Contents: (1) Recent Legislative Action; (2) Intro.: Where the Congressional Debate Will Likely Focus; Evolution and Purpose of Legislation; ROZs as a Trade Preference Program; Economic, Trade and Investment Context for Legislation; (3) Major Elements of H.R. 1318 and S. 496: Permissible Locations for ROZs; Articles Eligible for Duty-Free Treatment under the ROZ Program and Rules of Origin; Tech. Assistance, Compliance Assessment, and Remediation Program; Responsibilities of Labor Officials; Presidential Responsibilities; Limitations on Providing Duty-Free Treatment; Termination of Benefits; (4) Potential Issues: Tariff Line Issues; Issues Related to Geographic Areas Permitted for ROZ Location; Labor-Related Issues; (5) Outlook. Illustrations.
Volume 117 of Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Conflict in Afghanistan includes recent documents relating to the conflict in Afghanistan against the Taliban and its foreign allies, including al Qaeda. Afghanistan remains a central front in the conflict against Al Qaeda and continues to plague analysts and military strategists alike. This collection of documents portrays a reoccurring theme: the integration of political and military strategies to better combat U.S. efforts in the region.
Volume 116 of Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Assessing President Obama's National Security Strategy extends the previous volumes on the Administration's national security policy by highlighting its specific strategies. The volume begins with an assessment of the recently published Obama National Security Strategy. It also includes other strategy documents, official statements, and budget documents to allow readers to compare and contrast this Administration's approach to its predecessor.
U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilise Afghanistan are mixed and subject to debate; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, particularly the U.S.-led eastern sector of Afghanistan. However, a November 2007 Bush Administration review of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan reportedly concluded that overall progress was inadequate. This mirrors recent outside studies that contain relatively pessimistic assessments, emphasising a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, and increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, as well as increasing divisions within the NATO alliance about the relative share of combat among the nations contributing to the peacekeeping mission. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan as failing -- either through lack of attention or eliberatestrategy -- to prevent Taliban commanders from operating from Pakistan. To try to gain momentum against the insurgency, the United States is considering new initiatives including adding U.S. troops to the still combat-intense south, possibly assuming U.S. command of the southern sector, and increasing direct U.S. action against Taliban concentrations inside Pakistan. Politically, the Afghan government remains reasonably stable. The post-Taliban transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005; a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to debate and peacefully resolve differences, as well as a centre of political pressure on President Hamid Karzai. Major regional strongmen have been marginalised. Afghan citizens are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban, and women are participating in economic and political life. Presidential elections are to be held in the fall of 2009, with parliamentary and provincial elections to follow one year later. To help stabilise Afghanistan, the United States and partner countries are deploying a 47,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, including the restive south. Of those, 19,000 of the 31,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF. The U.S. and partner forces also run regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan National Army and National Police. The United States has given Afghanistan over $23 billion (appropriated, including FY2008 to date) since the fall of the Taliban, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces.
The book discusses invasive-species problems in agriculture, forests and aquatic ecosystems, highlighting the invasive mechanisms and management of the selected invasive species. Biological invasion has become a serious global ecological and economic problem that deserves particular attention from both government officials and scientists. This volume focuses on three key scientific areas: 1) population establishment and spreading mechanisms of the selected invasive species; 2) ecology adaptation, population growth, expansion and evolution of invasive species; and 3) impact of bio-invasion on the ecosystem structure and function at community and ecosystem levels. The presented research will result in techniques for better management of invasive species.
In the context of a review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan during September-November 2009, the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government figured prominently. In his December 1, 2009, speech announcing a way forward in Afghanistan, President Obama stated that the Afghan government would be judged on performance, and "The days of providing a blank check are over." The policy statement was based, in part, on an assessment of the security situation furnished by the top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, which warned of potential mission failure unless a fully resourced classic counterinsurgency strategy is employed. That counterinsurgency effort is deemed to require a legitimate Afghan partner. The Afghan government's limited writ and widespread official corruption are believed by U.S. officials to be helping sustain a Taliban insurgency and complicating international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. At the same time, President Hamid Karzai has, through compromise with faction leaders, been able to confine ethnic disputes to political competition, enabling his government to focus on trying to win over those members of the ethnic Pashtun community that support Taliban and other insurgents.
