This volume contains selected essays which together attempt to re-frame the roles of guilds in medieval and early modern European cities. They focus on the different ways in which we can understand the interfaces between regulatory frameworks, represented by guild and civic regulations, and the wider world of labour and production. Through case studies of single cities, economic sectors, and of territories, they address a range of questions about the operation of labour markets, the nature of guild regulation within and outside guild jurisdictions, and the interaction between 'regulation' and 'freedom' as expressed in legislation and in the organization of production and distribution. In doing so, they offer a means to compare and contrast experiences across Europe and the circumstances which determined and altered economic structures and, in turn, political and social structures in cities.
European Convention on Human Rights – Article 10 – Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. In the context of an effective democracy and respect for human rights mentioned in the Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights, freedom of expression is not only important in its own right, but it also plays a central part in the protection of other rights under the Convention. Without a broad guarantee of the right to freedom of expression protected by independent and impartial courts, there is no free country, there is no democracy. This general proposition is undeniable. This handbook is a practical tool for legal professionals from Council of Europe member states who wish to strengthen their skills in applying the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in their daily work.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, social media sites like Facebook and Twitter have become important venues for users to exercise free speech rights protected under the First Amendment. Commentators and legislators, however, have questioned whether these social media platforms are living up to their reputation as digital public forums. Some have expressed concern that these sites are not doing enough to counter violent or false speech. At the same time, many argue that the platforms are unfairly banning and restricting access to potentially valuable speech. Currently, federal law does not offer much recourse for social media users who seek to challenge a social media provider's decision about whether and how to present a user's content. Lawsuits predicated on these sites' decisions to host or remove content have been largely unsuccessful, facing at least two significant barriers under existing federal law. First, while individuals have sometimes alleged that these companies violated their free speech rights by discriminating against users' content, courts have held that the First Amendment, which provides protection against state action, is not implicated by the actions of these private companies. Second, courts have concluded that many non-constitutional claims are barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, which provides immunity to providers of interactive computer services, including social media providers, both for certain decisions to host content created by others and for actions taken "voluntarily" and "in good faith" to restrict access to "objectionable" material. Some have argued that Congress should step in to regulate social media sites. Government action regulating internet content would constitute state action that may implicate the First Amendment. In particular, social media providers may argue that government regulations impermissibly infringe on the providers' own constitutional free speech rights. Legal commentators have argued that when social media platforms decide whether and how to post users' content, these publication decisions are themselves protected under the First Amendment. There are few court decisions evaluating whether a social media site, by virtue of publishing, organizing, or even editing protected speech, is itself exercising free speech rights. Consequently, commentators have largely analyzed the question of whether the First Amendment protects a social media site's publication decisions by analogy to other types of First Amendment cases. There are at least three possible frameworks for analyzing governmental restrictions on social media sites' ability to moderate user content. Which of these three frameworks applies will depend largely on the particular action being regulated. Under existing law, social media platforms may be more likely to receive First Amendment protection when they exercise more editorial discretion in presenting user-generated content, rather than if they neutrally transmit all such content. In addition, certain types of speech receive less protection under the First Amendment. Courts may be more likely to uphold regulations targeting certain disfavored categories of speech such as obscenity or speech inciting violence. Finally, if a law targets a social media site's conduct rather than speech, it may not trigger the protections of the First Amendment at all.
As this publication explains, freedom of expression is not just a by-product of technical change; it must be protected by legal and regulatory measures that balance a variety of potentially conflicting values and interests in a complex global ecology of choices. The impetus that this report provides for the prioritization of research in this field encourages further scrutiny of the multifaceted issues that govern the conditions for freedom of expression on the Internet. The findings of this research point to the need to better track a wider array of global, legal and regulatory trends. It is my hope that this publication proves to be a useful and informative resource for all users working in this domain, whether individual researchers, students or policy makers.
The contentious role of social media in recent elections and referendums has brought to the fore once again the fundamental question of media freedom and the extent to which, and the way in which, the media should be regulated in a modern democratic society. This book surveys the history of media in the US, the UK and Europe in order to develop a new theory of media freedom that is capable of resolving current controversies about how best to regulate the media, including the internet and social media. Tambini argues that democratic regulation of the media must build upon – and learn from – the long history of accommodation between the press, broadcasting, the state and corporate power. By attending to this history, we can see that media freedom is not absolute but rather conditional, taking the form of a social contract of privileges and connected duties. Tambini develops this social contract account of media freedom and applies it to different media sectors, from the press and broadcasting to the internet and social media. Above all, he argues for a renewed role for international human rights law standards in media governance, and an end to American exceptionalism. Written for students, scholars, policymakers and media professionals, this wide-ranging book will be of interest to everyone concerned about the role of the media in our societies and about the health of our democracies.
There's a common belief that cyberspace cannot be regulated-that it is, in its very essence, immune from the government's (or anyone else's) control.Code argues that this belief is wrong. It is not in the nature of cyberspace to be unregulable; cyberspace has no "nature." It only has code-the software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is. That code can create a place of freedom-as the original architecture of the Net did-or a place of exquisitely oppressive control.If we miss this point, then we will miss how cyberspace is changing. Under the influence of commerce, cyberpsace is becoming a highly regulable space, where our behavior is much more tightly controlled than in real space.But that's not inevitable either. We can-we must-choose what kind of cyberspace we want and what freedoms we will guarantee. These choices are all about architecture: about what kind of code will govern cyberspace, and who will control it. In this realm, code is the most significant form of law, and it is up to lawyers, policymakers, and especially citizens to decide what values that code embodies.
Hateful thoughts and words can lead to harmful actions like the March 2019 terrorist attack on mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. In free, open and democratic societies, governments cannot justifiably regulate what citizens think, feel, believe or value, but do have a duty to protect citizens from harmful communication that incites discrimination, active hostility and violence. Written by a public policy advisor for fellow practitioners in politics and public life, this book discusses significant practical and moral challenges regarding internet governance and freedom of speech, particularly when responding to content that is legal but harmful. Policy makers and professionals working for governmental institutions need to strike a fair balance between protecting from harm and preserving the right to freedom of expression. And because merely passing laws does not solve complex social problems, governments need to invest, not just regulate. Governments, big tech and the private sector, civil society, individual citizens and the fourth estate all have roles to play, and counter-speech is everyone’s responsibility. This book tackles hard questions about internet governance, hate speech, cancel culture and the loss of civility, and illustrates principled pragmatism applied to perplexing policy problems. Furthermore, it presents counter-speech strategies as alternatives and complements to censorship and criminalisation.
Addresses a critical analysis of major media policies in the European Union and Council of Europe at the period of profound changes affecting both media environments and use, as well as the logic of media policy-making and reconfiguration of traditional regulatory models. The analytical problem-related approach seems to better reflect a media policy process as an interrelated part of European integration, formation of European citizenship, and exercise of communication rights within the European communicative space. The question of normative expectations is to be compared in this case with media policy rationales, mechanisms of implementation (transposing rules from EU to national levels), and outcomes.
Freedom of expression – particularly freedom of speech – is, in most Western liberal democracies, a well accepted and long established, though contested constitutional right or principle. Whilst based in ethical, rights-based and political theories such as those of: justice, the good life, personal autonomy, self determination, and welfare, as well as arrangements over legitimate government, pluralism and its limits, democracy and the extent and role of the state, there is always a lack of agreement over what precisely freedom of expression entails and how it should be applied. For the purposes of this book we are concerned with freedom of expression and the media with regard to the current application of legal standards and self-regulation to journalistic practice.
