This United States Army manual, Army Regulation AR 600-20 Army Command Policy February 2021, prescribes the policies and responsibilities of command, which include the Army Ready and Resilient Campaign Plan, military discipline and conduct, the Army Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, the Army Harassment Prevention and Response Program, and the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program.
This manual, Army Doctrine Publication ADP 6-22 Army Leadership and the Profession Change 1 November 2019, establishes and describes the Army profession and the associated ethic that serve as the basis for a shared professional identity. It establishes and describes what leaders should be and do. Having a standard set of leader attributes and core leader competencies facilitates focused feedback, education, training, and development across all leadership levels. ADP 6-22 describes enduring concepts of leadership through the core competencies and attributes required of leaders of all cohorts and all organizations, regardless of mission or setting. These principles reflect decades of experience and validated scientific knowledge. An ideal Army leader serves as a role model through strong intellect, physical presence, professional competence, and moral character. An Army leader is able and willing to act decisively, within superior leaders' intent and purpose, and in the organization's best interests. Army leaders recognize that organizations, built on mutual trust and confidence, accomplish missions. Every member of the Army profession, military or civilian, is part of a team and functions in the role of leader and subordinate. Being a good subordinate is part of being an effective leader. Leaders do not just lead subordinates-they also lead other leaders. Leaders are not limited to just those designated by position, rank, or authority. Being and doing are ineffectual without knowledge. Knowing the what and how of soldiering, tactics, operational art, staff operations, functional and technical expertise, and many other areas are essential to leading well. ADP 6-22 cannot convey all of the specific knowledge areas to become an expert leader. All leaders accrue the knowledge and develop the expertise required to contribute to the support and execution of the Army's four strategic roles: shaping operational environments, preventing conflict, prevailing in largescale ground combat operations, and consolidating gains.Army Doctrine Publication ADP 6-22 Army Leadership and the Profession Change 1 November 2019 establishes and describes the Army Profession and the foundations of Army leadership, (outlines the echelons of leadership (direct, organizational, and strategic), and describes the attributes and core leader competencies expected of all leaders across all levels and cohorts. The principal audience for ADP 6-22 consists of all members of the Army profession, military and civilian. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication. The use of the term Army leaders refers to officers, noncommissioned officers, and select Department of the Army Civilians unless otherwise specified.
ADP 6-22 describes enduring concepts of leadership through the core competencies and attributes required of leaders of all cohorts and all organizations, regardless of mission or setting. These principles reflect decades of experience and validated scientific knowledge.An ideal Army leader serves as a role model through strong intellect, physical presence, professional competence, and moral character. An Army leader is able and willing to act decisively, within superior leaders' intent and purpose, and in the organization's best interests. Army leaders recognize that organizations, built on mutual trust and confidence, accomplish missions. Every member of the Army, military or civilian, is part of a team and functions in the role of leader and subordinate. Being a good subordinate is part of being an effective leader. Leaders do not just lead subordinates--they also lead other leaders. Leaders are not limited to just those designated by position, rank, or authority.
