This Safety Guide provides recommendations on meeting the requirements of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1) relevant to reactor containment and associated systems. The publication addresses the containment structure and the systems with the functions of isolation, control and management of mass and energy releases, control and limitation of radioactive releases, and control and management of combustible gases. The Safety Guide is intended for use primarily for land based, stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors designed for electricity generation or for other heat generating applications, such as for district heating or desalination.
This Safety Guide provides recommendations on meeting the requirements of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1) relevant to reactor containment and associated systems. The publication addresses the containment structure and the systems with the functions of isolation, control and management of mass and energy releases, control and limitation of radioactive releases, and control and management of combustible gases. The Safety Guide is intended for use primarily for land based, stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors designed for electricity generation or for other heat generating applications, such as for district heating or desalination.
On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.
A concise and current treatment of the subject of nuclear power safety, this work addresses itself to such issues of public concern as: radioactivity in routine effluents and its effect on human health and the environment, serious reactor accidents and their consequences, transportation accidents involving radioactive waste, the disposal of radioactive waste, particularly high-level wastes, and the possible theft of special nuclear materials and their fabrication into a weapon by terrorists. The implementation of the defense-in-depth concept of nuclear power safety is also discussed. Of interest to all undergraduate and graduate students of nuclear engineering, this work assumes a basic understanding of scientific and engineering principles and some familiarity with nuclear power reactors
The present report is a revision of Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-3 (1988), updating the statements made on the objectives and principles of safe design and operation for electricity generating nuclear power plants. It includes the improvements made in the safety of operating nuclear power plants and identifies the principles underlying the best current safety policies to be applied in future plants. It presents INSAG's understanding of the principles underlying the best current safety policies and practices of the nuclear power industry.
La 4e de couverture indique : Organizes and presents all the latest thought on LWR nuclear safety in one consolidated volume, provided by the top experts in the field, ensuring high-quality, credible and easily accessible information.
Author: National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants
The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants" is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. "Lessons Learned" makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, "Lessons Learned" is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.
Despite all the efforts being put into expanding renewable energy sources, large-scale power stations will be essential as part of a reliable energy supply strategy for a longer period. Given that they are low on CO2 emissions, many countries are moving into or expanding nuclear energy to cover their baseload supply. Building structures required for nuclear plants whose protective function means they are classified as safety-related, have to meet particular construction requirements more stringent than those involved in conventional construction. This book gives a comprehensive overview from approval aspects given by nuclear and construction law, with special attention to the interface between plant and construction engineering, to a building structure classification. All life cycle phases are considered, with the primary focus on execution. Accidental actions on structures, the safety concept and design and fastening systems are exposed to a particular treatment. Selected chapters from the German concrete yearbook are now being published in the new English "Beton-Kalender Series" for the benefit of an international audience. Since it was founded in 1906, the Ernst & Sohn "Beton-Kalender" has been supporting developments in reinforced and prestressed concrete. The aim was to publish a yearbook to reflect progress in "ferro-concrete" structures until - as the book's first editor, Fritz von Emperger (1862-1942), expressed it - the "tempestuous development" in this form of construction came to an end. However, the "Beton-Kalender" quickly became the chosen work of reference for civil and structural engineers, and apart from the years 1945-1950 has been published annually ever since.
The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for meeting the IAEA safety requirements in performing or managing a level 2 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) project for a nuclear power plant; thus it complements the Safety Guide on level 1 PSA. One of the aims of this Safety Guide is to promote a standard framework, standard terms and a standard set of documents for level 2 PSAs to facilitate regulatory and external peer review of their results. It describes all elements of the level 2 PSA that need to be carried out if the starting point is a fully comprehensive level 1 PSA. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. PSA project management and organization; 3. Identification of design aspects important to severe accidents and acquisition of information; 4. Interface with level 1 PSA: Grouping of sequences; 5. Accident progression and containment analysis; 6. Source terms for severe accidents; 7. Documentation of the analysis: Presentation and interpretation of results; 8. Use and applications of the PSA; References; Annex I: Example of a typical schedule for a level 2 PSA; Annex II: Computer codes for simulation of severe accidents; Annex III: Sample outline of documentation for a level 2 PSA study.
