Begun in ignorance of the military reality, the War of 1812 was our "most unmilitary war," fought catch-as-catch-can with raw troops, incompetent officers, and appallingly inadequate logistics. American soil was invaded along three frontiers, thte nation's capital was occupied and burned, and the secession of the New England states loomed as a possibility. In Amateurs, to Arms! distinguished military historian Colonel John R. Elting shows how the young republic fought and almost lost its "Second War for Independence," and how it was saved by the handful of amateur soldiers and sailors who survived, masters their deadly new professions, and somehow battled Great Britain to a standstill along our wilderness borders and on the high seas.
Thorough examination of the antebellum fortifications that formed the backbone of U.S. military defense during the National Period The system of coastal defenses built by the federal government after the War of 1812 was more than a series of forts standing guard over a watery frontier. It was an integrated and comprehensive plan of national defense developed by the US Army Corps of Engineers, and it represented the nation’s first peacetime defense policy. Known as the Third System since it replaced two earlier attempts, it included coastal fortifications but also denoted the values of the society that created it. The governing defense policy was one that combined permanent fortifications to defend seaports, a national militia system, and a small regular army. The Third System remained the defense paradigm in the United States from 1816 to 1861, when the onset of the Civil War changed the standard. In addition to providing the country with military security, the system also provided the context for the ongoing discussion in Congress over national defense through annual congressional debates on military funding.
Begun in ignorance of the military facts of life, fought with raw troops, mostly incompetent officers, and inadequate logistics, the War of 1812 was a near disaster for the fledgling United States. This new volune in Algonquin's Major Battles and Campaigns series tells how our country's most unmilitary war was fought and almost lost. 12 pages of illustrations. 16 maps.
Jacob Jennings Brown was one of the most successful generals of his era, and his military reforms were still in operation in the 20th century. This text presents a study of his career, focusing on his involvement in the creation of a professional army and the establishment of a command structure.
Chronicles the naval history of the War of 1812 and the birth of the United States Navy, when a small American force stunningly defeated the powerful British Navy in a series of battles.
In 1812, less than forty years after breaking from Britain, the United States found itself in another war with its former colonial master. Now, during the two hundredth anniversary of the War of 1812 comes Neither Victor nor Vanquished, William WeberÆs reappraisal of this critical but frequently misunderstood conflict.
When the leaders of the French Revolution executed Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette in 1793, they sent a chilling message to the hereditary ruling orders in Europe. Believing that monarchy anywhere presented a threat to democratic rule in France, the leaders of the revolution declared war on European aristocracies, including those of Great Britain. For more than twenty years thereafter, France and England waged a protracted war that ended in British victory. In Titan, William R. Nester offers a deeply informed and thoroughly fascinating narrative of how England accomplished this remarkable feat. Between 1789 and 1815, British leaders devised, funded, and led seven coalitions against the revolutionary and Napoleonic governments of France. In each enterprise, statesmen and generals searched for order amid a complex welter of bureaucratic, political, economic, psychological, technological, and international forces. Nester combines biographies of great men—the likes of William Pitt, Horatio Nelson, and Arthur Wellesley—with an explanation of the critical decisions they made in Britain’s struggle for power and his own keen analysis of the forces that operated beyond their control. Their efforts would eventually crush France and Napoleon and establish a system of European power relations that prevented a world war for nearly a century. The interplay of individuals and events, the importance of conjunctures and contingency, the significance of Britain's island character and resources: all come into play in Nester's exploration of the art of British military diplomacy. The result is a comprehensive and insightful account of the endeavors of statesmen and generals to master the art of power in a complex battle for empire.
The death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC threw the Macedonians into confusion; there was no capable heir, and no clear successor among the senior figures in Alexander's circle. Initial attempts to preserve the unity of Alexander's conquests gave way to a period of bloody and prolonged warfare. For well over a century the largely mercenary armies of Alexander's successors imposed their influence over the whole of the Near East, while absorbing local military practices. After Rome's decisive defeat of Carthage in 202 BC, Macedonia came under increasing pressure from the Romans. Three wars between the two powers culminated in the Roman victory at Pydna in 168 BC, which laid Alexander's empire to rest and established Roman hegemony in the Near East. Drawing upon a wide array of archaeological and written sources and written by a noted authority on the Hellenistic period, this survey of the organization, battle history and appearance of the armies of Alexander's successors is lavishly illustrated with specially commissioned full-colour artwork.
The first study to explore all Britain’s key land and sea campaigns from 179–1815 and the two military geniuses who vanquished France. The art of power consists of getting what one wants. That is never more challenging than when a nation is at war. Britain fought a nearly nonstop war against first revolutionary then Napoleonic France from 1793 to 1815. During those twenty-two years, the government formed, financed, and led seven coalitions against France. The French inflicted humiliating defeats on the first five. Eventually Britain and its allies prevailed, not once but twice, by vanquishing Napoleon temporarily in 1814 and definitively in 1815. French revolutionaries had created a new form of warfare, which Napoleon perfected. Never before had a government mobilized so much of a realm’s manpower, industry, finance, and patriotism, nor, under Napoleon, wielded it more effectively and ruthlessly to pulverize and conquer one’s enemies. Britain struggled up a blood-soaked learning curve to master this new form of warfare. With time the British made the most of their natural strategic and economic advantages. Britons were relatively secure and prosperous in their island realm. British merchants, manufacturers, and financiers dominated global markets. The Royal Navy not only ruled the waves that lapped against the nation’s shores but those plowed by international commerce around the world. Yet even with those assets victory was not inevitable. Two military geniuses are the most vital reasons why Britain and its allies vanquished France when and how they did. General Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington and Admiral Horatio Nelson respectively mastered warfare on land and at sea. Of the hundreds of books on the era, none before has explored all of Britain’s land and sea campaigns from the first in 1793 to the last in 1815. This vividly written, meticulously researched book lets readers experience each level of war from the debates over grand strategy in London to the horrors of combat engulfing soldiers and sailors in distant lands and seas. Haunting voices of participants echo from two centuries ago, culled from speeches, diaries, and letters. Britain's Rise to Global Superpower in the Age of Napoleon reveals how decisively or disastrously the British army and navy wielded the art of military power during the Age of Revolution and Napoleon.