The U. S. Secretary of the Army appointed the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee(FHIRC or Committee) and directed it to "conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Fort Hoodcommand climate and culture, and its impact, if any, on the safety, welfare and readiness of ourSoldiers and units." In addressing this mandate, the FHIRC determined that during the time periodcovered by the Review, the command climate relative to the Sexual Harassment/Assault Responseand Prevention (SHARP) Program at Fort Hood was ineffective, to the extent that there was apermissive environment for sexual assault and sexual harassment.As set forth in this Report, specific Findings demonstrate that the implementation of theSHARP Program was ineffective. During the review period, no Commanding General or subordinateechelon commander chose to intervene proactively and mitigate known risks of high crime, sexualassault and sexual harassment. The result was a pervasive lack of confidence in the SHARP Programand an unacceptable lack of knowledge of core SHARP components regarding reporting and certainvictim services. Under a structurally weak and under-resourced III Corps SHARP Program, theSexual Assault Review Board (SARB) process was primarily utilized to address administrative and notthe actual substantive aspects of the Program. While a powerful tool by design, the SARB processbecame a missed opportunity to develop and implement proactive strategies to create a respectfulculture and prevent and reduce incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment. From the III Corpslevel and below, the SHARP Program was chronically under-resourced, due to understaffing, lack oftraining, lack of credentialed SHARP professionals, and lack of funding. Most of all, it lackedcommand emphasis where it was needed the most: the enlisted ranks.A resonant symptom of the SHARP Program's ineffective implementation was significantunderreporting of sexual harassment and sexual assault. Without intervention from the NCOs andofficers entrusted with their health and safety, victims feared the inevitable consequences of reporting: ostracism, shunning and shaming, harsh treatment, and indelible damage to their career. Many haveleft the Army or plan to do so at the earliest opportunity.As part of the command climate, the issues of crime and Criminal Investigation Division(CID) operations were examined. The Committee determined that serious crime issues on and offFort Hood were neither identified nor addressed. There was a conspicuous absence of an effectiverisk management approach to crime incident reduction and Soldier victimization. A militaryinstallation is essentially a large, gated community. The Commander of a military installation possessesa wide variety of options to proactively address and mitigate the spectrum of crime incidents. Despitehaving the capability, very few tools were employed at Fort Hood to do so. Both the Directorate ofEmergency Services (DES) and the CID have a mandate and a role to play in crime reduction.Each contributed very little analysis, feedback and general situational awareness to the command towardfacilitating and enabling such actions. This was another missed opportunity.The deficient climate also extended into the missing Soldier scenarios, where no onerecognized the slippage in accountability procedures and unwillingness or lack of ability of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to keep track of their subordinates. The absence of any formalprotocols for Soldiers who fail to report resulted in an ad hoc approach by units and Military Police(MP) to effectively address instances of missing Soldiers during the critical first 24 hours, again withadverse consequences.Consistent with the FHIRC Charter, this Report sets forth nine Findings and offers seventyRecommendations.
This United States Army manual, Army Regulation AR 670-1 Uniform and Insignia: Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia January 2021, prescribes Department of the Army policy for proper wear and appearance of Army uniforms and insignia, as worn by officers and enlisted personnel of the Regular Army, the U.S. Army Reserve, and former Soldiers. This regulation, AR 670-1, applies to the Regular Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. It also applies to Army Civilians and Veterans, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and the Corps of Cadets, U.S. Military Academy, only when their respective uniform regulations do not include sufficient guidance or instruction. It does not apply to the Chief of Staff of the Army, or former Chiefs of Staff of the Army, each of whom may prescribe their own uniform. Portions of this regulation are punitive. Violation of the specific prohibitions and requirements of specific portions by Soldiers may result in adverse administrative action and/or charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
This manual, Training Circular TC 7-22.7 The Noncommissioned Officer Guide January 2020, provides the Army's NCOs a guide for leading, supervising, and caring for Soldiers. While this guide is not all-inclusive, nor is it intended as a stand-alone document, it provides NCOs a quick and ready reference to refresh and develop leadership traits. It is a guide to develop an innovative, competent professional NCO. Training Circular TC 7-22.7 The Noncommissioned Officer Guide January 2020 provides critical information for the success of today's NCO and is intended for use by all the NCOs in the Active Army Component, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve Component.The contents of this guide will serve as a tool in the kit bag of every NCO, enabling them to understand the requirements, regulations, and methods required to train our Soldiers. As Noncommissioned Officers, you are charged with the care, training, education and readiness of every Soldier in the U.S. Army. Your ability to coach, train and mentor competent Soldiers of character is the key to the success of our force. The Nation, our Officers and our Soldiers have placed great trust and confidence in the NCO Corps, and deserve nothing less than competent, confident, and trusted professionals to remain the world's premier land fighting force.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), from its most-senior leaders to military operators in the field, has expressed a strong commitment to complying with the law of war and to mitigating civilian harm for legal, moral, and strategic reasons and for reasons related to mission-effectiveness. But above and beyond its law of war obligations, DoD implements policies and procedures at multiple levels to mitigate civilian harm during armed conflict. In this report, researchers from the RAND Corporation and the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) conduct an independent assessment of DoD standards, processes, procedures, and policies relating to civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations. In particular, the researchers examine DoD's efforts to assess, investigate, and respond to civilian harm, as well as DoD's resourcing and structure to address such issues. The researchers outline their findings and recommendations for how DoD can improve in these areas.
