"The renewed threat of biological weapons highlights the importance of crafting policy responses informed by the rule of law. This book explores patterns in recent governance initiatives and advocates building a "global biosecurity concert" as a way to address the threats presented by biological weapons and infectious diseases in the early 21st century."--BOOK JACKET.
This book is a source of information on practical and innovative approaches to biosecurity surveillance. It explains the foundation and concepts behind surveillance design, with examples of methods and tools created to deal with surveillance challenges. With supporting case studies and including current directions in research, it covers evidence-based approaches to surveillance, statistics, detectability, single and multi-species detection, risk assessment, diagnostics, data-basing, modelling of invasion and spread, optimisation, and future climate challenges.
The explosive growth of bioeconomy and bioscience, coupled with an interconnected planet increases the potential impact of large-scale bio-events. Either causing public health threats as in epidemics or posing food security issues, from mass poisonings to large-scale starvation, such eventualities are direct threats and indirect destabilizers in a planetary context. The issue of Biosecurity thus pervades every affected aspect, from exploitations of the agro-sector and the food industry to the Public Health management, the novel therapeutic/treatment approaches, the new age of space, deep-sea and subterranean explorations and the interface with the cyber world and the massive or small-scale projection of violence. It has been present since ancient times tacitly and discreetly but only recently took its present guise, the different aspects of which are explored in this book.
Arranging the transportation of animals at research facilities is often an ordeal. There is a confusing patchwork of local, national, and international regulations; a perceived lack of high-quality shipping services; a dearth of science-based good practices; and a lack of biosafety standards. It's a challenge â€"and an impediment to biomedical research. Guidelines for the Humane Transportation of Research Animals identifies the current problems encountered in the transportation of research animals and offers recommendations aimed at local and federal officials to rectify these problems. This book also includes a set of good practices based on the extensive body of literature on transportation of agricultural animals, universal concepts of physiology, and a scientific understanding of species-specific needs and differences. Good practices were developed by the committee to address thermal environment, space requirements, food and water requirements, social interaction, monitoring of transportation, emergency procedures, personnel training, and biosecurity. Guidelines for the Humane Transportation of Research Animals is an essential guide for all researchers, animal care technicians, facilities managers, administrators, and animal care and use committees at research institutions.
Globalization of the food supply has created conditions favorable for the emergence, reemergence, and spread of food-borne pathogens-compounding the challenge of anticipating, detecting, and effectively responding to food-borne threats to health. In the United States, food-borne agents affect 1 out of 6 individuals and cause approximately 48 million illnesses, 128,000 hospitalizations, and 3,000 deaths each year. This figure likely represents just the tip of the iceberg, because it fails to account for the broad array of food-borne illnesses or for their wide-ranging repercussions for consumers, government, and the food industry-both domestically and internationally. A One Health approach to food safety may hold the promise of harnessing and integrating the expertise and resources from across the spectrum of multiple health domains including the human and veterinary medical and plant pathology communities with those of the wildlife and aquatic health and ecology communities. The IOM's Forum on Microbial Threats hosted a public workshop on December 13 and 14, 2011 that examined issues critical to the protection of the nation's food supply. The workshop explored existing knowledge and unanswered questions on the nature and extent of food-borne threats to health. Participants discussed the globalization of the U.S. food supply and the burden of illness associated with foodborne threats to health; considered the spectrum of food-borne threats as well as illustrative case studies; reviewed existing research, policies, and practices to prevent and mitigate foodborne threats; and, identified opportunities to reduce future threats to the nation's food supply through the use of a "One Health" approach to food safety. Improving Food Safety Through a One Health Approach: Workshop Summary covers the events of the workshop and explains the recommendations for future related workshops.
