During World War II the uniformed heads of the U.S. armed services assumed a pivotal and unprecedented role in the formulation of the nation's foreign policies. Organized soon after Pearl Harbor as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these individuals were officially responsible only for the nation's military forces. During the war their functions came to encompass a host of foreign policy concerns, however, and so powerful did the military voice become on those issues that only the president exercised a more decisive role in their outcome. Drawing on sources that include the unpublished records of the Joint Chiefs as well as the War, Navy, and State Departments, Mark Stoler analyzes the wartime rise of military influence in U.S. foreign policy. He focuses on the evolution of and debates over U.S. and Allied global strategy. In the process, he examines military fears regarding America's major allies--Great Britain and the Soviet Union--and how those fears affected President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, interservice and civil-military relations, military-academic relations, and postwar national security policy as well as wartime strategy.
In 1920 Lenin called on the Communist International to open a second front against the imperialist powers by fighting alongside nationalist and peasant movements in the colonies. Eighteen months later, leaders of fledgling East Asian communist parties and other revolutionaries gathered in Moscow to plan the way forward. The Congress of the Toilers of the Far East profoundly influenced the strategy of Communist Parties throughout the colonial world. But alliances with other parties were fragile and risky. East Asian Communist Parties suffered serious defeats in the years following the Congress until WWII revived their fortunes. This edited and annotated edition of the Congress minutes will be of interest to scholars and general readers alike.
This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States. Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare.
Military alliances drive international politics. They embody conflict and cooperation among states and shape the international political landscape. Despite the profound effect alliances have on the course of international politics, many gaps remain in our understanding of their formation, continuance, and cohesion. In this book, Patricia Weitsman introduces a comprehensive theory that unifies current ideas about alliances and examines the relationship between threat and alliance politics under conditions of both war and peace. Examining military alliances before and during World War I, Weitsman provides a new interpretation of the politics of the great powers of this period. She reveals that states frequently form alliances to keep peace among the allied countries, not simply to counter shared external threats. Though alliances may be perceived by others to present a unified and threatening front, countries often face significant threats from within their own alliances. It is this paradox that underscores Weitsman's theory: although alliances are frequently forged to sustain peace, they may, in fact, increase the prospects of war.
Allied nations often stop each other from going to war. Some countries even form alliances with the specific intent of restraining another power and thereby preventing war. Furthermore, restraint often becomes an issue in existing alliances as one ally wants to start a war, launch a military intervention, or pursue some other risky military policy while the other ally balks. In Warring Friends, Jeremy Pressman draws on and critiques realist, normative, and institutionalist understandings of how alliance decisions are made. Alliance restraint often has a role to play both in the genesis of alliances and in their continuation. As this book demonstrates, an external power can apply the brakes to an incipient conflict, and even unheeded advice can aid in clarifying national goals. The power differentials between allies in these partnerships are influenced by leadership unity, deception, policy substitutes, and national security priorities. Recent controversy over the complicated relationship between the U.S. and Israeli governments—especially in regard to military and security concerns—is a reminder that the alliance has never been easy or straightforward. Pressman highlights multiple episodes during which the United States attempted to restrain Israel's military policies: Israeli nuclear proliferation during the Kennedy Administration; the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; preventing an Israeli preemptive attack in 1973; a small Israeli operation in Lebanon in 1977; the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; and Israeli action during the Gulf War of 1991. As Pressman shows, U.S. initiatives were successful only in 1973, 1977, and 1991, and tensions have flared up again recently as a result of Israeli arms sales to China. Pressman also illuminates aspects of the Anglo-American special relationship as revealed in several cases: British nonintervention in Iran in 1951; U.S. nonintervention in Indochina in 1954; U.S. commitments to Taiwan that Britain opposed, 1954-1955; and British intervention and then withdrawal during the Suez War of 1956. These historical examples go far to explain the context within which the Blair administration failed to prevent the U.S. government from pursuing war in Iraq at a time of unprecedented American power.
Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, this title explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent.
