China’s maritime “gray zone” operations represent a new challenge for the U.S. Navy and the sea services of our allies, partners, and friends in maritime East Asia. There, Beijing is waging what some Chinese sources term a “war without gunsmoke.” Already winning in important areas, China could gain far more if left unchecked. One of China’s greatest advantages thus far has been foreign difficulty in understanding the situation, let alone determining an effective response. With contributions from some of the world’s leading subject matter experts, this volume aims to close that gap by explaining the forces and doctrines driving China’s paranaval expansion, operating in the “gray zone” between war and peace. The book covers China’s major maritime forces beyond core gray-hulled Navy units, with particular focus on China’s second and third sea forces: the “white-hulled” Coast Guard and “blue-hulled” Maritime Militia. Increasingly, these paranaval forces, and the “gray zone” in which they typically operate, are on the frontlines of China’s seaward expansion.
In modern history, China has been primarily a land power, dominating smaller states along its massive continental flanks. But China’s turn toward the sea is now very much a reality, as evident in its stunning rise in global shipbuilding markets, its vast and expanding merchant marine, the wide offshore reach of its energy and minerals exploration companies, its growing fishing fleet, and indeed its increasingly modern navy. Yet, for all these achievements, there is still profound skepticism regarding China’s potential as a genuine maritime power. Beijing must still import the most vital subcomponents for its shipyards, maritime governance remains severely bureaucratically challenged, and the navy evinces, at least as of yet, little enthusiasm for significant blue water power projection capabilities. This volume provides a truly comprehensive assessment of prospects for China’s maritime development by situating these important geostrategic phenomena within a larger world historical context. China is hardly the only land power in history to attempt transformation by fostering sea power. Many continental powers have elected or been impelled to transform themselves into significant maritime powers in order to safeguard their strategic position or advance their interests. We examine cases of attempted transformation from the Persian Empire to the Soviet Union, and determine the reasons for their success or failure. Too many works on China view the nation in isolation. Of course, China’s history and culture are to some extent exceptional, but building intellectual fences actually hinders the effort to understand China’s current development trajectory. Without underestimating the enduring pull of China’s past as it relates to threats to the country’s internal stability and its landward borders, this comparative study provides reason to believe that China has turned the corner on a genuine maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the case, it would be a remarkable if not singular event in the history of the last two millennia.
China’s reaction to the United States’ new maritime strategy will significantly impact its success, according to three Naval War College professors. Based on the premise that preventing wars is as important as winning wars, this new U.S. strategy, they explain, embodies a historic reassessment of the international system and how the United States can best pursue its interests in cooperation with other nations. The authors contend that despite recent turbulence in U.S.-China military relations, substantial shared interests could enable extensive U.S.-China maritime security cooperation, as they attempt to reach an understanding of “competitive coexistence.” But for professionals to structure cooperation, they warn, Washington and Beijing must create sufficient political and institutional space.
China’s shipbuilding industry has grown more rapidly than any other in modern history. Commercial shipbuilding output jumped thirteen-fold from 2002–12, ensuring that Beijing has largely reached its goal of becoming the world’s leading shipbuilder. Yet progress is uneven, with military shipbuilding leading overall but with significant weakness in propulsion and electronics for military and civilian applications. It has never been more important to assess what ships China can supply its navy and other maritime forces with, today and in the future. Chinese Naval Shipbuilding answers three pressing questions: What are China’s prospects for success in key areas of naval shipbuilding? What are the likely results for China’s navy? What are the implications for the U.S. Navy? To address these critical issues, this volume assembles some of the world’s leading experts and linguistic analysts, often pairing them in research teams. These sailors, scholars, industry professionals, and government specialists have commanded ships at sea, led shipbuilding programs ashore, toured Chinese vessels and production facilities, invested in Chinese shipyards, and analyzed and presented important data to top-level decision-makers in times of crisis. In synthesizing their collective insights, this book fills a key gap in our understanding of China, its shipbuilding industry, its navy, and what it all means.
