During the Cold War the small state of Cyprus was of great strategic importance to the West. Britain, the United States, and Nato all had valuable installations there; and any armed conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots could easily suck two nearby Nato members - Greece and Turkey - into war. When therefore, intercommunal fighting broke out in Cyprus in December 1963, the West was deeply embarrassed. This book examines the consequential efforts of, first Britain, and then the UN, to keep the peace.
This work casts light on the actions of the United Kingdom during the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64. In particular, the volume concentrates on a very specific period of events, charting the course of British actions from the start of fighting to the moment when UN Security Council Resolution 186 passed responsibility for peacekeeping and peacemaking over to the United Nations.As is shown, Britain actually undertook several different roles during this period. On the one hand, it was a crisis manager and peacekeeper. Its timely decision, along with Greece and Turkey, to establish a peacekeeping force, the Joint Truce Force, certainly helped to limit the extent of fighting on the island, and thus reduced the chance of direct Turkish intervention. However, as this work shows, it was not an easy role to play and required a significant manpower commitment from the United Kingdom. On the other hand, Britain also tried to act as peacemaker. At first this was done informally on the island, but was later supplemented by a formal peace process in London. Unfortunately, the process failed in its objective and in doing so created a rift between Britain and the Greek Cypriots, which ended all hopes that Britain might be able to broker a compromise between the parties. It also affected Britain's efforts to find an alternative peacekeeping force to replace the Joint Truce Force - an effort that involved looking at the Commonwealth and NATO as possible peacekeepers. In the end, the United Nations was called upon to keep the peace, a role that is forty years old.However, the book also shows that the 1963-64 Crisis is profoundly important for two other reasons. First of all, it was during these months that the Greek Cypriots were accorded international legitimacy as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. As will be shown, this came about partly as a requirement of international peacemaking and peacekeeping. However, it also becomes clear that the actual confirmation of this recognition involved a certain amount of what the Turkish Cypriots see as betrayal - betrayal by Britain, by the United States, and, most surprisingly, by Turkey. Secondly, this period saw the acceptance by the international community of the legality of the Treaty of Guarantee. As a result, Turkey retained an internationally accepted constitutional right to intervene in the island's affairs. This right was put into effect in 1974 after a coup ordered by the then military government in Athens overthrew Archbishop Makarios, the first president of the independent state. As a result the island was divided and the more modern understanding of the 'Cyprus Problem' was created.Drawing on official British government documents and interviews with many of the protagonists of the period, this work is the first in-depth study of Britain's leading role during this critically important juncture in the modern history of Cyprus.
In 1974 the Greek colonels ousted the Greek-Cypriot leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and Turkey retaliated by invading and seizing a third of the island. Cyprus remains split in two, like Berlin before the wall came down, bristling with troops and spying bases, and permanently policed by the United Nations. Henry Kissinger claimed he could do nothing to stop the coup because of the Watergate crisis, but this book presents evidence to support the view that it was no failure of American foreign policy, but the realization of a long-term plot. The authors describe the strategic reasons for Washington's need to divide the island. Their account encompasses an international cast of characters that includes Eden, Eisenhower, Nixon, Kissinger, Wilson, Callaghan, Grivas, and the leaders of the two halves of the divided island, Clerides and Denktas.
