First-Strike Stability and Strategic Defenses: Part 2 of a Methodology for Evaluating Strategic Forces
First-Strike Stability and Strategic Defenses: Part 2 of a Methodology for Evaluating Strategic Forces

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 1990

Total Pages: 69

ISBN-13:

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First-strike stability between two adversaries is robust when both leaders perceive no great difference between the expected 'cost' to each side of striking first and the expected 'cost' of incurring a first strike if one withholds his attack. Conclusions include: (1) First-strike stability is currently quite robust. (2) Deployment of strategic nationwide ballistic missile defenses by either superpower in competition with the other's strategic offenses generally erodes first-strike stability. (3) Neither country would be likely to continue to adhere to agreements that constrain and reduce offensive arms under the specter of intent by the other to deploy robust strategic defenses in contravention to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. (4) There may be a 'window' in which United States and Soviet strategic nationwide BMD could be robust in defending against 'limited' attacks (third-country ballistic missile attacks, unauthorized attacks, and accidental launches), yet not so robust that first-strike stability is seriously undermined. (5) The level of U.S. defenses attributed to the so-called 'Phase I' deployment seems to go beyond the upper bounds of this 'window' even with current offensive forces, and certainly with offensive forces constrained by START I. (6) Any attempt to transition to a situation in which each side's strategic defenses dominate the opponent's ballistic missiles must include a careful negotiation on the critical role of bomber forces in maintaining firs-strike stability.

Thinking about America's Defense
Thinking about America's Defense

Author: Glenn A. Kent

Publisher: Rand Corporation

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 283

ISBN-13: 0833044524

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"Lieutenant General Glenn A. Kent was a uniquely acute analyst and developer of American defense policy in the second half of the twentieth century. His 33-year career in the Air Force was followed by more than 20 years as one of the leading analysts at RAND. This volume is not a memoir in the normal sense but rather a summary of the dozens of national security issues in which Glenn was personally engaged over the course of his career. These issues included creating the single integrated operational plan (SIOP), leading DoD's official assessment of strategic defenses in the 1960s, developing and analyzing strategic nuclear arms control agreements, helping to bring new weapon systems to life, and many others. Each vignette describes the analytical frameworks and, where appropriate, the mathematical formulas and charts that Glenn developed and applied to gain insights into the issue at hand. The author also relates his roles in much of the bureaucratic pulling and hauling that occurred as issues were addressed within the government." -- publisher's website.

Statecraft and Power
Statecraft and Power

Author: Christopher C. Harmon

Publisher: University Press of America

Published: 1994

Total Pages: 298

ISBN-13: 9780819187185

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These essays on strategy, war, and statecraft have been written during the current reassessment of United States' national strategy. But they also take strategic thinking back to certain principals and interests which have guided America before, during, and after the Cold War. Co-published with The Institute for Public Policy.

China's Strategic Arsenal
China's Strategic Arsenal

Author: James M. Smith

Publisher: Georgetown University Press

Published: 2021-04-01

Total Pages: 280

ISBN-13: 1647120802

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This volume brings together an international group of distinguished scholars to provide a fresh assessment of China's strategic military capabilities, doctrines, and its political perceptions in light of rapidly advancing technologies, an expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal, and increased great-power competition with the United States.

Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age
Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age

Author: Keith B. Payne

Publisher: University Press of Kentucky

Published: 2021-10-21

Total Pages: 223

ISBN-13: 0813184134

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Keith Payne begins by asking, "Did we really learn how to deter predictably and reliably during the Cold War?" He answers cautiously in the negative, pointing out that we know only that our policies toward the Soviet Union did not fail. What we can be more certain of, in Payne's view, is that such policies will almost assuredly fail in the Second Nuclear Age—a period in which direct nuclear threat between superpowers has been replaced by threats posed by regional "rogue" powers newly armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The fundamental problem with deterrence theory is that is posits a rational—hence predictable—opponent. History frequently demonstrates the opposite. Payne argues that as the one remaining superpower, the United States needs to be more flexible in its approach to regional powers.