This paper examines voluntary disclosures of information about corporate strategies. We develop a model in which managers choose whether to reveal their strategic plans only to some partners of the firm or also to the outside world. We show that managers face a tradeoff when deciding whether to disclose their private information to outsiders. On the one hand, by disclosing their intentions, managers become reluctant to change their minds in the future. This may lead them to make inefficient project implementation decisions. On the other hand, information disclosure about corporate strategy provides strong incentives for partners of the firm to undertake strategy-specific investments.
This paper develops a theory of strategic information disclosure with disagreement. Managers of firms are voluntarily communicating subjective information, and prior beliefs about the strategy to maximize project value are rational but heterogeneous, potentially generating fundamental disagreement. Three main results are derived. First, not all firms disclose (subjective) information about strategy. Second, more valuable firms, and those whose strategies investors are more likely to agree with, disclose less information in equilibrium. Third, improved corporate governance leads to lower executive compensation and less information disclosure. An implication of the analysis for banks is that greater strategic information disclosure may increase the probability of bank runs -- banks may choose to be opaque because transparency makes them fragile.
Business leaders increasingly face pressure from stakeholders to be transparent. There appears however little consensus on the risks and payoffs of disclosing vital information such as corporate strategy. To fill this gap, this study analyzes firm-specific determinants and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Stakeholder theory and agency theory help to understand whether companies serve their interest to engage with stakeholders and overcome information asymmetries. I connect these theories and propose a comprehensive approach to measure voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Hypotheses from the theoretical framework are empirically tested through panel regression of data on identified determinants and outcomes and of disclosed strategy through annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports, corporate websites and corporate press releases by the 70 largest publicly listed companies in the Netherlands from 2003 through 2008. I found that industry, profitability, dual-listing status, national ranking status and listing age have significant effects on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effects are found for size, leverage and ownership concentration. On outcomes, I found that liquidity of stock and corporate reputation are significantly influenced by voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effect is found for volatility of stock. My contributions to theory, methodology and empirics offers a stepping-stone for further research into understanding how companies can use transparency to manage stakeholder relations.
This book presents a range of recent advances concerning industrial restructuring strategies, industrial organization, industrial policy, departmental economic research, industrial competitiveness, regional industrial structure, national industrial economic security theory and empirical research. Successfully combining theory and practice, the book gathers the outcomes of the “6th International Conference on Industrial Economics System and Industrial Security Engineering”, which was held at the University of Maryland, USA.
I empirically investigate the managements' decision to voluntarily disclose strategic information. While carrying a benefit of reduced information asymmetry, strategic information disclosure carries a cost of investors disagreeing with managements' strategy and thus refusing to provide funding to the firm. Using a handcollected sample of information releases, I identify firm characteristics that affect the likelihood of strategic information disclosure. In Essay I, I illustrate that the level of information asymmetry and investor management disagreement affects the strategic information disclosure decision. Furthermore, I show that, controlling for the level of information asymmetry and investor-management disagreement, firms with higher intrinsic value are less likely to disclose strategic information. Finally, I study the cross-sectional variation of the announcement returns around standalone strategic information releases. In Essay II, I empirically investigate the relation between the quality of corporate governance and the propensity of the firm to disclose strategic information. I demonstrate that companies with better contractual bonding mechanism of corporate governance (lower managerial entrenchment) are less likely to disclose strategic information. Firms that enjoy better monitoring through higher board independence and better quality auditors possess a higher propensity to provide strategic guidance. Furthermore, I investigate the link between the level and the structure of executive compensation and strategic information disclosure. Empirical results suggest an existence of a "disclosure bonus" that is paid to executives following strategic information disclosure. The bonus reflects in the level of total compensation, the salary, and the equity-related component of executive compensation.
This new work by Neil W. Chamberlain will be of great importance to the business community -- and to all those charged with defining the role large corporations play in the affairs of society. Social Strategy and Corporate Structure is an objective, indepth examination of the organizational requirements of a social role for large-scale business. The role Neil Chamberlain presents is one of heroic dimensions: the political choice of goals, the strategic allocation of resources, and the tactical operations of the mechanisms of production. While there has been much discussion of corporate social responsibility, few have investigated the ways its structure will have to change if the corporation is to pursue a strategy that is both economic and social. This timely book integrates a large number of issues involving corporate activities and governance that go directly to the heart of this problem. In step-by-step detail, Chamberlain analyzes the organizational imperatives of this new age of social responsibility: the composition and functions of boards of directors and the relation of their duties to a broad system of national planning; the internal social audit; changes in the characteristics of corporate social planning; and proposals for restructuring ultimate corporate authority, either through public or outside directors. In addition, he examines the potential relevance of federal chartering of corporations, and the effects of international economic interdependence on the development of a new corporate social strategy. This book is not a detailed blueprint for change. Rather, it presents a thorough, systematic study of available courses of action for improvement, based on the principle that conventional notions of corporate independence will have to be modified for any social strategy to work. And while not everyone will agree with Neil Chamberlain, few can afford to ignore his provocative insights into what corporations must do to function effectively in a changed social environment.
The Handbook offers a diverse set of scholarly perspectives on the nature of corporate reputation: what it is, where it comes from, and how it may be managed to create and protect corporate as well as societal value. Written and organized in an accessible way, it assesses the current state of the field and provides guidance for future research.
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Big Data Economy and Digital Management (BDEDM 2023) supported by University Malaysia Sabah, Malaysia, held on 6th–8th January 2023 in Changsha, China (virtual conference). The immediate purpose of this Conference was to bring together experienced as well as young scientists who are interested in working actively on various aspects of Big Data Economy and Digital Management. The keynote speeches addressed major theoretical issues, current and forthcoming observational data as well as upcoming ideas in both theoretical and observational sectors. Keeping in mind the “academic exchange first” approach, the lectures were arranged in such a way that the young researchers had ample scope to interact with the stalwarts who are internationally leading experts in their respective fields of research. The major topics covered in the Conference are: Big Data in Enterprise Performance Management, Enterprise Management Modernization, Intelligent Management System, Performance Evaluation and Modeling Applications, Enterprise Technology Innovation, etc.
