"The pay gap between chief executive officers of major U.S. firms and their workers is higher than ever before--depending on the method of calculation, CEOs get paid between 300 and 700 times more than the average worker. Such outsized pay is a relatively recent phenomenon, but ... few detractors truly understand the numerous factors that have contributed to the dizzying upward spiral in CEO compensation. Steven Clifford, a former CEO who has also served on many corporate boards, has a name for these procedures and practices: 'The CEO Pay Machine.' [This book] is Clifford's ... explanation of the 'machine'--how it works, how its parts interact, and how every step pushes CEO pay to higher levels"--
In this book proposes a whole new system for incenting managers to act in the best interests of company owners. Reversing his earlier position—that companies probably weren’t paying enough to attract the best executive talent—Jensen and his coauthors are now positing that, in fact, pay packages can be too high and too risk-free, causing otherwise highly talented managers to act in ways that destroy corporate value. The authors have identified the critical missing link in current incentive plans, namely that link between a manager’s effectiveness in executing strategy and the capital market’s valuation of the results, which they call strategic value accountability. They explain how it works and how to devise a plan that holds top managers accountable for creating long-term strategic value.
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Nonprofit leadership is messy Nonprofits leaders are optimistic by nature. They believe with time, energy, smarts, strategy and sheer will, they can change the world. But as staff or board leader, you know nonprofits present unique challenges. Too many cooks, not enough money, an abundance of passion. It’s enough to make you feel overwhelmed and alone. The people you help need you to be successful. But there are so many obstacles: a micromanaging board that doesn’t understand its true role; insufficient fundraising and donors who make unreasonable demands; unclear and inconsistent messaging and marketing; a leader who’s a star in her sector but a difficult boss… And yet, many nonprofits do thrive. Joan Garry’s Guide to Nonprofit Leadership will show you how to do just that. Funny, honest, intensely actionable, and based on her decades of experience, this is the book Joan Garry wishes she had when she led GLAAD out of a financial crisis in 1997. Joan will teach you how to: Build a powerhouse board Create an impressive and sustainable fundraising program Become seen as a ‘workplace of choice’ Be a compelling public face of your nonprofit This book will renew your passion for your mission and organization, and help you make a bigger difference in the world.
Prodded by economists in the 1970s, corporate directors began adding stock options and bonuses to the already-generous salaries of CEOs with hopes of boosting their companiesÕ fortunes. Guided by largely unproven assumptions, this trend continues today. So what are companies getting in return for all the extra money? Not much, according to the empirical data. In Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay Experiment Failed and How to Fix It, Michael Dorff explores the consequences of this development. He shows how performance pay has not demonstrably improved corporate performance and offers studies showing that performance pay cannot improve performance on the kind of tasks companies ask of their CEOs. Moreover, CEOs of large established companies do not typically have much impact on their companiesÕ results. In this eye-opening exposŽ, Dorff argues that companies should give up on the decades-long experiment to mold compensation into a corporate governance tool and maps out a rationale for returning to the era of guaranteed salaries.
The high compensation for executives and in particular for CEOs has been a topic of debate for many years. Increasing salaries and bonuses for leaders of companies have mostly been criticized and even pointed out as a key factor for a rising wealth distribution inequality. Especially in the United States, where CEO pay is most extreme, the public as well as the media ask for new regulations and political intervention. But are these high compensations really undeserved and unfair? How much do top managers actually earn and why do businesses support it? This academic paper will first give an overview of some important numbers and statistics in order to have an idea of how high a CEO’s income is compared to an average employee. It will also explain how to properly interpret these data and how much an executive’s income can vary depending on different factors. After analyzing the recent history and developments in CEO pay, chapter 8 will provide the necessary economic background to help understand companies’ decisions and see high wages from a business point of view. Although the paper will focus on CEO earnings in the US, it will give examples of differences in other countries and systems. Due to a distinct set of labor regulations, we will draw a comparison to CEO pay in Germany and furthermore illustrate the event of a political referendum in Switzerland. Finally, we will pick on various arguments by media, the public, as well as renowned economists, listing a series of pros and cons for excessive CEO pay. An insightful survey, conducted in the US, will then close the debate and leave the reader with the final thoughts of the conclusion.
Featuring insightful interviews with Fortune 1000 C-level executives and real lessons from the field, this essential book reveals the tough questions leaders should be asking about how sales incentives drive the business.
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
This four-volume handbook covers important concepts and tools used in the fields of financial econometrics, mathematics, statistics, and machine learning. Econometric methods have been applied in asset pricing, corporate finance, international finance, options and futures, risk management, and in stress testing for financial institutions. This handbook discusses a variety of econometric methods, including single equation multiple regression, simultaneous equation regression, and panel data analysis, among others. It also covers statistical distributions, such as the binomial and log normal distributions, in light of their applications to portfolio theory and asset management in addition to their use in research regarding options and futures contracts.In both theory and methodology, we need to rely upon mathematics, which includes linear algebra, geometry, differential equations, Stochastic differential equation (Ito calculus), optimization, constrained optimization, and others. These forms of mathematics have been used to derive capital market line, security market line (capital asset pricing model), option pricing model, portfolio analysis, and others.In recent times, an increased importance has been given to computer technology in financial research. Different computer languages and programming techniques are important tools for empirical research in finance. Hence, simulation, machine learning, big data, and financial payments are explored in this handbook.Led by Distinguished Professor Cheng Few Lee from Rutgers University, this multi-volume work integrates theoretical, methodological, and practical issues based on his years of academic and industry experience.
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
