Academic research shows that well-known principal-agent and capital market problems are strongly influenced by tax considerations. Against this background, this volume is the first to present a fully-fledged overview of the interdependence of tax and corporate governance. Not only the basic political, legal and economic questions but also major topics like income measurement, shareholding structures, corporate social responsibility and tax shelter disclosure are covered.
Research question/issue: How does corporate governance affect corporate tax avoidance?Research findings/insights: Applying a stakeholder-oriented view, we find that various aspects of corporate governance institutions, such as management compensation, board characteristics, ownership structure, audit, stakeholder pressure and CSR performance & reporting have a strong influence on corporate tax avoidance. Findings indicate that strong corporate governance quality steers tax avoidance at its firm-specific optimal level. It crucially depends on the strength of corporate governance institutions whether a given level of tax avoidance is beneficial or harmful to the firm.Theoretical/academic Implications: The classical principal-agent theory is insufficient in explaining corporate tax avoidance. Investigating the determinants of corporate tax avoidance requires a more comprehensive approach taking into account corporate governance institutions and all stakeholders that are relevant to the firm. This review underlines that taxation is not merely a sub-discipline of accounting but spreads out into all areas of economics and business research and even into neighboring disciplines like psychology, sociology, political and administrative science.Practitioner/policy Implications: To practitioners, we show how strongly developed corporate governance institutions have the potential to increase tax avoidance, making firms more profitable, but also to limit tax avoidance to a level where the arising risks do not outweigh the benefits. To policy makers, we reinforce the necessity of strict tax enforcement with high rates of audit to prevent corporate taxpayers from avoiding taxes. Furthermore, we show that internal monitoring, e.g. by audit committees and independent board members can effectively complement external tax enforcement.
This book focuses on corporate sector development in the context of transition economies, such as China. In doing so, the book uses quantitative methods to test several hypotheses that are salient to the Chinese economic situation. Topics covered in the book include the relationship between tax management and firm performance, the extent to which a short-term focus on tax management can lead to long-term vulnerabilities, the impact of government ownership on tax management impact, and the link between the co-evolution of marketization and corruption, and institutional change and tax management. With that the book offers rich empirical evidence to examine tax management, firm performance and corruption in a broad context, while permitting comparison between the Chinese experience and the market economies.
Volume 31 of Advances in Taxation includes studies from expert contributors, exploring topics such as: firms’ domestic and foreign effective tax rates; tax avoidance; and tax compliance. A study reviews prior literature on tax increment financing, an economic development tool frequently used by U.S. local governments.
We examine how corporate governance affects the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and financial constraints. Conditional on having poor governance, tax avoidance is associated with greater financial constraints and a greater likelihood of financial distress. In firms with strong governance, however, we find that tax avoidance does not have a negative impact on financial constraints. Our results suggest that tax avoidance is a less useful source of financing for constrained firms when they are plagued with potential agency problems and opaque information environments. Stronger governance mechanisms can help firms mitigate the negative consequences of tax avoidance.
For MBA students and graduates embarking on careers in investment banking, corporate finance, strategy consulting, money management, or venture capital Through integration with traditional MBA topics, Taxes and Business Strategy, Fifth Edition provides a framework for understanding how taxes affect decision-making, asset prices, equilibrium returns, and the financial and operational structure of firms. Teaching and Learning Experience This program presents a better teaching and learning experience-for you and your students: *Use a text from an active author team: All 5 authors actively teach the tax and business strategy course and provide students with relevant examples from both classroom and real-world consulting experience. *Teach students the practical uses for business strategy: Students learn important concepts that can be applied to their own lives. *Reinforce learning by using in-depth analysis: Analysis and explanatory material help students understand, think about, and retain information.
This study examines whether tax avoidance is associated with corporate debt policy. Specifically, this study investigates the influence of bond investors and financial institutions such as the banks, which are long-term loan owners, on corporate governance (CG) to determine comprehensively the relationship between tax avoidance and debt ratio. Note that, the financial institutions in Japan have a larger role in indirect finance policies, relative to in the European and U.S. financial markets, and that the financial institutions of the other Asian nations seem to take on the same level of responsibility as those of Japan.This study firstly investigates the association between debt ratio and corporate tax avoidance. Secondly, we examine the influence of effectiveness of debt governance on debt ratio and CG. Thirdly, we focus on the representative tools, such as outside directors and auditors for CG and corporate tax avoidance. Finally, we test the influence of the main banks on this effect because, in addition to their monitoring role, main banks also play a significant advisory role and are thus likely to be in a better position to make superior decisions about a firm's optimal debt and capital structure mix.According to the main result of this study, it seems that the debt enhancement effect is more dominant than the debt substitution effect in Japanese firms. When tax avoidance increases, firms' profitability rise. Thus, considering the ability to afford a loan from a financial institution, the firms can borrow more. With regard to interactive effects among CG, debt policy, and tax avoidance, we find the CG of firms strengthens when they carry out tax avoidance. If the outside director ratio increases, then the monitoring function of the debtholders improves due to the enhancement of CG functions, and our result suggests that the financial institutions in Japan achieve an effective monitoring function.