“Some historians are great because they write great books, others because they write books that need to be written. Mark A. Stoler... has done both. Allies in War offers an accessible and gracefully written synthesis of the wealth of new and important scholarship... addressing American and British grand strategy during World War II. Allies in War presents a global overview of Anglo-American cooperation against the Axis powers with a chronological account of the major diplomatic and military events. It begins with a brief summary of World War I and the interwar years, continues through the capitulation of Japan in September 1945, and concludes with a short discussion of the origins of the Cold War... Stoler’s story also covers the world war like a world war... Each chapter covers major developments in every theater... [Stoler] makes particular effort to recognize the critical role of the Soviet Union in winning World War II and its impact on Anglo-American strategy. Allies in War is a versatile work with a lot of uses. Both students and professionals will find rewards. This volume will be an excellent tool for teaching survey and elective history courses. It will also aid in understanding the dynamics that attend coalition warfare.” — The Journal of American History “[A] decided tour de force... Stoler provides an excellent and readable overview on a global scale of the interrelated wartime military, strategic, and diplomatic decisions and contributions of the United States and Great Britain... Stoler’s forte is elegantly concise syntheses of massive outpourings of scholarship in both military and diplomatic history and judicious, balanced, and stimulating assessments of often controversial issues... Lucid, balanced, nuanced, and acute, giving equal space to the wars in both Europe and Asia, Stoler’s interpretive overview is a valuable and welcome addition to its field.” — The Journal of Military History “This is the work of a mature historian, comfortably in command of his material, using his considerable experience to construct a tightly controlled narrative that carries the reader forward with little effort on his or her part; a sure sign of considerable effort on the part of the writer... Stoler’s book is much more than the synthesis it might appear to be... It is a masterly summary of existing scholarship, but one enriched by his own knowledge of the archival and secondary material... this book shines when it comes to grand strategy; the reader wanting a potted (and accurate) evolution of Anglo-American grand strategy will find all he or she will need here.” — The International History Review “Mark Stoler... is supremely well qualified to undertake this volume... Previous studies of Anglo-American relations during the Second World War tend to focus on either the war in Europe or the war in the Pacific. The originality of Stoler’s approach is that he wants to cover both. He seeks as well to incorporate the results of relatively recent publications on the Second World War... The results are impressive... Stoler’s writing is a major strength of this book... Stoler provides admirable surveys of the major historical controversies of the Anglo-American war against the Axis powers, such as the efficacy of the Allied strategic bombing campaign, the utility of the Italian campaign, and the continuing debate over the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Anyone who teaches courses on the history of the Second World War will find this volume a valuable resource.” — The Journal of Modern History “Allies in War is... a solid survey of the war... [an] effective synthesis of the most troublesome aspects of the special [Britain-US] relationship.” — Naval History Magazine “An important new study by one of the leading scholars in the field.” — David Reynolds, University of Cambridge
Glenn H. Snyder creates a theory of alliances by deductive reasoning about the international system, by integrating ideas from neorealism, coalition formation, bargaining, and game theory, and by empirical generalization from international history. Using cases from 1879 to 1914 to present a theory of alliance formation and management in a multipolar international system, he focuses particularly on three cases--Austria-Germany, Austria-Germany-Russia, and France-Russia--and examines twenty-two episodes of intra-alliance bargaining. Snyder develops the concept of the alliance security dilemma as a vehicle for examining influence relations between allies. He draws parallels between alliance and adversary bargaining and shows how the two intersect. He assesses the role of alliance norms and the interplay of concerts and alliances.His great achievement in Alliance Politics is to have crafted definitive scholarly insights in a way that is useful and interesting not only to the specialist in security affairs but also to any reasonably informed person trying to understand world affairs.
Timothy W. Crawford's The Power to Divide examines the use of wedge strategies, a form of divisive statecraft designed to isolate adversaries from allies and potential supporters to gain key advantages. With a multidimensional argument about the power of accommodation in competition, and a survey of alliance diplomacy around both World Wars, The Power to Divide artfully analyzes the past and future performance of wedge strategy in great power politics. Crawford argues that nations attempting to use wedge strategy do best when they credibly accommodate likely or established allies of their enemies. He also argues that a divider's own alliances can pose obstacles to success and explains the conditions that help dividers overcome them. He advances these claims in eight focused studies of alliance diplomacy surrounding the World Wars, derived from published official documents and secondary histories. Through those narratives, Crawford adeptly assesses the record of countries that tried an accommodative wedge strategy, and why ultimately, they succeeded or failed. These calculated actions often became turning points, desired or not, in a nation's established power. For policymakers today facing threats to power from great power competitors, Crawford argues that a deeper historical and theoretical grasp of the role of these wedge strategies in alliance politics and grand strategy is necessary. Crawford drives home the contemporary relevance of the analysis with a survey of China's potential to use such strategies to divide India from the US, and the United States' potential to use them to forestall a China-Russia alliance, and closes with a review of key theoretical insights for policy.
