reasons. The U.S. electric power industry is presently embarking on a fundamental restructuring in terms of integration and competition. In other countries, privatization of state-owned enterprises is being viewed as the answer to unsatisfactory performance. From a longer perspective, the question of the relative performance of publicly owned versus privately owned utilities in the U.S. has never been resolved. And despite much speculation there is little reliable evidence as to the importance of either vertical integration or competition.

Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform
Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform

Author: Witold J. Henisz

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 59

ISBN-13: 0050824155

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"Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizations whose activities are governed by the federal government). The authors observe that an actor's power alone may be sufficient to promote reform, regardless of the actor's legitimacy. But such reforms are more susceptible to subsequent change than those that emerge from processes not subject to the influence of external actors whose sway derives from their power alone. They develop and test their arguments in the context of the worldwide electricity provision industry by analyzing countries' adoption of reforms in response to conditional lending practices by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The authors find that reforms adopted in response to coercive pressures exerted by these organizations encounter much greater resistance, and that the incidence of financial and economic crises, the absence of checks and balances in established political institutions, and the inexperience of investor coalitions dramatically increase the predicted level of resistance. "--World Bank web site.