In the troubled island of Cyprus, the national interests and rivalries of Greece and Turkey still collide, the population remains divided between the Greek and Turkish communities and the country is still a cat's paw of outside powers - especially the USA and the now resurgent Russia - as it has been since the acquisition of the island by Britain in 1878. Global rivalry between the great powers and Cyprus's vitally strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean - a 'listening post' in the Cold War and even today - has meant that the populations have never been free to shape their own destinies which have been constantly influenced by great power interests. These are problems that have been brought into sharp focus by Cyprus's entry into the European Union. William Mallinson's book is a fast-moving and incisive narrative history which portrays Cyprus as a continuing source of international tension in the Mediterranean and beyond. It features the latest source material from the recently released National Archive, vivid interviews with key players, even reports which raise awkward and embarrassing questions. His critical eye uncovers the underlying story of American and British involvement in the island's affairs, first as a key territory in Cold War politics with its close proximity to the Middle East and Asia and now as a key asset in the 'war on terror'. Mallinson's new insights and revelations on the period leading up to and following the Turkish invasion in 1974, when Greece and Turkey - both NATO members - were on the brink of war are fascinating and make essential reading. Henry Kissinger is seen to be even more the master puppeteer, pressuring Britain not to give up her bases. Mallinson examines how after the Turkish invasion Kissinger planned the abortive Annan Plan to divide the island and how he regarded the retention of Cyprus as vital for a future solution of the Arab-Israeli problem. For Kissinger Cyprus was the important square on the 'world chequer-board' while British influence continued to decline and her independence in foreign policy was virtually non-existent. Mallinson also explores how Turkey's drive to join the EU will affect not only stability in Cyprus but also the whole region, as Russia's influence in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean expands. So, in William Mallinson's words, 'Cyprus lies [still] at the epicentre of this whole geopolitical merry-go-round'.
The Cyprus conflict was for long an inactive volcano, but it erupted violently in 1955, 1963 and 1974. Now more of a smouldering fire, its persistence is a serious obstacle on Turkey's route to EU accession. Uniquely utilizing Turkish sources, this book looks at how the conflict has developed since 1978.
Focusing on the period from September 1964, when Senor Galo Lasso Plaza assumed the UN mediatory role, to the coup d'etat and the Turkish invasion ten years later, Cyprus Before 1974 seeks to unpick the internal conflicts which led to the failure of the peace process in Cyprus. Marilena Varnava studies three phases: Plaza's mediation of 1964-1965; the negotiating impasse on the island during the period 1965-1967; and finally the inter-communal talks of 1968-1974. Varnava argues persuasively that each of these successive phases, particularly the latter two, were inextricably tied to political and social developments within the two main communities on the island itself. In particular, Cyprus before 1974 focuses on the events of 1968 - when the Greek-Cypriot political leadership, and the President of the Republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios III, failed to grasp the nature of the changes within the island's post-independence arena. Recurrent attempts within both communities during the talks of that year to create faits accomplis favourable to their own bargaining positions served to heighten the barriers to a stable and peaceful outcome. This study enlarges our understanding of the underlying issues which the Turkish invasion of 1974 were to throw into stark relief and is essential reading for all those who study the Cyprus problem and conflict resolution.
"The book describes how the Greek fixation with Enosis--union with Greece--led to a one-sided war against the Turks and the brutal massacres of their men, women and children."--Provided by publisher.
Borowiec portrays Cyprus as a permanent source of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and a potential trigger for future conflict between Greece and Turkey. He describes the depth of animosity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and analyzes the obstacles in the path of a search for a solution. Most casual observers see the conflict between Greeks and Turks on a strategic Mediterranean island as a struggle within a sovereign state. Borowiec concludes that there has never been a Cypriot nation, only Greeks and Turks living in Cyprus, separated by the hostility reflecting the traditional animosity between their motherlands. If these two groups could forget their past conflicts—as did, for example, Germany and Poland—there might be a way to end the partition of Cyprus. At the present time, however, the crisis is likely to continue with varying degrees of tension, threatening the entire Eastern Mediterranean and undermining NATO's cohesion. Borowiec traces the history of Cyprus from antiquity through Ottoman and British colonial rule and the post-independence period. He describes the break between the island's communities in 1963, the UN intervention of 1964, and the path toward the Athens junta's coup in 1974 which caused the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. He compares the conflicting views of the protagonists—the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority. Considerable attention is paid to the two separate economic and political entities on the island. Borowiec analyzes the futility of myriad international mediation efforts and suggests possible ways of creating a climate propitious to dialogue. This important new look at the Cypriot conflict will be valuable to researchers, policy makers, and scholars involved with the Eastern Mediterranean and conflict/peace studies.
