This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. DoD relies overwhelmingly on commercial electrical power grids for secure, uninterrupted electrical power supplies to support its critical assets and is the single largest consumer of energy in the U.S. In 2008, it was reported that "[c]ritical national security and homeland defense missions are at an unacceptably high risk of extended outage from failure of the grid". Commercial electrical power grids have become increasingly fragile and vulnerable to extended disruptions that could severely impact DoD's critical assets. This report addresses these issues and argues that with more detailed knowledge of the assets' risks and vulnerabilities to electrical power disruptions, DoD can better avoid compromising crucial DoD-wide missions during electrical power disruptions.
According to the Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS), there are thousands of facilities in the U.S. that if destroyed by a disaster could cause casualties, econ. losses, or disruptions to national security. DHS issued the Nat. Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in June 2006 to provide the approach for integrating the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources. This report studied DHS's Jan. 2009 revisions to the NIPP in light of a debate over whether DHS has emphasized protection rather than resilience. The report discusses: (1) how the 2009 NIPP changed compared to the 2006 NIPP; and (2) how DHS addressed resiliency as part of their planning efforts. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find report.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations