"Fortna demonstrates that peacekeeping is an extremely effective policy tool, dramatically reducing the risk that war will resume. Moreover, she explains that relatively small and militarily weak consent-based peacekeeping operations are often just as effective as larger, more robust enforcement missions. Fortna examines the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping, paying particular attention to the perspective of the peacekept--the belligerents themselves--on whose decisions the stability of peace depends."--publisher website.
Dennis C. Jett examines why peacekeeping operations fail by comparing the unsuccessful attempt at peacekeeping in Angola with the successful effort in Mozambique, alongside a wide range of other peacekeeping experiences. The book argues that while the causes of past peacekeeping failures can be identified, the chances for success will be difficult to improve because of the way such operations are initiated and conducted, and the way the United Nations operates as an organization. Jett reviews the history of peacekeeping and the evolution in the number, size, scope, and cost of peacekeeping missions. He also explains why peacekeeping has become more necessary, possible, and desired and yet, at the same time, more complex, more difficult, and less frequently used. The book takes a hard look at the UN's actions and provides useful information for understanding current conflicts.
Explains how peacekeeping can work effectively by employing power through verbal persuasion, financial inducement, and coercion short of offensive force.
When powerful states and international organizations decide to respond to violent conflict around the world, their preferred policy instrument is to deploy peace operations -- institutions that must serve both the international politics of their creation as well as the fractured local societies they aim to transform. But while their international face has been widely analysed, we know less about how peace operations function 'on the ground.' In How Peace Operations Work, Jeni Whalan addresses this critical dimension of peacekeeping. She analyses the effectiveness of peace operations through a local lens, asking new questions about how they work, and generating new insights about how they might be made to work better. What emerges is the overriding importance of local legitimacy -- the perception among local actors that a peace operation, its personnel, and its objectives are right, fair, and appropriate. How Peace Operations Work demonstrates that when local actors perceive a peace operation to be legitimate, they are more likely to help the operation achieve its goals. This book combines novel theoretical progress with rich empirical work, drawing on in-depth case studies of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) to propose a new approach to studying the effectiveness of peace operations, and a set of practical recommendations that challenge key elements of prevailing peace operations policy.
First published in 1998, Peacekeeping in Africa was written to help make up the shortfall in the number of books that concentrated specifically on peacekeeping in Africa. The book covers the main peacekeeping operations of Africa, and provides a wealth of background material. In doing so, it explores the policies and actions of the international organisations concerned and the participating African states. It also considers the impact of sub-regional powers and the role of the USA, Britain, and France. Comprising three parts, Peacekeeping in Africa examines world perspectives, case studies, and wider issues surrounding Africa’s peacekeeping operations.
Why do cease-fire agreements sometimes last for years while others flounder barely long enough to be announced? How to maintain peace in the aftermath of war is arguably one of the most important questions of the post--Cold War era. And yet it is one of the least explored issues in the study of war and peace. Here, Page Fortna offers the first comprehensive analysis of why cease-fires between states succeed or fail. She develops cooperation theory to argue that mechanisms within these agreements can help maintain peace by altering the incentives for war and peace, reducing uncertainty, and helping to prevent or manage accidents that could lead to war. To test this theory, the book first explores factors, such as decisive victory and prior history of conflict, that affect the baseline prospects for peace. It then considers whether stronger cease-fires are likely to be implemented in the hardest or the easiest cases. Next, through both quantitative and qualitative testing of the effects of cease-fire agreements, firm evidence emerges that agreements do matter. Durable peace is harder to achieve after some wars than others, but when most difficult, states usually invest more in peace building. These efforts work. Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war. Mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can help maintain peace between even the deadliest of foes.
Making War and Building Peace examines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.
UN peace operations are increasingly asked to pursue stabilization mandates with lofty expectations of being able to stabilize conflict zones, achieve national reconciliation, and rebuild state legitimacy. This book investigates the relationship between UN stabilization mandates and the concept of ‘human security’. The book is divided into three parts. Part I outlines the emergence of stabilization and other trends in peacekeeping practice and outlines an analytical framework of human security. Part II applies the analytical framework to case studies of MINUSMA, MINUSCA, and UNMISS examining issues, such as human rights, empowerment, protection, and vulnerability. In Part III the book draws out several concerns that arise from stabilization mandates, including the militarisation of UN peace operations and the consequences under international humanitarian law, the risks of close cooperation with the host state and engagement in counter-terror activities, and the potential clash between peacebuilding activities and militarisation. The book will be a valuable resource for academics, policymakers and practitioners working on UN peacekeeping generally, and those specifically looking at stabilization, from the perspective of international relations, international law, peace and conflict studies, security studies and human rights.
