The appropriate level of bank capital and, more generally, a bank’s capacity to absorb losses, has been at the core of the post-crisis policy debate. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on how much capital would have been needed to avoid imposing losses on bank creditors or resorting to public recapitalizations of banks in past banking crises. The paper also looks at the welfare costs of tighter capital regulation by reviewing the evidence on its potential impact on bank credit and lending rates. Its findings broadly support the range of loss absorbency suggested by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee for systemically important banks.
The paper finds that, given Australia's conservative approach in implementing the Basel II framework, Australian banks' headline capital ratios underestimate their capital strengths. Given their high capital quality and the progress in their funding profiles since the global financial crisis, the Australian banks are making good progress toward meeting the Basel III requirements, including the new liquidity standards. Stress tests calibrated on the Irish crisis experience show that the banks could withstand sizable shocks to their exposure to residential mortgages. However, combining residential mortgage shocks with corporate losses expected at the peak of the global financial crisis would put more pressure on Australian banks' capital. Therefore, it would be useful to consider the merits of higher capital requirements for systemically important domestic banks.
This paper reviews Australian banks’ performance from an international perspective, with a focus on changes in capital and liquidity risk. The paper analyses the extent of any vulnerability that might arise from a potential deterioration in the funding markets and discusses whether liquidity rules, such as those being considered by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, may help reduce banks’ liquidity risks and improve financial stability.
In this paper, we provide an overview of the concerns surrounding the variations in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across banks and jurisdictions and how this might undermine the Basel III capital adequacy framework. We discuss the key drivers behind the differences in these calculations, drawing upon a sample of systemically important banks from Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific. We then discuss a range of policy options that could be explored to fix the actual and perceived problems with RWAs, and improve the use of risk-sensitive capital ratios.
Life Insurance Act 1995 (Australia) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Life Insurance Act 1995 (Australia) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 15, 2018 This book contains: - The complete text of the Life Insurance Act 1995 (Australia) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section
Most central banks oblige depository institutions to hold minimum reserves against their liabilities, predominantly in the form of balances at the central bank. The role of these reserve requirements has evolved significantly over time. The overlay of changing purposes and practices has the result that it is not always fully clear what the current purpose of reserve requirements is, and this necessarily complicates thinking about how a reserve regime should be structured. This paper describes three main purposes for reserve requirements - prudential, monetary control and liquidity management - and suggests best practice for the structure of a reserves regime. Finally, the paper illustrates current practices using a 2010 IMF survey of 121 central banks.
Near-term global financial stability risks have been contained as an unprecedented policy response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has helped avert a financial meltdown and maintain the flow of credit to the economy. For the first time, many emerging market central banks have launched asset purchase programs to support the smooth functioning of financial markets and the overall economy. But the outlook remains highly uncertain, and vulnerabilities are rising, representing potential headwinds to recovery. The report presents an assessment of the real-financial disconnect, as well as forward-looking analysis of nonfinancial firms, banks, and emerging market capital flows. After the outbreak, firms’ cash flows were adversely affected as economic activity declined sharply. More vulnerable firms—those with weaker solvency and liquidity positions and smaller size—experienced greater financial stress than their peers in the early stages of the crisis. As the crisis unfolds, corporate liquidity pressures may morph into insolvencies, especially if the recovery is delayed. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are more vulnerable than large firms with access to capital markets. Although the global banking system is well capitalized, some banking systems may experience capital shortfalls in an adverse scenario, even with the currently deployed policy measures. The report also assesses the pandemic’s impact on firms’ environmental performance to gauge the extent to which the crisis may result in a reversal of the gains posted in recent years.
In this study, Australia’s economic performance from the onset of the global financial crisis is discussed. A healthy banking system, flexible exchange rate, and robust demand for commodities from Asia are important for good performance. Although recent global market volatility has increased uncertainty about the economic outlook and tilted risks downward, strong commodity demand from emerging Asia underpins Australia’s favorable economic prospects. The importance of tax and structural reforms is emphasized. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s plans are used to undertake stress tests incorporating disruptions to funding markets.
