Vols. 2-6 of the CAIB's Final Report contain appendices that provide the supporting documentation for the main text of the Final Report contained in Vol. 1, which was released on Aug. 26, 2003. These appendix materials were working documents. They contain a number of conclusions and proposed recommendations, several of which were adopted by the CAIB in Vol. 1. The other conclusions and proposed recommendations drawn in Vols. 2-6 do not necessarily reflect the views of the CAIB but are included for the record. When there is conflict, Vol. 1 takes precedence. It alone is the CAIB's official statement.
NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia's external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The Columbia accident was not survivable. After the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) investigation regarding the cause of the accident was completed, further consideration produced the question of whether there were lessons to be learned about how to improve crew survival in the future. This investigation was performed with the belief that a comprehensive, respectful investigation could provide knowledge that can protect future crews in the worldwide community of human space flight. Additionally, in the course of the investigation, several areas of research were identified that could improve our understanding of both nominal space flight and future spacecraft accidents. This report is the first comprehensive, publicly available accident investigation report addressing crew survival for a human spacecraft mishap, and it provides key information for future crew survival investigations. The results of this investigation are intended to add meaning to the sacrifice of the crew's lives by making space flight safer for all future generations.
Vols. 2-6 of the CAIB's Final Report contain appendices that provide the supporting documentation for the main text of the Final Report contained in Vol. 1, which was released on Aug. 26, 2003. These appendix materials were working documents. They contain a number of conclusions and proposed recommendations, several of which were adopted by the CAIB in Vol. 1. The other conclusions and proposed recommendations drawn in Vols. 2-6 do not necessarily reflect the views of the CAIB but are included for the record. When there is conflict, Vol. 1 takes precedence. It alone is the CAIB's official statement.
"NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia's external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB’s findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan.1 Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations."--PDF Executive summary.