Do Banks Provision for Bad Loans in Good Times?
Do Banks Provision for Bad Loans in Good Times?

Author: Michèle Cavallo

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 40

ISBN-13:

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Recent debate about the pro-cyclical effects of bank capital requirements, has ignored the important role that bank loan loss provisions play in the overall framework of minimum capital regulation. It is frequently observed that under-provisioning, due to inadequate assessment of expected credit losses, aggravates the negative effect of minimum capital requirements during recessions, because capital must absorb both expected, and unexpected losses. Moreover, when expected losses are properly reflected in lending rates, but not in provisioning practices, fluctuations in bank earnings magnify true oscillations in bank profitability. The relative agency problems faced by different stakeholders, may help explain the prevailing, and often unsatisfactory institutional arrangements. The authors test their hypotheses with a sample of 1,176 large commercial banks - 372 of them in non-G10 countries - for the period 1988-99. After controlling for different country-specific macroeconomic, and institutional features, they find robust evidence among G10 banks, of a positive association between loan loss provisions, and banks' pre-provision income. Such evidence is not confirmed for non-G10 banks, which on average, provision too little in good times, and are forced to increase provisions in bad times. The econometric evidence shows that the protection of outsiders' claims - the claims of minority shareholders in common law countries, and of fiscal authorities in countries with high public debt - on bank income, has negative effects on the level of bank provisions.

Do Banks Provision for Bad Loans in Good Times? Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications
Do Banks Provision for Bad Loans in Good Times? Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications

Author: Michele Cavallo

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 34

ISBN-13:

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The general recognition that bank capital should provide a buffer for unexpected losses assumes that expected losses are considered in setting loan loss provisions. Failure to provide coherent and internationally accepted regulation of provisions for loan losses reduces the usefulness of minimum capital regulations, especially in emerging economies.Recent debate about the pro-cyclical effects of bank capital requirements has ignored the important role that bank loan loss provisions play in the overall framework of minimum capital regulation. It is frequently observed that underprovisioning, due to inadequate assessment of expected credit losses, aggravates the negative effect of minimum capital requirements during recessions because capital must absorb both expected and unexpected losses. Moreover, when expected losses are properly reflected in lending rates but not in provisioning practices, fluctuations in bank earnings magnify true oscillations in bank profitability.The relative agency problems faced by different stakeholders may help explain the prevailing and often unsatisfactory institutional arrangements. Cavallo and Majnoni test their hypotheses with a sample of 1,176 large commercial banks - 372 of them in non-G10 countries - for the period 1988-99. After controlling for different country-specific macroeconomic and institutional features, they find robust evidence among G10 banks of a positive association between loan loss provisions and banks' pre-provision income. Such evidence is not confirmed for non-G10 banks, which on average provision too little in good times and are forced to increase provisions in bad times.The econometric evidence shows that the protection of outsiders' claims - the claims of minority shareholders in common law countries and of fiscal authorities in countries with high public debt - on bank income has negative effects on the level of bank provisions.This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the impact of financial regulation on economic development.

Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System
Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System

Author: Richard M. Levich

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 380

ISBN-13: 1461509998

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Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System brings together the research of economists at New York University and the University of Maryland, along with those from the private sector, government bodies, and other universities. The first section of the volume focuses on the historical origins of the credit rating business and its present day industrial organization structure. The second section presents several empirical studies crafted largely around individual firm-level or bank-level data. These studies examine (a) the relationship between ratings and the default and recovery experience of corporate borrowers, (b) the comparability of credit ratings made by domestic and foreign rating agencies, and (c) the usefulness of financial market indicators for rating banks, among other topics. In the third section, the record of sovereign credit ratings in predicting financial crises and the reaction of financial markets to changes in credit ratings is examined. The final section of the volume emphasizes policy issues now facing regulators and credit rating agencies.

Accounting discretion of banks during a financial crisis
Accounting discretion of banks during a financial crisis

Author: Mr.Luc Laeven

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2009-09-01

Total Pages: 43

ISBN-13: 1451873549

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This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair-value accounting, and these banks provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks.

Staff Guidance Note on Macroprudential Policy
Staff Guidance Note on Macroprudential Policy

Author: International Monetary Fund

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2014-06-11

Total Pages: 45

ISBN-13: 1498342620

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This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries

Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking
Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking

Author: Natalya Martynova

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2015-11-25

Total Pages: 44

ISBN-13: 1513565818

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Traditional theory suggests that more profitable banks should have lower risk-taking incentives. Then why did many profitable banks choose to invest in untested financial instruments before the crisis, realizing significant losses? We attempt to reconcile theory and evidence. In our setup, banks are endowed with a fixed core business. They take risk by levering up to engage in risky ‘side activities’(such as market-based investments) alongside the core business. A more profitable core business allows a bank to borrow more and take side risks on a larger scale, offsetting lower incentives to take risk of given size. Consequently, more profitable banks may have higher risk-taking incentives. The framework is consistent with cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run up to the recent financial crisis.

Chile's Regional Arrangements and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
Chile's Regional Arrangements and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas

Author: Glenn W. Harrison

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 48

ISBN-13:

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July 2001 - Among Chile's bilateral regional agreements, only Chile's agreements with "Northern" partners provide enough market access to offset the costs to Chile of trade diversion. Because of preferential market access, however, "additive regionalism" is likely to provide Chile with far more gains than the static welfare gains from unilateral free trade. At least one partner country loses from each of the regional trade agreements considered in this study, and excluded countries always lose. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) produces gains for almost all the member countries, but the European Union is a big loser. Countries of the Americas gain more in aggregate from global free trade than from the FTAA. Using a multisector, multicountry, computable general equilibrium model, Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr examine Chile's strategy of negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with all of its significant trading partners (referring to this policy as additive regionalism). They also evaluate the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and global free trade. Among Chile's bilateral regional agreements, only Chile's agreements with "Northern" partners provide enough market access to offset the costs to Chile of trade diversion. Because of preferential market access, however, additive regionalism is likely to provide Chile with many times as many gains as the static welfare gains from unilateral free trade. Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr find that at least one partner country loses from each of the regional trade agreements they consider, and excluded countries as a group always lose. They estimate that the FTAA produces large welfare gains for the members, with the European Union being the big loser. Gains to the world from global free trade are estimated to be at least 36 times greater than gains from the FTAA. Even countries of the Americas in aggregate gain more from global free trade than from the FTAA. This paper--a product of Trade, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to examine the impact of regional trade arrangements on development and poverty reduction. David Tarr may be contacted at [email protected].