This Worldwide List of Alternative Theories and Critics (only avalailable in english language) includes scientists involved in scientific fields. The 2023 issue of this directory includes the scientists found in the Internet. The scientists of the directory are only those involved in physics (natural philosophy). The list includes 9700 names of scientists (doctors or diplome engineers for more than 70%). Their position is shortly presented together with their proposed alternative theory when applicable. There are nearly 3500 authors of such theories, all amazingly very different from one another. The main categories of theories are presented in an other book of Jean de Climont THE ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
The word “dissident” is used in a broad sense. It includes scientists proposing not fully accepted ideas within the Relativity-Quantum Mechanics paradigm as well as opponents to some aspects of these theories.
This insightful Handbook scrutinizes alternative concepts and approaches to the dominant economic or industrial theories of innovation. Providing an assessment of these alternatives, it questions the absence of these neglected types of innovation and suggests diverse theories.
In a recent poll of practicing art critics, 75 percent reported that rendering judgments on artworks was the least significant aspect of their job. This is a troubling statistic for philosopher and critic Noel Carroll, who argues that that the proper task of the critic is not simply to describe, or to uncover hidden meanings or agendas, but instead to determine what is of value in art. Carroll argues for a humanistic conception of criticism which focuses on what the artist has achieved by creating or performing the work. Whilst a good critic should not neglect to contextualize and offer interpretations of a work of art, he argues that too much recent criticism has ignored the fundamental role of the artist's intentions. Including examples from visual, performance and literary arts, and the work of contemporary critics, Carroll provides a charming, erudite and persuasive argument that evaluation of art is an indispensable part of the conversation of life.
These essays, written in the 1930s and 1940s, represent a first selection in English from the major work of the founder of the famous Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. Horkheimer's writings are essential to an understanding of the intellectual background of the New Left and the to much current social-philosophical thought, including the work of Herbert Marcuse. Apart from their historical significance and even from their scholarly eminence, these essays contain an immediate relevance only now becoming fully recognized.
This volume examines Popper’s philosophy by analyzing the criticism of his most popular critics: Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos. They all followed his rejection of the traditional view of science as inductive. Starting from the assumption that Hume’s criticism of induction is valid, the book explores the central criticism and objections that these three critics have raised. Their objections have met with great success, are significant and deserve paraphrase. One also may consider them reasonable protests against Popper’s high standards rather than fundamental criticisms of his philosophy. The book starts out with a preliminary discussion of some central background material and essentials of Popper’s philosophy. It ends with nutshell representations of the philosophies of Popper. Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos. The middle section of the book presents the connection between these philosophers and explains what their central ideas consists of, what the critical arguments are, how they presented them, and how valid they are. In the process, the author claims that Popper's popular critics used against him arguments that he had invented (and answered) without saying so. They differ from him mainly in that they demanded of all criticism that it should be constructive: do not stop believing a refuted theory unless there is a better alternative to it. Popper hardly ever discussed belief, delegating its study to psychology proper; he usually discussed only objective knowledge, knowledge that is public and thus open to public scrutiny.
In this book, Walter Friedman exposes internal contradictions that nullify the theory of evolution. He also reveals the ways Charles Darwin falsified observation data to promote his pseudoscientific discovery. In a variety of ways, Friedman aims to undercut the logical assumptions of evolutionary theory. First, he applies elementary probability theory to show that a random mutation cannot spread to an entire population, which means that the evolution of species is a myth. Friedman further contends that the centerpiece of Darwin's theory--the hypothesis of natural selection--is also a statistical impossibility, as simple arithmetic reveals. Third, he turns to genetics data to demonstrate that the idea of the evolution of species leads to ridiculous conclusions. Next, Friedman employs anthropological findings of so-called human ancestors to argue the reverse of what anthropologists believe to be true-- that evolution never took place. Fifth, Friedman appeals to the laws of physics to explain why it is impossible, in principle, for inorganic matter to transform into organic matter with a DNA-like structure. Darwin's racist view of people of African descent and its legal implications for the teaching of the evolutionary theory in public schools are also investigated. The last section of the book provides extensive criticism of the books written by prominent evolutionists, including Darwin. Friedman points out that a vast majority of false scientific theories stumbled and fell not because they were replaced by new, more sophisticated theories, but simply because of an abundance of conflicting statements and disagreement with the experimental data. For the same reasons, he finally asserts, the theory of evolution is destined for oblivion.
Why do critics feel impelled to unmask and demystify the works that they read? What is the rationale for their conviction that language is always withholding some important truth, that the critic's task is to unearth what is unsaid, naturalized, or repressed? These are the features of critique, a mode of thought that thoroughly dominates academic criticism. In this book, Rita Felski brilliantly exposes critique's more troubling qualities and proposes alternatives to it. Critique, she argues, is not just a method but also a sensibility--one best captured by Paul Ricoeur's phrase "the hermeneutics of suspicion." As the characteristic affect of critique, suspicion, Felski shows, helps us understand critique's seductions and limitations. The questions that Felski poses about critique have implications well beyond intramural debates among literary scholars. Literary studies, says Felski, is facing a legitimation crisis thanks to a sadly depleted language of value that leaves the field struggling to find reasons why students should care about Beowulf or Baudelaire. Why is literature worth bothering with? For Felski, the tendencies to make literary texts the object of suspicious reading or, conversely, impute to them qualities of critique, forecloses too many other possibilities. Felski offers an alternative model that she calls "postcritical reading." Rather than looking behind the text for its hidden causes, conditions, and motives, she suggests that literary scholars place themselves in front of a text, reflecting on what it calls forth and makes possible. Here Felski enlists the work of Bruno Latour to rethink reading as a co-production between actors, rather than an unraveling of manifest meaning, a form of making rather than unmaking. As a scholar with an abiding respect for theory who has long deployed elements of critique in her own work, Felski is able to provide an insider's account of critique's limits and alternatives that will resonate widely in the humanities.
William Whewell's views on the philosophy of science were dismissed as incoherent and eclectic when he introduced them in the middle of the 19th century, though some leading contemporaries engaged and even incorporated them. When his ideas were resurrected a century later, they were dismissed as poor induction rather than original thinking. Wettersten (philosophy of science, Mannheim U., Germany) explores why Whewell's impact continues to be felt, and why almost all theorists have had to come to terms with his ideas. He also addresses larger concerns such as whether traditions can be assessed rationally, and whether there is a logic to how they change or can be changed. Six commentaries follow his treatise, and he responds to them. Annotation : 2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).
