Challenges to Legal Theory offers the reader a fascinating journey through a variety of multi-disciplinary topics, ranging from law and literature, and law and religion, to legal philosophy and constitutional law. The collection reflects some of the challenges that the field of legal theory currently faces. It is compiled by a selection of international and Spanish scholars, whose essays are made available in English translation for the first time. The volume is based on a collection of essays, published in Spanish, in honour of Professor José Iturmendi Morales, of Complutense University, Madrid, and brings the rich scholarship of pre-eminent Spanish scholars of law and legal theory to an international audience.
In almost every field of law,from tort and contract to environmental law and criminal justice, issues about 'risk' are increasingly of interest to lawyers. At the same time, there has been little general enquiry into the nature of the contact between law and risks. This book argues that ideas about risk have not traditionally been absent from law, as is sometimes supposed. Lawyers and legal theorists have used and conceptualised risk in particular ways, and ideas of risk have had significant influence in key elements of legal theory including questions of justice and responsibility. The book explores the conceptual place of risk across a number of fields of law; and identifies some significant challenges for law and legal theory arising from broader debates about risk. It therefore sheds light on areas that are under-explored despite current interest among lawyers, and aims to provide an accessible guide to emerging controversies and challenges for law in this area while explaining their significance.
The book is a collection of essays, which aim to situate African legal theory in the context of the myriad of contemporary global challenges; from the prevalence of war to the misery of poverty and disease to the crises of the environment. Apart from being problems that have an indelible African mark on them, a common theme that runs throughout the essays in this book is that African legal theory has been excluded, under-explored or under-theorised in the search for solutions to such contemporary problems. The essays make a modest attempt to reverse this trend. The contributors investigate and introduce readers to the key issues, questions, concepts, impulses and problems that underpin the idea of African legal theory. They outline the potential offered by African legal theory and open up its key concepts and impulses for critical scrutiny. This is done in order to develop a better understanding of the extent to which African legal theory can contribute to discourses seeking to address some of the challenges that confront African and non-African societies alike.
The third in a series of three volumes on Contemporary Legal Theory, this volume deals with four topics: 1) the role of legal theory in the legal curriculum; 2) the teaching of legal theory; 3) the relationship of legal theory to legal scholarship; and 4) the relationship of legal theory to comparative law. The focus of the first two topics is on the common law world, where the debates over the aims and proper place of legal theory in the study of law have traversed a good deal of ground since John Austin's 1828 lecture, 'The Uses and the Study of Jurisprudence.' These first two parts offer a selection of the most important papers, including surveys, as well as pedagogical viewpoints and particular course descriptions from analytical, critical, feminist, law-and-literature and global perspectives. The last three decades have seen just as many changes for legal scholarship and comparative law. These changes (such as the rise of empirical legal scholarship) have often attracted the attention of legal theorists. Within comparative law, the last thirty years have witnessed intense methodological reflection within the discipline; the results of these reflections are themselves properly recognised as legal theoretical contributions. The volume collects the key papers, including those by Neil MacCormick, Mark Van Hoecke, Andrew Halpin, William Ewald and Geoffrey Samuel.
One of the leading legal philosophers of this century, Kelsen published this short treatise in 1934, when the neo-Kantian influence on his work was at its zenith. An earlier, "constructivist" phase had been displaced by his effort to provide something approximating a neo-Kantian foundation for his theory. If this second phase represents the Pure Theory of Law in its most characteristic form, then the present treatise may well be its central text. And of Kelsen's many statements of the Pure Theory, this one is surely the most accessible. Topics covered include the legal norm and Kelsen's normativity thesis, law and morality, the role of ideology, the concept of the legal person, legal interpretation, the identity of law and state, and the theory of international law. Among the appendices is an annotated bibliography of secondary literature on Kelsen.
Exploring the intricate and multi-dimensional conception of clarity and obscurity in law, this volume presents and examines the most recent research and theories. It provides practical guidance on how to avoid obscurity in legal drafting, as well as legal interpretation at both the national and international levels.
It gives me great pleasure to offer this foreword to the present work of my admired friend and respected colleague Ota Weinberger. Apart from the essays of his which were published in our joint work An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal Positivism in 1986, relatively little of Wein berger's work is available in English. This is the more to be regretted, since his is work of particular interest to jurists of the English-speaking world both in view of its origins and in respect of its content As to its origins, Weinberger war reared as a student of the Pure Theory of Law, a theory which in its Kelsenian form has aroused very great interest and has had considerable influence among anglophoone scholars -perhaps even more than in the Germanic countries. Less well known is the fact that the Pure Theory itself divided into two schools, that of Vienna and that of Brno. It was in the Brno school of Frantisek Weyr that Weinberger's legal theory found its early formation, and perhaps from that early influence one can trace his continuing insistence on the dual character of legal norms -both as genuinely normative and yet at the same time having real social existence.
This book addresses theoretical problems concerning legal evidence. The concept of evidence is expected to fulfill a number of distinct roles in science and philosophy, but also in legal theory and law, some of which are complementary, while others are conflicting. In their profession, lawyers have to deal with evidence and proof. Yet the legal concept of evidence is constantly changing, and the debate concerning the distinction between a legal concept of evidence, the ordinary concept of evidence and the concept of evidence in science is far from being settled. What is more, the problem of evidence is central to both epistemology and the philosophy of science, and by extension to our academic thinking on law. In short, legal theorists’ interest in evidence may include such diverse objects as a bloody knife, sensory data, linguistic entities or psychologically recognized beliefs. The book surveys selected theoretical roles that the concept of evidence plays and explores their relations and interconnections. The content is divided into three parts, investigating: (1) evidence in epistemology and the philosophy of science, which focuses on evidence methodologies and the problem of proof in legal scholarship; (2) evidence in legal theory and legal philosophy, where particular attention is paid to the interplay between evidence, legal reasoning and the binding force of such reasoning; and (3) evidence in law, where theoretical problems pertaining to witnesses, expert opinions, explanations of the accused, statistical evidence and neuroscientific evidence are examined.
