Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.
Banks, Bankers, and Bankruptcies Under Crisis uses case studies of failed banks, banks that would have failed without taxpayer intervention, and in some cases banks obliged to merge under government pressure, to better understand global banking today.
An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.
"Before reading The Panic of 1907, the year 1907 seemed like a long time ago and a different world. The authors, however, bring this story alive in a fast-moving book, and the reader sees how events of that time are very relevant for today's financial world. In spite of all of our advances, including a stronger monetary system and modern tools for managing risk, Bruner and Carr help us understand that we are not immune to a future crisis." —Dwight B. Crane, Baker Foundation Professor, Harvard Business School "Bruner and Carr provide a thorough, masterly, and highly readable account of the 1907 crisis and its management by the great private banker J. P. Morgan. Congress heeded the lessons of 1907, launching the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to prevent banking panics and foster financial stability. We still have financial problems. But because of 1907 and Morgan, a century later we have a respected central bank as well as greater confidence in our money and our banks than our great-grandparents had in theirs." —Richard Sylla, Henry Kaufman Professor of the History of Financial Institutions and Markets, and Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University "A fascinating portrayal of the events and personalities of the crisis and panic of 1907. Lessons learned and parallels to the present have great relevance. Crises and panics are as much a part of our future as our past." —John Strangfeld, Vice Chairman, Prudential Financial "Who would have thought that a hundred years after the Panic of 1907 so much remained to be written about it? Bruner and Carr break significant new ground because they are willing to do the heavy lifting of combing through massive archival material to identify and weave together important facts. Their book will be of interest not only to banking theorists and financial historians, but also to business school and economics students, for its rare ability to teach so clearly why and how a panic unfolds." —Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions, Columbia University, Graduate School of Business
In spite of its key role in creating the ruinous financial crisis of 2008, the American banking industry has grown bigger, more profitable, and more resistant to regulation than ever. Anchored by six megabanks whose assets amount to more than 60 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, this oligarchy proved it could first hold the global economy hostage and then use its political muscle to fight off meaningful reform. 13 Bankers brilliantly charts the rise to power of the financial sector and forcefully argues that we must break up the big banks if we want to avoid future financial catastrophes. Updated, with additional analysis of the government’s recent attempt to reform the banking industry, this is a timely and expert account of our troubled political economy.
This study of post-Civil War banking panics has constructed estimates of bank closures and their incidence in five separate banking disturbances. The book reconstructs the course of banking panics in the interior, where suspension of cash payment was the primary effect on the average person.
This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.
On March 6, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt, less than forty-eight hours after becoming president, ordered the suspension of all banking facilities in the United States. How the nation had reached such a desperate situation and how it responded to the banking "holiday" are examined in this book, the first full-length study of the crisis. Although the 1920s had witnessed a wave of bank failures, the situation worsened after the 1929 stock market crash, and by the winter of 1932-1933, complete banking collapse threatened much of the nation. President Hoover's stopgap measures proved totally inadequate, the author shows, and by March 4, the day of Roosevelt's inauguration, thirty-four states had declared banking moratoriums. Of special interest in this study is Ms. Kennedy's examination of relations between Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt.
A fascinating analysis of the critical role commercial property investment played in the economic boom and bust during the global financial crisis The unprecedented financial boom stretching from the mid-1990s through 2008 ultimately led to the deepest recession in modern times and one of the slowest economic recoveries in history. It also resulted in the emergence of the draconian austerity policies that have swept across Europe in recent years. Property Boom and Banking Bust offers an expert insight into the complex property market dynamics that contributed to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 and its devastating economic consequences. It is the first book to focus on a woefully underreported dimension of the crisis, namely, the significant role that lending on commercial property development played in the crisis. Among other key topics, the authors explore the philosophical and behavioral factors that propelled irresponsible bank lending and the property boom; how it led to the downfall of the banks; the impact of the credit crunch on the real estate industry generally in the wake of the financial crisis; the catastrophic effects the property bust had on property investors, both large and small; and how the financial institutions have sought to recover in the wake of the financial crisis. Provides valuable insights into what happened in previous booms and busts, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, and how they compare with the most recent one Offers an expert assessment of the consequences of the global financial crisis for the banking system and the commercial property industry Examines strategies banks have used to recover their positions and manage the overhang of indebtedness and bad property assets Addresses strategies the real estate industry have used to recover from the collapse in property values Written in an accessible style, and featuring numerous insider case accounts from property bankers, Property Boom and Banking Bust disentangles the complex, tightly-woven factors that led to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, while offering powerful lessons for property industry professionals on how to avoid having history repeat itself.
