Offering a fresh and challenging interpretation of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy in both historical and conceptual terms, Litwak focuses on the relationship between its two central elements: The United States-Soviet detente and the Nixon Doctrine, which provided the basis not only for the subsequent American withdrawal from Vietnam, but also for United States security policy toward the Third World in general.
A long-time U.S. policy insider’s scholarly and encyclopedic history with unprecedented analysis of the official documents of the Cold War explores its Marxist-Leninist totalitarian roots, faltering pre-Reagan U.S. strategies of Containment, MAD, and Détente, and the Reagan Revolution. This book details Reagan’s integrated new strategies in defense, arms control, diplomacy, information and intelligence, and support for the faiths and forces of freedom that collapsed the Soviet ideology and empire.
In this revisionist account of U.S.-Iran relations during the Cold War, Roham Alvandi provides a detailed historical study of the partnership that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran forged with U.S. President Richard Nixon and his adviser Henry Kissinger in the 1970s.
The U.S.-European relationship remains the closest and most important alliance in the world. Since 1945, successive American presidents each put their own touches on transatlantic relations, but the literature has reached only into the presidency of Lyndon Johnson (1963-9). This first study of transatlantic relations during the era of Richard Nixon shows a complex, turbulent period during which the postwar period came to an end, and the modern era came to be on both sides of the Atlantic in terms of political, economic, and military relations.
In this revised edition of his acclaimed 1985 volume, incorporating newly declassified secret Russian as well as American materials, Raymond Garthoff reexamines the historical development of American-Soviet relations from 1969 through 1980. The book takes into account both the broader context of world politics and internal political considerations and developments, and examines these developments as experienced by both sides. Despite a long history as rivals and adversaries, the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached a ditente in relations in 1972. From 1975 to 1979, however, this ditente gradually eroded until it collapsed in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Garthoff recounts how differences in ideology, perceptions, aims, and interests were key determinants of both U.S. and Soviet policies. Involvements in Europe, with China, and in the third world further entangled their relations. And each saw the other not only as harboring hostile intentions but also as building military and other capabilities to support such aims. Ditente--as well as confrontation--remained an alternative only within the constraints of a continuing cold war. Praise for the first edition: "A gold mine of information." The New York Times Book Review "A monumental contribution offering insightful, rarely considered comparisons of Soviet and American perspectives." Library Journal Praise for the revised edition: "This unprecedented, detailed volume adds invaluable new information to the public knowledge and the historical record." Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin
This book contains the papers on Soviet foreign policy, concentrating on the constants that form the bedrock of Soviet policy and the Soviet variant of a policy of detente. It deals with the cultural-historical background that lies behind the political outlooks of the United States and Russia.
This book will illustrate that despite the variations of nuclear tensions during the Cold War period—from nuclear inception, to mass proliferation, to arms control treaties and détente, through to an intensification and “reasonable” conclusion (the INF Treaty and START being case points)—the “lessons” over the last decade are quickly being unlearned. Given debates surrounding the emerging “new Cold War,” the deterioration of relations between Russia and the United States, and the concurrent challenges being made by key nuclear states in obfuscating arms control mechanisms, this book attempts to provide a much needed revisit into US presidential foreign policy during the Cold War. Across nine chapters, the monograph traces the United States’ nuclear diplomacy and Presidential strategic thought, transitioning across the early period of Cold War arms racing through to the era’s defining conclusion. It will reveal that notwithstanding the heightened periods when great power conflict seemed imminent, arms control fora and seminal agreements were able to be devised, implemented, and provided a needed base in bringing down the specter of a cataclysmic nuclear war, as well as improving bilateral relations. This volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, diplomatic history, security studies and international relations.
During the 2008 election season, the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates both aspired to be understood as foreign policy "realists" in the mold of Henry Kissinger. Kissinger, who is distrusted on the neoconservative right for his skepticism about American exceptionalism and on the liberal left for his amoral, realpolitik approach, once again stood as the sage of foreign relations and the wise man who rises above partisan politics. In The Eccentric Realist, Mario Del Pero questions this depiction of Kissinger. Lauded as the foreign policy realist par excellence, Kissinger, as Del Pero shows, has been far more ideological and inconsistent in his policy formulations than is commonly realized.Del Pero considers the rise and fall of Kissinger's foreign policy doctrine over the course of the 1970s—beginning with his role as National Security Advisor to Nixon and ending with the collapse of détente with the Soviet Union after Kissinger left the scene as Ford's outgoing Secretary of State. Del Pero shows that realism then (not unlike realism now) was as much a response to domestic politics as it was a cold, hard assessment of the facts of international relations. In the early 1970s, Americans were weary of ideological forays abroad; Kissinger provided them with a doctrine that translated that political weariness into foreign policy. Del Pero argues that Kissinger was keenly aware that realism could win elections and generate consensus. Moreover, over the course of the 1970s it became clear that realism, as practiced by Kissinger, was as rigid as the neoconservativism that came to replace it.In the end, the failure of the détente forged by the realists was not the defeat of cool reason at the hands of ideologically motivated and politically savvy neoconservatives. Rather, the force of American exceptionalism, the touchstone of the neocons, overcame Kissinger's political skills and ideological commitments. The fate of realism in the 1970s raises interesting questions regarding its prospects in the early years of the twenty-first century.
