Before 2000, roughly 96% of China’s energy demands were met domestically. Since 2001, however, this position of near self-reliance has changed. With steadily increasing demands, China’s need for foreign energy has grown. Today, China is the world’s biggest energy consumer and emitter of greenhouse gases. Building upon the first volume, which examined China’s energy plans, this book will examine the strategies China has taken to meet its burgeoning energy demands, continue its fast-paced economic growth and also address the mounting concerns about environmental welfare and the true cost of China’s development. With new chapters addressing international agreements, the so-called “China energy threat” and the Belt and Road Initiative, this volume will continue to discuss and interpret both domestic policies and China’s international role. 香港城市大學出版社出版。 Published by City University of Hong Kong Press.
A Brookings Institution Press and Global Public Policy Institute publication The global market for oil and gas resources is rapidly changing. Three major trends—the rise of new consumers, the increasing influence of state players, and concerns about climate change—are combining to challenge existing regulatory structures, many of which have been in place for a half-century. Global Energy Governance analyzes the energy market from an institutionalist perspective and offers practical policy recommendations to deal with these new challenges. Much of the existing discourse on energy governance deals with hard security issues but neglects the challenges to global governance. Global Energy Governance fills this gap with perspectives on how regulatory institutions can ensure reliable sources of energy, evaluate financial risk, and provide emergency response mechanisms to deal with interruptions in supply. The authors bring together decisionmakers from industry, government, and civil society in order to address two central questions: •What are the current practices of existing institutions governing global oil and gas on financial markets? •How do these institutions need to adapt in order to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century? The resulting governance-oriented analysis of the three interlocking trends also provides the basis for policy recommendations to improve global regulation. Contributors include Thorsten Benner, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; William Blyth, Chatham House, Royal Institute for International Affairs, London; Albert Bressand, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Dick de Jong, Clingendael International Energy Programme; Ralf Dickel, Energy Charter Secretariat; Andreas Goldthau, Central European University, Budapest, and Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; Enno Harks, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; Wade Hoxtell, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; Hillard Huntington, Energy Modeling Forum, Stanford University; Christine Jojarth, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University; Frederic Kalinke, Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University; Wilfrid L. Kohl, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Jamie Manzer, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; Amy Myers Jaffe, James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University; Yulia Selivanova, Energy Charter Secretariat; Tom Smeenk, Clingendael International Energy Programme; Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University; Ronald Soligo, Rice University; Joseph A. Stanislaw, Deloitte LLP and The JAStanislaw Group, LLC; Coby van der Linde, Clingendael International Energy Programme; Jan Martin Witte, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; Simonetta Zarrilli, Division on International Trade and Commodities, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
The Routledge Handbook of Politics in Asia is designed to serve as a comprehensive reference guide to politics in Asia. Covering East, South, Southeast, and Central Asia, this handbook brings together the work of leading international academics to cover the political histories, institutions, economies, and cultures of the region. Taking a comparative approach, it is divided into four parts, including: A thorough introduction to the politics of the four regions of Asia from the perspectives of democratization, foreign policy, political economy, and political culture. An examination of the "Big Three" of Asia – China, India, and Japan – focusing on issues including post-Mao reform, China’s new world outlook, Indian democracy, and Japanese foreign policy. A discussion of important contemporary issues, such as human rights, the politics of the internet, security, nationalism, and geopolitics. An analysis of the relationship between politics and certain theoretical ideas, such as Confucianism, Hinduism, socialist constitutionalism, and gender norms. As an invaluable and all-inclusive resource, this handbook will be useful for students, scholars, researchers, and practitioners of Asian politics and comparative politics.
In modern history, China has been primarily a land power, dominating smaller states along its massive continental flanks. But China’s turn toward the sea is now very much a reality, as evident in its stunning rise in global shipbuilding markets, its vast and expanding merchant marine, the wide offshore reach of its energy and minerals exploration companies, its growing fishing fleet, and indeed its increasingly modern navy. Yet, for all these achievements, there is still profound skepticism regarding China’s potential as a genuine maritime power. Beijing must still import the most vital subcomponents for its shipyards, maritime governance remains severely bureaucratically challenged, and the navy evinces, at least as of yet, little enthusiasm for significant blue water power projection capabilities. This volume provides a truly comprehensive assessment of prospects for China’s maritime development by situating these important geostrategic phenomena within a larger world historical context. China is hardly the only land power in history to attempt transformation by fostering sea power. Many continental powers have elected or been impelled to transform themselves into significant maritime powers in order to safeguard their strategic position or advance their interests. We examine cases of attempted transformation from the Persian Empire to the Soviet Union, and determine the reasons for their success or failure. Too many works on China view the nation in isolation. Of course, China’s history and culture are to some extent exceptional, but building intellectual fences actually hinders the effort to understand China’s current development trajectory. Without underestimating the enduring pull of China’s past as it relates to threats to the country’s internal stability and its landward borders, this comparative study provides reason to believe that China has turned the corner on a genuine maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the case, it would be a remarkable if not singular event in the history of the last two millennia.