Well over six years of Chinese anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have directly supported People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) modernization goals and provided invaluable experience operating in distant waters. Lessons learned have spawned PLAN innovations in doctrine, operations, and international coordination. Many of the insights gleaned during deployments are applicable to security objectives closer to home; some officers enjoy promotion to important positions after returning. Anti-piracy operations have been a springboard for China to expand considerably its maritime security operations, from evacuating its citizens from Libya and Yemen to escorting Syrian chemical weapons to their destruction and participating in the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. So great are the benefits to China's global maritime presence and enhanced image at home and abroad that when Gulf of Aden anti-piracy operations finally wind down, Beijing will have to develop new means to address its burgeoning overseas interests.
This edited volume examines the political and security issues influencing and shaping the developing maritime order in the Indo Pacific. If focuses specifically on the impact of China’s maritime expansion upon the policies and strategies of the regional states as well as the major players. The chapters examine the interaction of these players, paying particular attention to Japan, as the originator of the Indo Pacific idea and promoter of security cooperation and regionalism. It also covers the responses of the ASEAN claimants, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines as well as Indonesia, alongside the key players, India, the US and also the EU.
In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China’s assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such “gray zone” coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China’s maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.
China is engaged in a widespread assertion of sovereignty in the South and East China Seas. It employs a "gray zone" strategy: using coercive but sub-conventional military power to drive off challengers and prevent escalation, while simultaneously seizing territory and asserting maritime control. Contests of Initiative: Confronting China's Gray Zone Strategy provides three courses of action for the US and its Asian security partners to preserve regional peace, uphold freedom of the seas, and deter conflict. Building on theories of escalation dominance, Dr. Kuo casts gray zone strategies as "contests of initiative." States that direct the operational tempo and choice of engagements can exploit gaps in political commitment to seize objectives. Once lost, their opponents face much higher costs to reestablish control. Using case analysis backed by statistical methods, the three courses of action reach different balances between American leadership, allied costs, and Chinese responses. Ultimately, the book recommends the U.S. employ an "extended deterrence" approach. Washington should foster a regional sovereignty settlement, establish a political-military coordinating institution, and attain dominance in sub-conventional capabilities using unmanned ISR and strike platforms to contest and break Beijing's control. The study will be of great value to those in the national security community with responsibility for US policies in East Asia, but it also provides important insights for strategic planners and analysts who will be grappling with the larger strategic dimensions of US-China relations, certain to be the paramount issue in global politics for the foreseeable future. Dr. Raymond Kuo is an independent political scientist focused on international security and East Asia. In addition to this book, he authored Following the Leader: International Order, Alliance Strategies, and Emulation (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2021), explaining how military alliance strategies generate international order. Dr. Kuo's other research has appeared in International Security, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, The National Interest, and The Diplomat, among others. He previously served in the United Nations, the National Democratic Institute, and the Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan). Dr. Kuo holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from Princeton University, an M.Sc. from the London School of Economics, and a B.A. from Wesleyan University.
One of the key concerns of naval strategists and planners today is the nature of the Chinese geostrategic challenge. Conceding that no one can know for certain China s intentions in terms of future conflict, the editors of this hot-topic book argue that the trajectory of Chinese nuclear propulsion for submarines may be one of the best single indicators of China s ambitions of global military power. Nuclear submarines, with their unparalleled survivability, remain ideal platforms for persistent operations in far-flung sea areas and offer an efficient means for China to project power. This collection of essays presents the latest thinking of leading experts on the emergence of a modern nuclear submarine fleet in China. Each contribution is packed with authoritative data and cogent analysis. The book has been compiled by four professors and analysts at the U.S. Naval War College who are co-founders of the college s recently established China Maritime Studies Institute. Given the opaque nature of China s undersea warfare development, readers will benefit from this penetrating investigation that considers the potential impact of even the most revolutionary changes in Chinese nuclear submarine capabilities. The editors believe that to ignore such possibilities would be the height of strategic folly and represent inexcusable negligence in terms of U.S. national defense. Anyone who is interested in the future of the U.S. Navy and the defense of the United States will find this book to be essential reading.
