This book considers the process of legal modernization in Russia from the development of the mechanism of complaints addressed to the authorities from the pre-revolutionary period to today. It analyzes wide-ranging data and sources, collected over 17 years, such as legislation, in-depth interviews, archival materials, original texts, and examples of different methods of complaints in Soviet and contemporary Russia. Being marginal to the legal system and almost invisible for researchers of legal development, the complaint mechanism has functioned as an extremely important way of restoring justice, available to the majority of people in Russia for centuries. It has survived several historical gaps and, in a sense, acts as a thread that stitches together different eras, coexisting with the establishment and modernization of legal institutions, compensating, accompanying, and sometimes substituting for them. The research covers a period of over 100 years, and shows how and why at major historical crossroads, Russia chooses between full-fledged legal modernization and saving the authoritarian social contract between the state and society. This book will be especially useful to scholars researching Soviet society and Post-Soviet transformations, socio-legal studies, and liberal legal reforms, but will also appeal to those working in the broader fields of Russian politics, the history of Soviet society and justice issues more generally.
This report includes an analytic assessment drafted and coordinated among The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and The National Security Agency (NSA), which draws on intelligence information collected and disseminated by those three agencies. It covers the motivation and scope of Moscow's intentions regarding US elections and Moscow's use of cyber tools and media campaigns to influence US public opinion. The assessment focuses on activities aimed at the 2016 US presidential election and draws on our understanding of previous Russian influence operations. When we use the term "we" it refers to an assessment by all three agencies. * This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment. This document's conclusions are identical to the highly classified assessment, but this document does not include the full supporting information, including specific intelligence on key elements of the influence campaign. Given the redactions, we made minor edits purely for readability and flow. We did not make an assessment of the impact that Russian activities had on the outcome of the 2016 election. The US Intelligence Community is charged with monitoring and assessing the intentions, capabilities, and actions of foreign actors; it does not analyze US political processes or US public opinion. * New information continues to emerge, providing increased insight into Russian activities. * PHOTOS REMOVED
Russia not only meddled in the U.S. democratic process and sought to exacerbate American social divisions but also seeks to undermine U.S. power in Europe and around the world. Neither President Barack Obama nor President Donald J. Trump responded to Russia's intervention in a way sufficient to deter it from future attacks.
Provides a detailed analysis of how Russia's understanding of international law has developed Draws on historical, theoretical, and practical perspectives to offer the reader the 'big picture' of Russia's engagement with international law Extensively uses sources and resources in the Russian language, including many which are not easily available to scholars outside of Russia
The raging question in the world today is who is the real Vladimir Putin and what are his intentions. Karen Dawisha’s brilliant Putin’s Kleptocracy provides an answer, describing how Putin got to power, the cabal he brought with him, the billions they have looted, and his plan to restore the Greater Russia. Russian scholar Dawisha describes and exposes the origins of Putin’s kleptocratic regime. She presents extensive new evidence about the Putin circle’s use of public positions for personal gain even before Putin became president in 2000. She documents the establishment of Bank Rossiya, now sanctioned by the US; the rise of the Ozero cooperative, founded by Putin and others who are now subject to visa bans and asset freezes; the links between Putin, Petromed, and “Putin’s Palace” near Sochi; and the role of security officials from Putin’s KGB days in Leningrad and Dresden, many of whom have maintained their contacts with Russian organized crime. Putin’s Kleptocracy is the result of years of research into the KGB and the various Russian crime syndicates. Dawisha’s sources include Stasi archives; Russian insiders; investigative journalists in the US, Britain, Germany, Finland, France, and Italy; and Western officials who served in Moscow. Russian journalists wrote part of this story when the Russian media was still free. “Many of them died for this story, and their work has largely been scrubbed from the Internet, and even from Russian libraries,” Dawisha says. “But some of that work remains.”
Sanctions are considered by many to be a central element of U.S. policy to counter Russian malign behavior. Most Russia-related sanctions have been in response to Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the United States has imposed sanctions on Russia in response to human rights abuses, election interference and cyberattacks, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North Korea, support to Syria, and use of a chemical weapon. The United States also employs sanctions to deter further objectionable activities. Most Members of Congress support a robust use of sanctions amid concerns about Russia's international behavior and geostrategic intentions. Ukraine-related sanctions are mainly based on four executive orders (EOs) the President introduced in 2014. In addition, Congress passed and the President signed into law two acts establishing sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine: the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95) and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272). In 2017, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II). This legislation codifies Ukraine-related and cyberrelated EOs, strengthens existing Russia-related sanctions authorities, and identifies several new targets for sanctions. It also establishes congressional review of any action the President takes to ease or lift a variety of sanctions. Additional sanctions on Russia may be forthcoming. On August 6, 2018, the United States determined that in March 2018 the Russian government used a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom in contravention of international law. In response, the United States launched an initial round of sanctions on Russia, as required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act; P.L. 102-182, Title III). The law requires a second, more severe round of sanctions in the absence of Russia's reliable commitment to no longer use such weapons. The United States has imposed most Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia in coordination with the European Union (EU). Since 2017, the efforts of Congress and the Trump Administration to tighten U.S. sanctions on Russia have prompted some degree of concern in the EU about U.S. commitment to sanctions coordination and U.S.-EU cooperation on Russia and Ukraine more broadly. The EU, in addition, continues to consider its response to Russia's use of a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom. Debates about the effectiveness of U.S. and other sanctions on Russia continue in Congress, in the Administration, and among other stakeholders. Russia has not reversed its occupation and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region, nor has it stopped fostering separatism in eastern Ukraine. With respect to other malign activities, the relationship between sanctions and Russian behavior is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, many observers argue that sanctions help to restrain Russia or that their imposition is an appropriate foreign policy response regardless of immediate effect. In the 115th Congress, several bills have been introduced to increase the use of sanctions in response to Russia's malign activities. The 116th Congress is likely to continue to debate the role of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia.
A Brookings Institution Press and the Nixon Center publication In this frank and engaging book, foreign minister Igor S. Ivanov describes the evolution of Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Drawing on Russia's long diplomatic history, Ivanov analyzes the complex process through which a newly democratic Russia has redefined its foreign policy during a volatile transformation over the last decade. The book includes the text of Russia's Foreign Policy Concept, a Putin administration document that guides the day-to-day activities of the government. Designed to provide the world community with a transparent outline of Russia's foreign policy agenda, the Concept attempts to balance Russia's important role in the new world order with internal pressures to focus on domestic stability. The radical transformation of the past decade has required a complete overhaul of the process by which foreign policy is crafted, implemented, and communicated, according to Ivanov. The Concept delineates the role of parliament in making foreign policy decisions, the interrelationship of the legislative and executive branches, and the apportionment of authority among the president, government, and regional authorities. It also stresses the need to renovate Russia's diplomatic service, whose tradition of professionally trained diplomats dates back to Peter the Great. While acknowledging the impulse to recreate foreign policy from scratch during periods of revolutionary change and radical reform, Ivanov stresses the theoretical and practical importance of continuity. Although the modern political system of the Russian Federation has no analogue in Russian history, Ivanov draws compelling connections between the country's contemporary challenges and the rich legacy of Russian and Soviet diplomacy—in the process invoking the political philosophies of historical Russian leaders from ancient Rus' to Alexander Gorchakov. The New Russian Diplomacy was originally published in Russia, where it received very favorable reviews