The decisions we make about energy shape our present and our future. From geopolitical tension to environmental degradation and an increasingly unstable climate, these choices infiltrate the very air we breathe. Energy security politics has direct impact on the continued survival of human life as we know it, and the earth cannot survive if we continue consuming fossil energy at current rates. The low carbon transition is simply not happening fast enough, and change is unlikely without a radical change in how we approach energy security. But thinking on energy security has failed to keep up with these changing realities. Energy security is primarily considered to be about the availability of reliable and affordable energy supplies - having enough energy - and it remains closely linked to national security. The Energy Security Paradox looks at contemporary energy security politics in the United States and China: the top two energy consumers and producers. Based on in-depth empirical analysis, it demonstrates that current energy security practices actually lead to a security paradox: they produce insecurity. To illustrate this, it develops the 'energy security paradox' as a framework for understanding the interconnected insecurities produced by current practices. However, it also goes beyond this, examining resistance to current practices to highlight that we not only can do energy security differently: this is already happening. In the process, the volume demonstrates that the value of security depends on the context. Based on this, The Energy Security Paradox proposes a radical reconsideration of how we approach and practice energy security.
The United States and China are the world's top two energy consumers and, as of 2010, the two largest economies. Consequently, they have a decisive role to play in the world's clean energy future. Both countries are also motivated by related goals, namely diversified energy portfolios, job creation, energy security, and pollution reduction, making renewable energy development an important strategy with wide-ranging implications. Given the size of their energy markets, any substantial progress the two countries make in advancing use of renewable energy will provide global benefits, in terms of enhanced technological understanding, reduced costs through expanded deployment, and reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions relative to conventional generation from fossil fuels. Within this context, the U.S. National Academies, in collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), reviewed renewable energy development and deployment in the two countries, to highlight prospects for collaboration across the research to deployment chain and to suggest strategies which would promote more rapid and economical attainment of renewable energy goals. Main findings and concerning renewable resource assessments, technology development, environmental impacts, market infrastructure, among others, are presented. Specific recommendations have been limited to those judged to be most likely to accelerate the pace of deployment, increase cost-competitiveness, or shape the future market for renewable energy. The recommendations presented here are also pragmatic and achievable.
China's two decades of rapid economic growth have fueled a demand for energy that has outstripped domestic sources of supply. China became a net oil importer in 1993, and the country's dependence on energy imports is expected to continue to grow over the next 20 years, when it is likely to import some 60 percent of its oil and at least 30 percent of its natural gas. China thus is having to abandon its traditional goal of energyself-sufficiency--brought about by a fear of strategic vulnerability--and look abroad for resources. This study looks at the measures that China is taking to achieve energy security and the motivations behind those measures. It considers China's investment in overseas oil exploration and development projects, interest in transnational oil pipelines, plans for a strategic petroleum reserve, expansion of refineries to process crude supplies from the Middle East, development of the natural gas industry, and gradual opening of onshore drilling areas to foreign oil companies. The author concludes that these activities are designed, in part, to reduce the vulnerability of China's energy supply to U.S. power. China's international oil and gas investments, however, are unlikely to bring China theenergy security it desires. China is likely to remain reliant on U.S. protection of the sea-lanes that bring the country most of its energy imports.
One of Chinese president Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy programs is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a web of infrastructure development plans designed to increase Eurasian economic integration. Chinese official rhetoric on the BRI focuses on its economic promise and progress, often in altruistic terms: all countries have been invited to board this "express train" to wealth and prosperity. Missing from the rhetoric is much discussion of the initiative's security dimensions and implications. Chinese officials avoid describing the strategic benefits they think the BRI could produce, while also gliding over major security risks and concerns. Yet at the unofficial level, China's security community has paid close attention to these issues, probing in great depth the gains Beijing can expect, the challenges it will face, and the new demands it will have to satisfy. Understanding those Chinese assessments is helpful as the United States considers how, when, and in what capacity to engage the BRI.