During July 10-13, 2011, 68 participants from 32 countries gathered in Istanbul, Turkey for a workshop organized by the United States National Research Council on Anticipating Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-containment Biological Laboratories. The United States Department of State's Biosecurity Engagement Program sponsored the workshop, which was held in partnership with the Turkish Academy of Sciences. The international workshop examined biosafety and biosecurity issues related to the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of high-containment biological laboratories- equivalent to United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention biological safety level 3 or 4 labs. Although these laboratories are needed to characterize highly dangerous human and animal pathogens, assist in disease surveillance, and produce vaccines, they are complex systems with inherent risks. Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories summarizes the workshop discussion, which included the following topics: Technological options to meet diagnostic, research, and other goals; Laboratory construction and commissioning; Operational maintenance to provide sustainable capabilities, safety, and security; and Measures for encouraging a culture of responsible conduct. Workshop attendees described the history and current challenges they face in their individual laboratories. Speakers recounted steps they were taking to improve safety and security, from running training programs to implementing a variety of personnel reliability measures. Many also spoke about physical security, access controls, and monitoring pathogen inventories. Workshop participants also identified tensions in the field and suggested possible areas for action.
On October 17, 2014, spurred by incidents at U.S. government laboratories that raised serious biosafety concerns, the United States government launched a one-year deliberative process to address the continuing controversy surrounding so-called "gain-of-function" (GOF) research on respiratory pathogens with pandemic potential. The gain of function controversy began in late 2011 with the question of whether to publish the results of two experiments involving H5N1 avian influenza and continued to focus on certain research with highly pathogenic avian influenza over the next three years. The heart of the U.S. process is an evaluation of the potential risks and benefits of certain types of GOF experiments with influenza, SARS, and MERS viruses that would inform the development and adoption of a new U.S. Government policy governing the funding and conduct of GOF research. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research is the summary of a two-day public symposia on GOF research. Convened in December 2014 by the Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council, the main focus of this event was to discuss principles important for, and key considerations in, the design of risk and benefit assessments of GOF research. Participants examined the underlying scientific and technical questions that are the source of current discussion and debate over GOF research involving pathogens with pandemic potential. This report is a record of the presentations and discussion of the meeting.
Based on a series of regional meetings on university campuses with officials from the national security community and academic research institutions, this report identifies specific actions that should be taken to maintain a thriving scientific research environment in an era of heightened security concerns. Actions include maintaining the open exchange of scientific information, fostering a productive environment for international scholars in the U.S., reexamining federal definitions of sensitive but unclassified research, and reviewing policies on deemed export controls. The federal government should establish a standing entity, preferably a Science and Security Commission, that would review policies regarding the exchange of information and the participation of foreign-born scientists and students in research.
The effort to understand and combat infectious diseases has, during the centuries, produced many key advances in science and medicine-including the development of vaccines, drugs, and other treatments. A subset of this research is conducted with agents that, like anthrax, not only pose a severe threat to the health of humans, plants, and animals but can also be used for ill-intended purposes. Such agents have been listed by the government as biological select agents and toxins. The 2001 anthrax letter attacks prompted the creation of new regulations aimed at increasing security for research with dangerous pathogens. The outcome of the anthrax letter investigation has raised concern about whether these measures are adequate. Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins evaluates both the physical security of select agent laboratories and personnel reliability measures designed to ensure the trustworthiness of those with access to biological select agents and toxins. The book offers a set of guiding principles and recommended changes to minimize security risk and facilitate the productivity of research. The book recommends fostering a culture of trust and responsibility in the laboratory, engaging the community in oversight of the Select Agent Program, and enhancing the operation of the Select Agent Program.
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, Second Edition, takes a holistic approach to biosecurity, with coverage of pathogens, prevention, and response methodology. It addresses these hazards in the context of vulnerability assessments and the planning strategies government and industry can use to prepare for and respond to such events. The book is organized into four thematic sections: Part I provides a conceptual understanding of biowarfare, bioterrorism and the laws we have to counteract this; Part II investigates known bioagents and the threat from emerging diseases; Part III focuses on agricultural terrorism and food security; and Part IV outlines international, US, and local initiatives for biodefense and biosecurity. Case studies illustrate biodefense against both intentional terrorism and natural outbreaks. - Covers emerging threats of pandemic influenza, antibiotic resistant strains of bacterial pathogens, and severe respiratory diseases caused by novel viruses - Offers increased international coverage, including initiatives to counter biological weapons and threats, and food security - Updated throughout with latest protocols for dealing with biological threats and new case studies - Includes online instructor ancillaries - PowerPoint lecture slides, test questions, and an instructor manual, for increased classroom functionality
