THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND FRANCE DID NOT MERELY BEGIN OVER 70 YEARS AGO. The journey of discovery began even earlier, when French cartography was being developed as early routes to and around the Philippines were first being plotted by adventurous maritime explorers. The cover of this book depicts this journey: a French frigate bravely traverses the seas of Guillaume Deliste's 17th century world map, headed eastward in search of new discoveries, guided by the Philippine sun. As both countries rediscover each other by building an even better relationship in the future, it will be a continuous journey of both discovery and rediscovery.
In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem organized an election to depose chief-of-state Bao Dai, after which he proclaimed himself the first president of the newly created Republic of Vietnam. The United States sanctioned the results of this election, which was widely condemned as fraudulent, and provided substantial economic aid and advice to the RVN. Because of this, Diem is often viewed as a mere puppet of the United States, in service of its Cold War geopolitical strategy. That narrative, Jessica M. Chapman contends in Cauldron of Resistance, grossly oversimplifies the complexity of South Vietnam's domestic politics and, indeed, Diem's own political savvy. Based on extensive work in Vietnamese, French, and American archives, Chapman offers a detailed account of three crucial years, 1953-1956, during which a new Vietnamese political order was established in the south. It is, in large part, a history of Diem's political ascent as he managed to subdue the former Emperor Bao Dai, the armed Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious organizations, and the Binh Xuyen crime organization. It is also an unparalleled account of these same outcast political powers, forces that would reemerge as destabilizing political and military actors in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Chapman shows Diem to be an engaged leader whose personalist ideology influenced his vision for the new South Vietnamese state, but also shaped the policies that would spell his demise. Washington's support for Diem because of his staunch anticommunism encouraged him to employ oppressive measures to suppress dissent, thereby contributing to the alienation of his constituency, and helped inspire the organized opposition to his government that would emerge by the late 1950s and eventually lead to the Vietnam War.
Walter Hallstein was among the great European visionaries. This is the first book length study of one of the key shapers of the European Community in its early years. The range of contributors include those who worked with Hallstein and have personal recollections of him, and younger historians drawing upon documents only recently available. The book contains sections on his contribution as State Secretary to post-war German foreign policy, his seminal role as the first President of the Commission of the EEC and the legacy of his work and ideas and later years as President of the European Movement.
This is a political biography of the French industrialist and political activist Jacques Lemaigre Dubreuil (1894-1955), president of the Taxpayers' Federation in the 1930s, entrepreneur in wartime France and Africa, organizer of the 'Group of Five' in Algiers which prepared for the Allied landings in North Africa (November 1942), 'inventor' of General Henri Giraud as a candidate for the leadership of liberated North and West Africa, negotiator of the Murphy-Giraud Agreements and the Anfa Memorandum with President Roosevelt (1942 and 1943), political writer on the postwar future of France in Morocco and the owner of the liberal newspaper Maroc-Presse. He was assassinated in Casablanca by French counter-terrorists in June 1955, a 'turning point' event which pushed the French government to grant independence to Morroco. Was he a rabble-rouser, a demagogue, a betrayer of French interests at home and overseas or a reformer, a patriot, a hero of the anti-German resistance, and a champion of Franco-Moroccan solidarity?
This book examines French motivations behind the decolonisation of Tunisia and Morocco and the intra-Western Alliance relationships. It argues that changing French policy towards decolonisation brought about the unexpectedly quick process of independence of dependencies in the post-WWII era.
This volume offers a unique perspective on a turbulent and dangerous age by focusing on the activities and accomplishments of its diplomats. Its twenty-three interconnected essays discuss the politics of ambassadors, foreign ministers, and heads of state from Acheson and Adenauer to Sadat and Gromyko, as well as the special problems of the professionals in the foreign offices and the role of the media in modern diplomacy. Among its contributors are such distinguished international scholars as Akira Iriye, Michael Brecher, Stanley Hoffmann, W. W. Rostow, and Norman Stone. Expanding the field of inquiry covered by its acclaimed predecessor, The Diplomats, 1919–1939, which concentrated on Europe and the coming of the Second World War, these essays showcase the major diplomatic practitioners of the period against the broader background of the problems and crises that confronted them—among others, the Polish question at the end of World War II, the onset of the Cold War, the defeat of EDC in 1954, the Suez crisis, Kruschchev's Berlin note in 1958, the Middle East War of 1967 and the oil shock of 1973, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This account of the pendular swing from crisis and detente and back again is given a global perspective by careful treatment of the diplomacy of new nations like India, Communist China, and Israel, and the transformation of the Middle East and Japan. Among the new perspectives offered here are Geoffrey Warner's critical view of Ernest Bevin's attitude toward the United States, John Lewis Gaddis's judgment of Henry Kissinger's detente policy, W. W. Rostow's analysis of the diplomatic method of Paul Monnnet, Rena Fonseca's assessment of Nehru's policy of nonalignment, Shu Guang Zhang's fresh look at the relationship between Zhou Enlai and Mao, and Paul Gordon Lauren's critique of U.N. crisis management from Trygve Lie to Perez de Cuellar. Highly original also are Steven Miner's portrait of Molotov, Michael Brecher's pioneering study of the diplomacy of Abba Eben, and James McAdams's analysis of German Ostpolitik. Originally published in 1994. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This title includes a new Foreword by WM. Roger Louis. On 26 July 1956, the British Empire received a blow from which it would never recover. On this day, Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, one of the gems of Britain's imperial portfolio. It was to be a fateful day for Britain as a world power. Britain, France and Israel subsequently colluded in attacking Egypt, ostensibly - in the case of Britain and France - to protect the Suez Canal but in reality in an attempt to depose Nasser. The US opposition to this scheme forced an ignominious withdrawal, leaving Nasser triumphant and marking a decisive end to Britain's imperial era. In this, the seminal work on the Suez Crisis, Keith Kyle draws on a wealth of documentary evidence to tell this fascinating political, military and diplomatic story. Including new introductory material, this revised edition of a classic work will be essential reading for anyone interested in the history of the twentieth century, military history and the end of empire.
The monumental events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union must be understood, Jan Van Oudenaren argues, in the context of a process of East-West détente begun in 1953 in the aftermath of Stalin's death. Van Oudenaren's comprehensive and timely study examines the development of Soviet-Western détente from the death of Stalin to the unification of Germany. In redefining détente as a process, rather than a code of conduct, Van Oudenaren looks to its origins in Soviet policy earlier than previously identified and analyzes both its history and character. His study explores the restoration of four-power negotiations in Germany and Austria in the mid-1950s, their subsequent breakdown in the Berlin crisis, their unexpected revival in 1990 in the form of "two plus four" talks on German unity, and the future of the Soviet Union as a European power. Among the key elements of détente discussed are diplomacy, particularly the role of summit conferences; cooperation among parliaments, political parties, and trade unions; arms control; economic relations; and links among cultural institutions, churches, and peace movements.
