The pre-Gaṅgeśa Navya-Nyāya treatise Upādhidarpaṇa (UD) deals with the upādhi, a key concept in the Navya-Nyāya theory of inference. This volume is the first published edition and translation of the only manuscript of the UD. Notes have been added to elucidate the historical context of the authors, works, and philosophical doctrines in the UD.
Simo Knuuttila was an influential philosopher, theologian, and historian of philosophy who conducted research on a variety of topics including modalities, emotions, perception, and change in different historical periods, from Ancient to Modern. His contribution to the study of modalities and emotions was groundbreaking and trendsetting with a lasting impact on the area. In this volume, a group of international scholars – all of whom worked directly with Knuuttila – elaborate on some of those topics, trying to understand the core interpretative ideas, the polemical aspects, and how to develop those interpretations in different authors and/or conceptual frameworks. The result is an unique volume that presents a broad range of perspectives on key topics in the history of philosophy in the last decades, both influenced and challenging the interpretations advocated by Knuuttila.
Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics introduces the reader to new perspectives on Indian philosophy based on philological research within the last twenty years. Concentrating on topics such as perception, inference, skepticism, consciousness, self, mind, and universals, some of the most notable scholars working in classical Indian philosophy today examine core epistemological and metaphysical issues. Philosophical theories and arguments from a comprehensive range of Indian philosophical traditions (including the Nyaya, Mimamsa, Saiva, Vedanta, Samkhya, Jain, Buddhist, materialist and skeptical traditions, as well as some 20th century thought) are covered. The contributors to this volume approach the topics from both a philosophical and a philological perspective. They demonstrate the importance of the subject matter for an understanding of Indian thought in general and they highlight its wider philosophical significance. By developing an appreciation of classical Indian philosophy in its own terms, set against the background of its unique assumptions and historical and cultural development, Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics is an invaluable guide to the current state of scholarship on Indian philosophy. It is a timely and much-needed reference resource, the first of its kind.
Relevant to philosophy, law, management, and artificial intelligence, these papers explore the applicability of nonmonotonic or defeasible logic to normative reasoning. The resulting systems purport to solve well-known deontic paradoxes and to provide a better treatment than classical deontic logic does of prima facie obligation, conditional obligation, and priorities of normative principles.
Defeasibility, most generally speaking, means that given some set of conditions A, something else B will hold, unless or until defeating conditions C apply. While the term was introduced into philosophy by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in 1949, today, the concept of defeasibility is employed in many different areas of philosophy. This volume for the first time brings together contributions on defeasibility from epistemology (Mikael Janvid, Klemens Kappel, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, Marcus Willaschek, Michael Williams), legal philosophy (Frederick Schauer) and ethics and the philosophy of action (Claudia Blöser, R. Jay Wallace, Michael Quante and Katarzyna Paprzycka). The volume ends with an extensive bibliography (by Michael de Araujo Kurth).
A new proposal for integrating the employment of formal and empirical methods in the study of human reasoning. In Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science, Keith Stenning and Michiel van Lambalgen—a cognitive scientist and a logician—argue for the indispensability of modern mathematical logic to the study of human reasoning. Logic and cognition were once closely connected, they write, but were “divorced” in the past century; the psychology of deduction went from being central to the cognitive revolution to being the subject of widespread skepticism about whether human reasoning really happens outside the academy. Stenning and van Lambalgen argue that logic and reasoning have been separated because of a series of unwarranted assumptions about logic. Stenning and van Lambalgen contend that psychology cannot ignore processes of interpretation in which people, wittingly or unwittingly, frame problems for subsequent reasoning. The authors employ a neurally implementable defeasible logic for modeling part of this framing process, and show how it can be used to guide the design of experiments and interpret results.
This book presents a novel interpretation of major problems of Indian ethics from an applied ethical perspective. It approaches prominent theories like Dharma, Karma and Purusarthas from a critical point of view, so as to render them logically consistent and free from some standard limitations. Ethical theories are meant to provide guidance for life, but quite often many of our celebrated theories appear to be inapplicable or difficult to apply in practical life. Indian ethical theories are of special significance to this problem because they have in them rich potentials of applicability as much as many of them typify inapplicable abstract theories of morals. The book incorporates a wealth of research on ethical theories, keeping in view the spirit of ethics and the demands of the situations; for a reasoned balance between the two is the key to applied ethics. The book argues that ethical theories are objective but defeasible in overriding circumstances where competing values deserve preference. Such justified exceptions are warranted by the very spirit of ethics, which is to promote the good life. The argument from defeasibility and justified violation in the book helps bridging the gap between ethics and its application and makes Indian theories of value appear in fresh light- workable, practically applicable and effective as incentives for morality. With uncommon virtue of contemporized presentation of Indian ethics, this book should be of interest to scholars and researchers working on Indian ethics and moral philosophy, as well as to those interested in Indian culture and value tradition.
You find yourself in a court of law, accused of having hit someone. What can you do to avoid conviction? You could simply deny the accusation: 'No, I didn't do it'. But suppose you did do it. You may then give a different answer. 'Yes, I hit him', you grant, 'but it was self-defence'; or 'Yes, but I was acting under duress'. To answer in this way-to offer a 'Yes, but. . .' reply-is to hold that your particular wrong was committed in exceptional circumstances. Perhaps it is true that, as a rule, wrongdoers ought to be convicted. But in your case the court should set the rule aside. You should be acquitted. Within limits, the law allows for exceptions. Or so we tend to think. In fact, the line between rules and exceptions is harder to draw than it seems. How are we to determine what counts as an exception and what as part of the relevant rule? The distinction has important practical implications. But legal theorists have found the notion of an exception surprisingly difficult to explain. This is the longstanding jurisprudential problem that this book seeks to solve. The book is divided into three parts. Part I, Defeasibility in Question, introduces the topic and articulates the core puzzle of defeasibility in law. Part II, Defeasibility in Theory, develops a comprehensive proof-based account of legal exceptions. Part III, Defeasibility in Action, looks more closely into the workings of exceptions in accusatory contexts, including the criminal trial.
