The advent of nuclear weapons introduced a complex new factor into world politics, drawing a line through history and ensuring that international relations would never be the same. By both accident and design, Canada was a central player in the new nuclear era, as countries grappled with the implications of this revolutionary new development. Canada's decision, unique among pioneer atomic powers, not to acquire a nuclear arsenal has been used to buttress widely differing political agendas, while the factors that shaped the policy-making process have been largely ignored.
Since the first atomic weapon was detonated in 1945, Canadians have debated not only the role of nuclear power in their uranium-rich land but also their country’s role in a nuclear world. Should Canada belong to international alliances that depend on the threat of nuclear weapons for their own security? Should Canadian-produced nuclear technologies be exported? What about the impact of atomic research on local communities and the environment? This incisive nuclear history engages with much larger debates about national identity, Canadian foreign policy contradictions during the Cold War, and Canada’s global standing to investigate these critical questions.
In Learning to Love the Bomb, Sean M. Maloney explores the controversial subject of Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Based on newly declassified Canadian and U.S. documents, it examines policy, strategy, operational, and technical matters and weaves these seemingly disparate elements into a compelling story that finally unlocks several Cold War mysteries. For example, while U.S. military forces during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were focused on the Caribbean Sea and the southeastern United States, Canadian forces assumed responsibility for defending the northern United States, with aircraft armed with nuclear depth charges flying patrols and guarding against missile attack by Soviet submarines. This defensive strategy was a closely guarded secret because it conflicted with Canada's image as a peacekeeper and therefore a more passive member of NATO than its ally to the south. It is revealed here for the first time. The place of nuclear weapons in Canadian history has, until now, been a highly secret and misunderstood field subject to rumor, rhetoric, half-truths, and propaganda. Learning to Love the Bomb reveals the truth about Canada's role as a nuclear power.
Canada has followed an ambiguous path with respect to its policy on nuclear weapons as a result of maintaining a Nuclear Division within its Foreign Affairs Department - which promotes disarmament and non-proliferation - while simultaneously, selling nuclear technology, such as that produced by Candu Energy Inc., that might be used for weapons production. There is a need to understand the rationale for this approach to Canada's foreign policy on disarmament and non-proliferation and for why Canada continues to support the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This major research paper analyzes whether a contradiction between policy and action exists, and what approach best explains the presence or absence of a contradiction. The central argument is that Canada's foreign policy framework is based in a realist position, wherein Canada's successive leaders have recognized the inherent risk in being geographically situated next to a hegemon. No political contradiction between Canada's economic interests and the country's ongoing support for the NPT was observed, predominantly due to its requirements to meet its own economic obligations in a changing world, and to ensure that its foreign policies are aligned with those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A unique Canadian strategic vision was identified, in that, the country is able to subsume its own identity in order to support the identities of other nations as the government of Canada has seen fit. Presently, it serves Canada well to maintain its staunch position on disarmament and non-proliferation, as it can and does rely heavily on the deterrence factor of the American armament.
"We are thus not only the first country in the world with the capability to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so, we are also the first nuclear armed country to have chosen to divest itself of nuclear weapons." Pierre Trudeau United Nations, 26 May 1978 From 1963 to 1984, US nuclear warheads armed Canadian weapons systems in both Canada and West Germany. It is likely that during the early part of this period, the Canadian military was putting more effort, money, and manpower into the nuclear commitment than any other single activity. This important book is an operational-technical history and exposÈ of this period. Its purpose is to bring together until-recently secret information about the nature of the nuclear arsenal in Canada, and combine it with known information about the systems in the US nuclear arsenal. The work begins with an account of the efforts of the Pearson government to sign the agreement with the US necessary to bring nuclear weapons to Canada. Subsequent chapters provide a detailed discussion of the four nuclear weapons systems deployed by Canada: the BOMARC surface-to-air guided interceptor missile; the Honest John short range battlefield rocket; the Starfighter tactical thermonuclear bomber; the VooDoo-Genie air defence system. Each chapter also includes a section on the accidents and incidents which occurred while the weapons were at Canadian sites. The final chapter covers the ultimately futile efforts of the Maritime Air Command and the Royal Canadian Navy to acquire nuclear weapons. An appendix includes the text of the until-now secret agreements Canada signed with the USA for the provision of nuclear weapons. Illustrated throughout with photographs and diagrams, and supported by extensive transcriptions of original documents, Canadian Nuclear Weapons will be of great value both to scholars and interested laypersons in its presentation of what has been a deeply hidden secret of Canadian political and military history.
The nuclear issue was a minor political matter when John Diefenbaker became prime minister in 1957. By 1963, it served as a catalyst for his defeat, with many attributing his demise to the indecision with which he handled it. Patricia McMahon tells a more nuanced story in Essence of Indecision. Tracing Diefenbaker's deliberations over nuclear policy, McMahon shows that Diefenbaker was politically cautious, not indecisive - he wanted to acquire nuclear weapons and understood from public opinion polls that most Canadians supported this position. However, Diefenbaker worried that the growing anti-nuclear movement might sway public opinion sufficiently to undermine his political support. He also feared that Liberal leader Lester Pearson could use the issue for political advantage. As long as Pearson opposed Canada's membership in the nuclear club, he could portray Diefenbaker's government as an irresponsible proponent of nuclear proliferation. Despite these reservations, Diefenbaker was involved in nuclear negotiations with the Americans throughout his tenure as prime minister, and an agreement was within reach on a number of occasions. When, in January 1963, Pearson reversed his position, Diefenbaker felt trapped - in making a clear public statement in favour of nuclear weapons it would appear as though he was merely following his opponent's lead. When Canada acquired nuclear weapons in 1963, it was under the leadership of Pearson, not Diefenbaker. The first book to deal exclusively with Diefenbaker's nuclear policy and the influence of the anti-nuclear movement, Essence of Indecision is key to understanding Diefenbaker's formulation of nuclear policy, and the environment, both international and domestic, in which that policy was created.
