This book examines the array of financial crises, slumps, depressions and recessions that happened around the globe during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. It covers events including World War I, hyperinflation and market crashes in the 1920s, the Great Depression of the 1930s, stagflation of the 1970s, the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, the post-socialist transitions in Central Eastern Europe and Russia in the 1990s, and the great financial crisis of 2008-09. In addition to providing wide geographic and historical coverage of episodes of crisis in North America, Europe, Latin America and Asia, the book clarifies basic concepts in the area of recession economics, analysis of high inflation, debt crises, political cycles and international political economy. An understanding of these concepts is needed to comprehend big recessions and slumps that often lead to both political change and the reassessment of prevailing economic paradigms.
This book is an analysis of the causes of the Great Depression of 1929. The author concludes that the Depression was caused not by laissez-faire capitalism, but by government intervention in the economy. The author argues that the Hoover administration violated the tradition of previous American depressions by intervening in an unprecedented way and that the result was a disastrous prolongation of unemployment and depression so that a typical business cycle became a lingering disease.
Excerpt from Business Cycles and the Depression of 1920-1 Another business cycle has about run its course. If one may hazard a guess based on previous experience and on a few current indices, we are somewhere near the middle of the busi ness depression which is liquidating the artificial boom of the war and the post-armistice period. As this is being written, in July, the between seasons month, normal midsummer dullness has aggravated the cyclical depression and the general tone of the business world has been not inaptly characterized as one of enthusiastic pessimism. Bad news is doubtless still in store for some trades; probably for business as a whole it may be next March before the worst is reached; and perhaps after that, recovery may be very gradual and halting. Yet funda mentally there is reason for confidence and courage. Indeed now almost for the first time, those who face facts squarely find solid ground for optimism. The gradual but substantial measure of liquidation already achieved, the increasing realiza tion of the necessity of a restored economic equilibrium 'on the part of groups like the building trades which had long resisted the inevitable, the settlement of some major strikes and the avoidance of others, the improved transportation situation, the easing of money rates, the back-to - work move ment in most European countries, and the improved political situation lead one to believe that we are already near the bottom and that the rest of the descent need not be so danger ously rapid as to result in a crash. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
“Magisterial. . . . The direct and indirect influence of the Monetary History would be difficult to overstate.”—Ben S. Bernanke, Nobel Prize–winning economist and former chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve From Nobel Prize–winning economist Milton Friedman and his celebrated colleague Anna Jacobson Schwartz, one of the most important economics books of the twentieth century—the landmark work that rewrote the story of the Great Depression and the understanding of monetary policy Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 is one of the most influential economics books of the twentieth century. A landmark achievement, it marshaled massive historical data and sharp analytics to argue that monetary policy—steady control of the money supply—matters profoundly in the management of the nation’s economy, especially in navigating serious economic fluctuations. One of the book’s most important chapters, “The Great Contraction, 1929–33” addressed the central economic event of the twentieth century, the Great Depression. Friedman and Schwartz argued that the Federal Reserve could have stemmed the severity of the Depression, but failed to exercise its role of managing the monetary system and countering banking panics. The book served as a clarion call to the monetarist school of thought by emphasizing the importance of the money supply in the functioning of the economy—an idea that has come to shape the actions of central banks worldwide.
An academic colleague has called Lucas "the dominant figure in Americanmacroeconomics." And another refers to this group of 14 essays, nearly all of which were firstpublished during the 1970s, as the most influential contribution to macroeconomics in thatdecade.
This volume presents the most complete collection available of the work of Victor Zarnowitz, a leader in the study of business cycles, growth, inflation, and forecasting.. With characteristic insight, Zarnowitz examines theories of the business cycle, including Keynesian and monetary theories and more recent rational expectation and real business cycle theories. He also measures trends and cycles in economic activity; evaluates the performance of leading indicators and their composite measures; surveys forecasting tools and performance of business and academic economists; discusses historical changes in the nature and sources of business cycles; and analyzes how successfully forecasting firms and economists predict such key economic variables as interest rates and inflation.
From Nobel Prize–winning economist and New York Times bestselling author Robert Shiller, a groundbreaking account of how stories help drive economic events—and why financial panics can spread like epidemic viruses Stories people tell—about financial confidence or panic, housing booms, or Bitcoin—can go viral and powerfully affect economies, but such narratives have traditionally been ignored in economics and finance because they seem anecdotal and unscientific. In this groundbreaking book, Robert Shiller explains why we ignore these stories at our peril—and how we can begin to take them seriously. Using a rich array of examples and data, Shiller argues that studying popular stories that influence individual and collective economic behavior—what he calls "narrative economics"—may vastly improve our ability to predict, prepare for, and lessen the damage of financial crises and other major economic events. The result is nothing less than a new way to think about the economy, economic change, and economics. In a new preface, Shiller reflects on some of the challenges facing narrative economics, discusses the connection between disease epidemics and economic epidemics, and suggests why epidemiology may hold lessons for fighting economic contagions.
