The conquest of Serbia was only one of the goals of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the First World War; beyond this lay the desire to control much of South-East Europe. Employing previously unseen sources, Marvin Fried provides the first complete analysis of the Monarchy's war aims in the Balkans and tells the story of its imperialist ambitions.
Despite renewed scholarly interest in war aims during the First World War, those of Austria-Hungary have so far been neglected. This thesis examines the efforts of the Monarchy's elite decision-makers to establish and achieve their war aims in the Balkans. It covers the decisive period of war aims formation (1914-1917) and focuses particularly on the leadership of Foreign Minister Istvan Burian (1915-1916) and the forces which affected his decision-making. The thesis demonstrates that Austria-Hungary's most vital political, economic, and military interests principally lay in the Balkans, where the Monarchy's war aims were most aggressive and expansionist. Despite facing enormous pressure for radicalization from the annexationist General Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf and the mostly non-annexationist Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Tisza, the Foreign Ministry retained overarching decision-making authority in the war aims question. This stands in stark contrast to Germany, where military influence became predominant. Burian pursued coherent and consistent war aims aimed at expanding Austro-Hungarian power, prestige, influence, and territory in the Balkans. By emphasizing Austria-Hungary's pre-eminence there, its leaders incurred serious German and Bulgarian opposition. Despite facing grave military setbacks and the risk of slipping into vassalage to Germany, until May 1917 the Monarchy's highest echelons refused to seriously entertain peace options until its Balkan war aims were met. Continued involvement in the First World War thus served a political purpose, and this thesis demonstrates that Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans were among the underlying factors prolonging the world conflagration. The work concludes by demonstrating a continuing Austro-Hungarian interest in Balkan expansion right up to the closing stages of the war. The thesis addresses one of the most significant gaps in the literature on Austria-Hungary. It does so by using formerly secret Austrian and Hungarian materials in Budapest, in addition to employing national and military archives in Austria, Hungary, Germany, the UK, and the United States.
Nearly fourteen million people died during the First World War. But why, and for what reason? Already many contemporaries saw the Great War as a "pointless carnage" (Pope Benedict XV, 1917). Was there a point, at least in the eyes of the political and military decision makers? How did they justify the losses, and why did they not try to end the war earlier? In this volume twelve international specialists analyses and compares the hopes and expectations of the political and military leaders of the main belligerent countries and of their respective societies. It shows that the war aims adopted during the First World War were not, for the most part, the cause of the conflict, but a reaction to it, an attempt to give the tragedy a purpose - even if the consequence was to oblige the belligerents to go on fighting until victory. The volume tries to explain why - and for what - the contemporaries thought that they had to fight the Great War.
Winner of the 2015 Norman B. Tomlinson, Jr. Book Prize Serbia and the Balkan Front, 1914 is the first history of the Great War to address in-depth the crucial events of 1914 as they played out on the Balkan Front. James Lyon demonstrates how blame for the war's outbreak can be placed squarely on Austria-Hungary's expansionist plans and internal political tensions, Serbian nationalism, South Slav aspirations, the unresolved Eastern Question, and a political assassination sponsored by renegade elements within Serbia's security services. In doing so, he portrays the background and events of the Sarajevo Assassination and the subsequent military campaigns and diplomacy on the Balkan Front during 1914. The book details the first battle of the First World War, the first Allied victory and the massive military humiliations Austria-Hungary suffered at the hands of tiny Serbia, while discussing the oversized strategic role Serbia played for the Allies during 1914. Lyon challenges existing historiography that contends the Habsburg Army was ill-prepared for war and shows that the Dual Monarchy was in fact superior in manpower and technology to the Serbian Army, thus laying blame on Austria-Hungary's military leadership rather than on its state of readiness. Based on archival sources from Belgrade, Sarajevo and Vienna and using never-before-seen material to discuss secret negotiations between Turkey and Belgrade to carve up Albania, Serbia's desertion epidemic, its near-surrender to Austria-Hungary in November 1914, and how Serbia became the first belligerent to openly proclaim its war aims, Serbia and the Balkan Front, 1914 enriches our understanding of the outbreak of the war and Serbia's role in modern Europe. It is of great importance to students and scholars of the history of the First World War as well as military, diplomatic and modern European history.
The origins of World War I were different and varied. But it was Austria-Hungary which unleashed the war. After more than four years the Habsburg Monarchy was defeated and ended as a failed state.
A major re-examination of Habsburg decision-making from 1912 to July 1914, the study argues that Austria-Hungary and not Germany made the crucial decisions for war in the summer of 1914. Based on extensive new archival research, the book traces the gradual militarization of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy during the Balkan Wars. The disasters of those wars and the death of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir-apparent and a force for peace in the monarchy, convinced the Habsburg elite that only a war against Serbia would end the South Slav threat to the monarchy's existence. Williamson also describes Russia's assertive foreign policy after 1912 and stresses the unique linkages of domestic and foreign policy in almost every issue faced by Habsburg statesmen.
The conquest of Serbia was only one of the goals of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the First World War; beyond this lay the desire to control much of South-East Europe. Employing previously unseen sources, Marvin Fried provides the first complete analysis of the Monarchy's war aims in the Balkans and tells the story of its imperialist ambitions.
