Contracting Over Actions
Contracting Over Actions

Author: Alexander Philip Frankel

Publisher: Stanford University

Published: 2011

Total Pages: 164

ISBN-13:

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I consider models in which contracts are written over the verifiable actions taken by an agent in multiple decisions. The principal's preferences over actions depend on underlying states of the world, but only the agent observes the states. The principal cannot audit the agent's information or punish her ex post for having taken inappropriate actions. Moreover, the principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences conditional on the states. Chapter 2 extends the concept of a quota contract to account for discounting and for the possibility of infinitely many periods: a discounted quota fixes the number of expected discounted plays on each action. Discounted quotas are optimal contract forms, even if arbitrary dynamic transfer payments are available, if the agent is assumed to have state-independent preferences. I recursively characterize the optimal discounted quotas for an infinitely repeated problem with independent and identically distributed states. Then I give a more explicit description of these contracts in the limit as interactions become frequent, and when only two actions are available. In Chapter 3 I allow the agent's preferences to depend on the states of the world. Under a variety of assumptions on the timing of the game and on the set of possible agent utility functions, I solve for the max-min optimal mechanisms -- those which maximize the principal's payoff against the worst possible agent preference type. These mechanisms are characterized by a property which I call "aligned delegation." Max-min optimal mechanisms may take the simple forms of simultaneous ranking mechanisms, sequential quotas, or budgets.

Contracting Over Actions
Contracting Over Actions

Author: Alexander Philip Frankel

Publisher:

Published: 2011

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

I consider models in which contracts are written over the verifiable actions taken by an agent in multiple decisions. The principal's preferences over actions depend on underlying states of the world, but only the agent observes the states. The principal cannot audit the agent's information or punish her ex post for having taken inappropriate actions. Moreover, the principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences conditional on the states. Chapter 2 extends the concept of a quota contract to account for discounting and for the possibility of infinitely many periods: a discounted quota fixes the number of expected discounted plays on each action. Discounted quotas are optimal contract forms, even if arbitrary dynamic transfer payments are available, if the agent is assumed to have state-independent preferences. I recursively characterize the optimal discounted quotas for an infinitely repeated problem with independent and identically distributed states. Then I give a more explicit description of these contracts in the limit as interactions become frequent, and when only two actions are available. In Chapter 3 I allow the agent's preferences to depend on the states of the world. Under a variety of assumptions on the timing of the game and on the set of possible agent utility functions, I solve for the max-min optimal mechanisms -- those which maximize the principal's payoff against the worst possible agent preference type. These mechanisms are characterized by a property which I call "aligned delegation." Max-min optimal mechanisms may take the simple forms of simultaneous ranking mechanisms, sequential quotas, or budgets.

Controversies in Affirmative Action
Controversies in Affirmative Action

Author: James A. Beckman

Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA

Published: 2014-07-23

Total Pages: 973

ISBN-13:

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An engaging and eclectic collection of essays from leading scholars on the subject, which looks at affirmative action past and present, analyzes its efficacy, its legacy, and its role in the future of the United States. This comprehensive, three-volume set explores the ways the United States has interpreted affirmative action and probes the effects of the policy from the perspectives of economics, law, philosophy, psychology, sociology, political science, and race relations. Expert contributors tackle a host of knotty issues, ranging from the history of affirmative action to the theories underpinning it. They show how affirmative action has been implemented over the years, discuss its legality and constitutionality, and speculate about its future. Volume one traces the origin and evolution of affirmative action. Volume two discusses modern applications and debates, and volume three delves into such areas as international practices and critical race theory. Standalone essays link cause and effect and past and present as they tackle intriguing—and important—questions. When does "affirmative action" become "reverse discrimination"? How many decades are too many for a "temporary" policy to remain in existence? Does race- or gender-based affirmative action violate the equal protection of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? In raising such issues, the work encourages readers to come to their own conclusions about the policy and its future application.