An unexpected shortage of banknotes emerged during 1992 in the former Soviet Union. The cash shortage is explained by the asymmetry in the monetary union that prevailed, under which one member (the Russian Federation) controlled banknote production while every member could create deposit money. Interest rate rigidity forestalled an equilibrating adjustment in demand for banknotes. The possible efficiency costs of the cash shortage are explored.
In 1991, a small group of Russians emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union and enjoyed one of the greatest transfers of wealth ever seen, claiming ownership of some of the most valuable petroleum, natural gas and metal deposits in the world. By 1997, five of those individuals were on Forbes Magazine's list of the world's richest billionaires.
A new history shows that, despite MarxismÕs rejection of money, the ruble was critical to the Soviet UnionÕs promise of shared prosperity for its citizens. In spite of Karl MarxÕs proclamation that money would become obsolete under Communism, the ruble remained a key feature of Soviet life. In fact, although Western economists typically concluded that money ultimately played a limited role in the Soviet Union, Kristy Ironside argues that money was both more important and more powerful than most histories have recognized. After the Second World War, money was resurrected as an essential tool of Soviet governance. Certainly, its importance was not lost on Soviet leaders, despite official Communist Party dogma. Money, Ironside demonstrates, mediated the relationship between the Soviet state and its citizens and was at the center of both the governmentÕs and the peopleÕs visions for the maturing Communist project. A strong rubleÑone that held real value in workersÕ hands and served as an effective labor incentiveÑwas seen as essential to the economic growth that would rebuild society and realize CommunismÕs promised future of abundance. Ironside shows how Soviet citizens turned to the state to remedy the damage that the ravages of the Second World War had inflicted upon their household economies. From the late 1940s through the early 1960s, progress toward Communism was increasingly measured by the health of its citizensÕ personal finances, such as greater purchasing power, higher wages, better pensions, and growing savings. However, the increasing importance of money in Soviet life did not necessarily correlate to improved living standards for Soviet citizens. The Soviet governmentÕs achievements in Òraising the peopleÕs material welfareÓ continued to lag behind the WestÕs advances during a period of unprecedented affluence. These factors combined to undermine popular support for Soviet power and confidence in the Communist project.
List of Figures. List of Tables. List of Symbols. List of Country Acronyms. Foreword and Acknowledgements. I. The Transition Economies. II. Saving, by Plan and in the Market. III. Considering the Competing Explanations of Transition in Inflation and Economic Growth. IV. The Inflationary Explosion Following Price Liberalization. V. The Crisis Years. VI. Directed Credits and Financial Repression in Belarus. VII. Stabilization in Transition Economies. VIII. Ukraine in the Stabilization Phase. IX. Georgia: from Crisis to Stabilization .. and Then? X. The Fallout of the Russian Financial C.
This edition of the Joint Economic Committee's 1993 reports on the economies of the ex-Soviet states tracks the Soviet and post-Soviet economic reform efforts, and looks at issues such as integration and developments.
This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the last twenty years rather than sooner? We begin by discussing the “tax smoothing” model and conclude that this approach alone cannot provide complete answers to these questions. We then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which we organize into six groups: (1) models based upon opportunistic policy makers and naive voters with “fiscal illusion”; (2) models of intergenerational redistributions; (3) models of debt as a strategic variable, linking the current government with the next one; (4) models of coalition governments; (5) models of geographically dispersed interests; and (6) models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions. We conclude by briefly discussing policy implications.
