Since 1992, the international community has responded to a series of armed conflicts in the Balkans region by establishing numerous, complex, mil. and civilian peace operations there. This report provides an analysis of Balkans security issues. It discusses: (1) the current security situation in the Balkans, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia; (2) the projected security in the region over the next 5 years; and (3) factors in the decision to withdraw Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo. Also describes how the executive branch has defined U.S. interests in the region in the National Security Strategy and public statements. This report summarizes the contents of those briefings.
U.S. strategy in the Balkans and the Army s role there is examined. The author recommends continued U.S. involvement, consideration of a long-term American military presence in the region, and some significant changes in role of the U.S. Army. The goals that led the United States into the Balkans have not yet been fully met. To do so requires both sustained involvement in that region and a continued refinement at the Army s peace operations capabilities. From a broader perspective, he argues that, if U.S. political leaders decide that involvement in protracted peace operations will be an enduring part of American strategy, the Department of Defense should help form specialized joint and interagency peacekeeping organizations as an augmentation to the existing military. The Army should clearly play a leading role in this.
This book examines international efforts to provide security in post-conflict sites and explains why internal security should be given precedence in statebuilding endeavours. The work begins by exploring the evolution of security sectors in mature liberal democratic states, before examining the attempts of such states to accelerate that evolutionary process in post-conflict sites through statebuilding and security sector reform. These discussions suggest interestingly different answers to the question of who should provide for internal security in international operations. When considering mature states, there are both practical and normative reasons as to why internal security has become the sole domain of police, with military forces being excluded from internal affairs. In peace and stability operations, on the other hand, difficulties with utilising police personnel have led to military forces being required to play internal security roles. This tension is investigated further through detailed case studies of three recent missions: Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands. These case studies both reinforce and augment the practical and normative reasons for ensuring that internal security remains the domain of police. This then impacts upon peace and stability operations in two important ways. If we are to provide enduring security in post-conflict sites, we should both (i) prioritise internal security agencies in security sector reform efforts, and (ii) prioritise ways of enabling police to play internal security roles in the contributing mission. This book will be of much interest to students of statebuilding, peace and conflict studies, military studies, police studies, historical sociology, security studies and IR in general.
Borawski and Young provide a serious analysis of the major issues confronting European-North American relations. They draw detailed attention to the fundamental political and military issues before the Atlantic Alliance. They illustrate that NATO remains essential to Euro-Atlantic security. Only the Atlantic Alliance can bring to bear well-tested military capability under US leadership to promote its members security, interests, and democratic values. However, to remain vital, the Alliance must undertake a serious review of its major purposes: enlargement to the former Warsaw Pact nations, a strategic partnership with Russia, defense against weapons of mass destruction, and a more mature transatlantic relationship drawing on the lessons of the former Yugoslavia. This is an important assessment for policymakers, military planners, scholars, students, and others concerned with current European-American relations.
The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.