Applies Dogen Kigen's religious philosophy and the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro to the philosophical problem of personal identity, probing the applicability of the concept of non-self to the philosophical problems of selfhood, otherness, and temporality which culminate in the conundrum of personal identity.
Applies Dogen Kigen's religious philosophy and the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro to the philosophical problem of personal identity, probing the applicability of the concept of non-self to the philosophical problems of selfhood, otherness, and temporality which culminate in the conundrum of personal identity.
Applies Dogen Kigen's religious philosophy and the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro to the philosophical problem of personal identity, probing the applicability of the concept of non-self to the philosophical problems of selfhood, otherness, and temporality which culminate in the conundrum of personal identity.
Going beyond the controversy surrounding personhood in non-philosophical contexts, this book defends the need for a credible philosophical conception of the person. Engaging with John Locke, Derek Parfit and P.F. Strawson, the authors develop an original philosophical anthropology based on the work of Charles Hartshorne and A.N. Whitehead.
The authors challenge theories that put the body at the centre of identity, going 'beyond the body' to highlight the persistence of self-identity even when the body itself has been disposed of or is missing.
Beyond the Self grew out of a conference of developmental scientists who examined the ways that young people were developing understandings of self that anchored youth to something larger than their own personal competencies and success. Each of the papers drew on the question of how one locates the formation of identity within the scope of different transcending demands or influences. This special issue is organized into three parts--moral, civic, and cultural and religous identity--but are not exclusive in their focus on these themes as many of the sections provide a more integrated view of human development. In sum, these articles recognize that the search for identity and purpose within adolescence is informed by a multiplicity of voices.
This study is about what matters in survival—about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In What Matters in Survival, Douglas Ehring argues that this Parfitian thesis does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view “Survival Nihilism,” according to which nothing matters in survival. Although we generally have motivating reasons to have prudential concern, and perhaps even indirect normative reasons for such concerns there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern. This view goes beyond what Parfit calls the "Extreme View." It is the "More Extreme View" and is in effect something like an error theory about prudential reason as a special kind of normative reason.