This book brings together leading legal theorists to present original philosophical work on the concept of law - the central question of jurisprudence. It covers five broad topics: firstly it addresses debates concerning the methodology of jurisprudence. In Part II it focuses on the notion of a legal system and its coercive nature, while Part III explores the relationships between law and morality, the traditional point of contention between positivist and non-positivist theories of law. Part IV then examines questions regarding law’s normative character and relationships with practical reason. Lastly, the final part introduces two novel theoretical approaches to conceptual jurisprudence.
Understanding the Nature of Law explores methodological questions about how best to explain law. Among these questions, one is central: is there something about law which determines how it should be theorized? This novel book explains the importance of
This is the most up-to-date comprehensive survey of the best work in analytic jurisprudence from Austin to the present, including contributions from the latest generation's brightest legal theorists. It begins with the earliest writings in natural law theory and positivism, tracing the history of the debate through the Hart-Fuller and Hart-Dworkin disputes to the current debates. The last third of the volume is devoted to the most influential papers on the hottest contemporary issues. The approach is analytic and hands-on. It seeks to motivate interest in foundational questions of law while simultaneously developing the skills the aspiring lawyer must have to succeed in the practice of law. To develop the student's ability to theorize on questions in analytic jurisprudence by providing a firm historical foundation before immersing her in the contemporary debates, where she will participate in the conversation. The book improves on existing text offerings in a number of respects. It provides the most comprehensive view of the field. The analytic approach is ascendant among researchers in law schools and philosophy departments worldwide who study the issues covered in this text. Accordingly, it is fair to say that this book provides, far and away, the most up-to-date and accurate snapshot of the work being done in conceptual issues regarding law so much so that it is suitable for use as a sourcebook for beginning research. Unlike the methodology of continental philosophy, the analytic methodology used in all the essays in this text employs the very same skills that a young lawyer is expected to have, and will deepen the law students' argumentative and verbal abilities.
Fifty years on from its original publication, HLA Hart's The Concept of Law is widely recognized as the most important work of legal philosophy published in the twentieth century, and remains the starting point for most students coming to the subject for the first time. In this third edition, Leslie Green provides a new introduction that sets the book in the context of subsequent developments in social and political philosophy, clarifying misunderstandings of Hart's project and highlighting central tensions and problems in the work.
This book addresses the philosophical questions that arise when neuroscientific research and technology are applied in the legal system. The empirical, practical, ethical, and conceptual issues that Pardo and Patterson seek to redress will deeply influence how we negotiate and implement the fruits of neuroscience in law and policy in the future.
Deference is central to almost everything that happens in law but has not been the subject of systematic study, perhaps because it shows up in so many different forms and places. This book aims to provide a definition and vocabulary for the study of deference that anyone, from any perspective, can use.
'Does European regulatory private law offer a genuine model of justice for society? Beyond its initial libertarian focus on economic integration through the market citizen, might it now serve the social inclusion of the vulnerable? In the wake of Hans Micklitz's inspired and relentless pursuit of meaning within the ongoing constitutionalization of private law relationships, this rich collection explores the implications of new, specifically European, forms of access rights, which ensure (horizontally and vertically) enforceable and non-discriminatory opportunity for market participation.' Horatia Muir Watt, Columbia Law School, US This insightful book, with contributions from leading international scholars, examines the European model of social justice in private law that has developed over the 20th century. The first set of articles is devoted to the relationship between corrective, commutative, procedural and social justice, more particularly the role and function of commutative justice in contrast to social justice. The second section brings together scholars who discuss the relationship between constitutional order, the values enshrined in the constitutional order and the impact of constitutional values on private law relations. The third section focuses on the impact of socio-economic developments within the EU and within selected Member States on the proprietary order of the EU, on the role and function of the emerging welfare state and the judiciary, as well as on nation state specific patterns of social justice. The final section tests the hypothesis to what extent patterns of social justice are context related and differ in between labour, consumer and competition law. The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law will prove to be of great interest to academics of law, as well as to private lawyers and European policymakers.
Morality and the Nature of Law explores the conceptual relationship between morality and the criteria that determine what counts as law in a given societythe criteria of legal validity. Is it necessary condition for a legal system to include moral criteria of legal validity? Is it even possible for a legal system to have moral criteria of legal validity? The book considers the views of natural law theorists ranging from Blackstone to Dworkin and rejects them, arguing that it is not conceptually necessary that the criteria of legal validity include moral norms. Further, it rejects the exclusive positivist view, arguing instead that it is conceptually possible for the criteria of validity to include moral norms. In the process of considering such questions, this book considers Raz's views concerning the nature of authority and Shapiro's views about the guidance function of law, which have been thought to repudiate the conceptual possibility of moral criteria of legal validity. The book, then, articulates a thought experiment that shows that it is possible for a legal system to have such criteria and concludes with a chapter that argues that any legal system, like that of the United States, which affords final authority over the content of the law to judges who are fallible with respect to the requirements of morality is a legal system with purely source-based criteria of validity.
Legal Positivism has been the dominant school of legal philosophy for much of the last century, despite its many critics. Its central tenet has long been that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. This book provides a broad but clear and jargon-free account of the central objections to the theory and why those objections are sufficient to show that legal positivism is no longer tenable. This includes a broad critique of the purported distinction method of legal positivism, the idea of ‘conceptual analysis,’ as well as a detailed assessment of the most influential of all legal positivist theories, that of H.L.A. Hart. The book also provides a defense of the natural law school, which holds in contrast to legal positivism that the authority of law arises from its intrinsic connection to morality. The author demonstrates that most of the criticism of the natural law school arises from a caricatured account of that doctrine, for instance the idea that it requires substantive theological commitments or particular conceptions of human nature. In contrast, the author presents an account of natural law theory that is grounded in a commitment to moral truth, but not to any theological beliefs. The nature of law can only be understood in terms of its moral function, to provide a clear set of moral rules that are required for a society to function effectively.
